Persistent persecution

threat

Persistent persecution

Ahmadi community in Faisalabad keeps carrying the tag of ‘liable to be killed’ with no security

By Aoun Sahi

September 18, 2010

Naseem Ahmad Butt, 55, father of four daughters and a son and a follower of Ahmadi school of thought, was sleeping in the courtyard of his house in Muzaffar Colony in Faisalabad on the night of September 4, 2011 when four unidentified attackers broke into his house and attacked him. He received one bullet in his chest while the second one ruptured his kidney.

The firing woke up his wife whose cries forced the attackers to flee. “My brother was lying in a pool of blood when I saw him. He told me that the attackers were between 20 and 25 years old. One of them kicked him and when he woke up, they shot him. He died in a local hospital seven hours after the attack,” Khalid Pervez Butt, younger brother of Naseem Butt, tells TNS.

Naseem used to work as a technician in a local powerloom and had no enmity. “The attackers did not steal anything from his house. Being Ahmadi seems to be his only ‘sin’ that made him liable to be killed,” says Khalid Butt. His first cousin Naseer Butt was also killed in a similar fashion on September 8, 2010. “Police has made no effort to trace his killers. However, in a hope of assistance, I have got a case registered with police under section 302 of Pakistan Penal Code,” he tells TNS, adding that it is the fourth murder in his family.

“In 1994, one of my younger brothers and one of my first cousins (younger brother of Naseer Butt) were killed by religious fanatics. Police had arrested the assailants. Local activists of religious parties held protest rallies against the arrests of culprits and one of the assailants had been released just a few months back,” he says.

Three days after this incident on September 7, 2011, another Ahmadi, Chaudhry Basheer Ahmad, was attacked in Rachna Town in Sheikhupura district. He received three bullets and is still in hospital in a critical condition.

September has always been a tough month for Ahmadis in Pakistan as on September 7, 1974, the Parliament of Pakistan declared them non-Muslims. Almost all religious parties hold rallies and gatherings in the first week of September every year against Ahmadis. Majlis-e Tahffuz-e Khatm-e Nubuwwat takes the lead and arranges an annual gathering to celebrate victory against Ahmadis every year in Rabwah — the Jama’at Ahmadiya’s headquarters in Pakistan.

“Faisalabad has become one of the toughest cities in Pakistan for Ahmadis to live in,” Syed Mahmood Ahmad, secretary of the Faisalabad chapter of Jama’at Ahmadiya, tells TNS. “Naseem Butt was neither an active member of our Jama’at nor was an influential person. He was killed only because of his religious beliefs. Within days after his killing, unidentified people have written slogans like ‘slaves of the companions of Prophet (PBUH) and ‘down with Qadyaniat’ on the walls of Muzaffar Colony.

In May this year, a pamphlet terming Ahmadis ‘liable to be killed’ was distributed in Faisalabad. “It also carried names and addresses of prominent Ahmadis in Faisalabad. We have time and again contacted the Faisalabad police that a group of fanatics is threatening Ahmadis in the area. But no action has ever been taken,” says Ahmad. “On June 2, 2011, I sent an email to the home secretary and the police chief of Punjab as well as Faisalabad’s regional police officer, but nothing has been done to help us.”

Over the past two years, as many as six Ahmadis have been killed in Faisalabad, but no killer has been brought to book. “Religious fanatics are being encouraged by a lack of action on the part of the government agencies. It has even become too tough for Ahmadi youth to get education in public sector universities. A few months back, four girls belonging to our community were expelled from National Textile University. The 2010 annual magazine of that university carried three articles against Ahmadis,” says Mahmood Ahmad.

Police officials in Faisalabad do not seem to have taken the issue seriously. “We have no resources to provide special security for Ahmadis,” Shakir Hussain Dawar, senior police official in Faisalabad, tells TNS. “As far as Naseem Butt’s murder is concerned, we are investigating it from all angles. We have not ruled out the possibility of religious factor,” he says.

Saleemuddin, the Jama’at spokesperson, says that Ahmadis are being threatened all across the country, adding that Faisalabad has become the most hostile city towards the Ahmadis. “Most hate material is being generated and funded there. Eleven Ahmadis have been killed in Faisalabad since 1984.” In May last year, more than 88 people were killed in Lahore when gunmen opened fire at two separate places of worship of Ahmadis. “One year has passed, but no progress has been made in the case.”

Human rights activists have termed the situation deplorable. They are worried about the situation and have been writing constantly to the government about the security of Ahmadis. “Faisalabad has become a test case for the government to check the persecution of Ahmadis. The opponents of Ahmadis have even published their addresses and phone numbers on the pamphlets distributed in Faisalabad around three months back. No action has been taken against the culprits. It seems that the persecution will continue,” says HRCP Director IA Rehman.

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/.../dia.htm#4

Morden man fears for brother named on Ahmadiyya Muslim murder list in Pakistan

News

Morden man fears for brother named on Ahmadiyya Muslim murder list in Pakistan

12:25pm Friday 5th August 2011

By Omar Oakes »

Fears: Chaudhary Nawaz shows a list of names of people, including his brother, who are “liable to be murdered” in Pakistan

The brother of a Pakistani man whose name was published on a religious murder list by Muslim fanatics has said he is distraught with worry.

Chaudhary Nawaz, from Hillcross Avenue in Morden, said his brother Dr Muhammad Nawaz, a technology college academic in Pakistan, had gone into hiding for fear of being murdered for being an Ahmadi Muslim.

Ahmadi Muslims are not considered Islamic in Pakistan under the Government’s strict blasphemy laws and this list of prominent Ahmadis is being widely distributed in Faisalabad, a textile hub in the Punjab province.

The list is published on a pamphlet given out widely in shopping areas and claims: “To shoot such people is an act of jihad [struggle of faith] and to kill such people is an act of sawab [reward].”

Mr Nawaz, 48, said: “I can’t tell you how worried I am. Sometimes I try not to think about it because I am so frightened about what could happen.

“My brother is a good man, an educator. He doesn’t deserve to be targeted like this.

“I feel helpless because he is thousands of miles away and I can’t help him.”

Mr Nawaz, a senior member of the Morden district of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association, said his brother cannot leave Faisalabad because he has to care for their mother, an 82-year-old Alzheimer’s sufferer.

A similar list of Ahmadis was published two years ago in Faisalabad. Three people on that list were murdered by militants in a crowded market bazaar in April 2010.

Nearly two months later, 94 Ahmadis were murdered in mosques in Lahore.

Last October, the Wimbledon Guardian revealed how religious hatred by hardline Muslims towards Ahmadis was being demonstrated on a much smaller scale in south London, which is home to their UK headquarters, the massive Bait-ul-Futuh mosque in London Road, Morden.

Our investigation revealed Sheikh Suliman Gani, imam at the Tooting Islamic Centre (TIC), had told worshippers to boycott Ahmadi businesses, leading to financial hardship for shop owners and the sacking of a worker who would not renounce his religion.

The Khatme Nabuwwat Academy, an East London-based religious group affiliated to the Pakistan-based Khatme Nabuwwat, was invited to talk at the TIC last year.

The Khatme Nabuwwat’s Pakistani-based website describes Ahmadis as “nothing but a gang of traitors, apostates and infidels”.

Copyright 2001-2010 Wimbledon Guardian, UK. All rights reserved.
URL: www.wimbledonguardian.co.uk/news/9180679.Man_fears.../

Writing on the pamphlet

minorities

Writing on the pamphlet

Dreaded messages have reappeared in Faisalabad to haunt the threatened Ahmadi community

By Aoun Sahi

June 19, 2010

Two brothers, Sheikh Ashraf Parvez and Sheikh Masood Jawed, owners of Murad Cloth House and Murad Jewellers, in Faisalabad’s Rail Bazaar, refused to leave the country after a mob destroyed their shops back in 1974 during the anti-Ahmadi riots. Luckily, in only a few months, they were able to establish their businesses again and, in the coming years, Sheikh Ashraf Parvez became the senior vice-president of Rail Bazaar traders’ association.

Things were going well until early 2010 when a pamphlet was distributed in Faisalabad condemning the Ahmadi community and exhorting the Muslims in the city to boycott the traders and businesses owned by the Ahmadis. Distributors of the pamphlet listed some shops and businesses owned by people belonging to the Ahmadi community. The names of Murad Cloth House and Murad Jewellers featured at number three on the list.

A couple of months later, on April 1, 2010, Sheikh Ashraf, Sheikh Masood and his son Sheikh Asif Masood were killed by ‘unknown people’ on the road at around 10 in the night when they were returning to their homes from their shops. A case was registered. However, no suspect has been arrested so far. “They were killed only because of their faith,” says Sheikh Ashraf’s son, requesting not to be named, who sits at the shop. His worries are not over yet.

Two weeks back, another pamphlet was distributed in Faisalabad that labelled members of the Ahmadi community as “Wajibul Qatl” (liable to be persecuted), and inciting people to publicly attack followers of the faith. “Their punishment is death. Killing these people amounts to jihad,” read the leaflet. The pamphlet contained names and addresses of Ahmadi traders, industrialists and doctors. This time, Murad Cloth House was on top of the list.

“I don’t know how to react; our lives have been disturbed, our sanity badly affected,” says the 28-year-old son of the slain Sheikh Ashraf. “We are very vulnerable. I cannot concentrate on my business. I suspect every customer is a potential attacker!”

“I don’t expect justice,” he goes on.

Talking to TNS, another person on the ‘hit list’ relates how he was forced to move somewhere else after last year’s pamphlet was circulated. “It seems we are being watched all the time. They seem to know everything about us which is obvious from the way they’ve given the latest addresses of our homes and businesses,” he says. “We feel like petty outcasts.”

According to him, as a matter of routine, the situation becomes tense every year in April-May when the annual event of ‘Khatm-e-Nabuwat’ is held in the city. “Every speaker condemns and abuses the Ahmadis. We have put up our complaints before the administration, to no avail.”

He laments the fact that things have gotten to a point where introducing oneself as Ahmadi means inviting trouble and public isolation.

So far, no security has been provided even to those who were mentioned in the pamphlet. On June 2, 2011, Mahmood Ahmad, Jamaat’s secretary in Faisalabad, sent an email to the home secretary and the police chief of Punjab as well as Faisalabad’s regional police officer, but nothing has been done to help the matter.

“Our mouths have been shut, our hands are tied. I am writing this in the hope that somewhere, somehow this letter finds its way to a compassionate and patriotic police official who shall dare to stand up for us, for the sake of Pakistan,” reads the email.

“Distribution of pamphlets against Ahmadis in Faisalabad is a regular practice,” Mahmood Ahmad tells TNS, adding that whereas the tone of these papers was “mild” in the past, their lives were jeopardised.

“Last year, the pamphlet had only asked the ‘Muslims’ to band together against the businesses owned by the Ahmadis which resulted in the persecution of at least five people belonging to our community, apart from instances of dacoity, kidnapping for ransom and expulsion of some of our students in mainstream educational institutions.”

Mahmood fears more violence if proper steps are not taken by the government. He also blames the Punjab government for ignoring the myriad protests lodged by the Ahmadi community in the province. “Religious fanatics are being encouraged by a lack of action on the part of the government agencies,” he says.

Police officials in Faisalabad do not seem to have taken the issue seriously so far. “I have deputed one person from the department to arrest the people whose cell numbers are mentioned on the pamphlet,” says Asmatullah Junenio, Superintendent of Police (SP), Faisalabad, talking to TNS.

He claims that the security of the Ahmadi community has been beefed up. “The number of police officials deputed to safeguard our worship places has been increased.”

Munir Ahmed, whose cell number is given on the pamphlet and who admits to be working for an organisation on the finality of Prophethood, informs TNS that he is in Lahore these days. “I have nothing to do with this [pamphlet] and I firmly believe they [the Ahmadis] are lying. The law should take its due course to punish them and the blasphemers.”

According to Saleemuddin, the Jamaat spokesperson, Ahmadis are being threatened all across the country. “Anti-Ahmadi wall-chalkings, pamphlets and stickers are a common phenomenon these days,” he says, adding that Faisalabad has become the most hostile towards the Ahmadis. “Most hate material is being generated or funded there.”

Legal experts believe inciting people to kill others is a serious crime as per the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). “According to the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, inciting somebody to kill others falls under the definition of terrorism. 153A, 505 and 506 sections of PPC also address such crime,” says Asad Jamal, advocate High Court.

Jamal, who has been working on human rights issues since long, believes that the police is bound to act against such activities.

Human Rights activists also believe there is no political will to protect the minorities, especially the Ahmadis. “They are indeed the most vulnerable group in Pakistan. Printing and distribution of hate material against them is a grave concern for us. We have already brought such activities by religious fundamentalists into the notice of the authorities, but no action has been taken against the culprits so far,” contends Zohra Yousuf, Chairperson, HRCP.

“Many members of this community have already migrated to other countries. The government will have to assert itself strongly to protect the community.”

aounsahi@gmail.com

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2011-weekly/nos-19-06-2011/dia.htm#4

Pakistan’s future is tied to rights for minorities

Commentary: Analysis

Pakistan’s future is tied to rights for minorities

Monday, June 13, 2011

By David Alton

In 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave a speech to the New Delhi Press Club, setting out the basis on which the new State of Pakistan was to be founded. In it, he forcefully defended the right of minorities to be protected and to have their beliefs respected:

“Minorities, to whichever community they may belong, will be safeguarded. Their religion, faith or belief will be secure. There will be no interference of any kind with their freedom of worship. They will have their protection with regard to their religion, faith, their life and their culture. They will be, in all respects, the citizens of Pakistan without any distinction of caste and creed.”

These words are a forgotten aspiration in today’s Pakistan where minorities, ranging from Ahmadis to Sikhs, from Christians to Hindus, Buddhists and Zoroastrians, face relentless violence and profound discrimination.

It is estimated that, of a population of over 172 million people, at least 4% of the population come from the minorities: in 2011 the Pakistan Hindu Council put the number of Hindus alone at 5.5% - some 7 million people, while there are almost 3 million Christians, and Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya community is 4 million strong. All of these minorities have suffered grievously, along with those caught up in the sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims.

Jinnah rightly declared that the Government of Pakistan has a duty to protect all of its citizens, regardless of their beliefs or origins. The international community ought to be asking how the State today honours that pledge.

Take the Ahmadis. One year ago, in two separate attacks in Lahore, 98 Ahmadis were murdered and many more injured while they were at Friday prayers. The vicious brutality of these attacks is magnified when considering the Ahmadis’ belief: “love for all and hatred for none.”

Sadly, too few share the same passion for tolerance. While the Ahmadis consider themselves Muslim and follow all Islamic rituals, in 1974 the State declared them to be non-Muslim and, in 1984, they were legally barred from proselytising or identifying themselves as Muslims. Ali Dayan Hassan of Human Rights Watch believes that Ahmadis had thus become “easy targets” for militant Sunni groups who behave with impunity believing they have the full authority of the State in declaring Ahmadis to be infidels. Despite repeated attacks on the Ahmadis no prosecution of perpetrators has occurred in the past 15 years.

And the situation is set to get worse. Earlier this month, on June 11th, The Asian Human Rights Commission issued a statement that “extremists openly plan to kill hundreds of Ahmadis while the government turns a blind eye.”

Last year Terrorism Monitor warned that:

“As the Pakistani Taliban are trying to spread their war on the Pakistani State, they are likely to continue to target minorities like the Ahmadis in their efforts to create instability.”

On March 29th of this year that threat was brutally and graphically underlined by the murder of Pakistan’s Minister for Minority Affairs, Mr.Shahbaz Bhatti. An advocate of reform of the country’s Blasphemy Law - the cause of many bogus prosecutions against non Muslims - he was gunned down by self described Taliban assassins as he left his Islamabad home. His murderers scattered pamphlets describing him as a “Christian infidel”. The leaflets were signed Taliban al-Qaida Punjab.”

Shahbaz Bhatti’s death is the second high profile killing this year of someone asking for changes to Pakistan’s laws and greater protection for its minorities.

The Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said that Bhatti’s death “is a tragic loss for Pakistan and for all people who believe in human rights and freedom of speech.”

Alistair Burt, Minister for South Asia, added that he had supported Mr.Bhatti’s “in his difficult role and in his attempts to revise his country’s Blasphemy Laws. Those laws have been used to target minorities.”

Minister Bhatti’s death was not an isolated incident.

As terrorism and instability has intensified, so have the deaths. Over 35,000 people have died in attacks since 2003; 2,522 fatalities in the first six months of 2011 alone. And, on the day of writing this, a report from Peshwar detailed the deaths of 34 more people, with over 100 badly injured.

Meanwhile, forced conversions to Islam, rape, and forced marriage are increasingly commonplace.

Take the case of Sidra Bibi.

She is a 14 year old Christian living in the district of Sheikhupura in Punjab, and the daughter of a worker in the cotton industry. She was molested, abducted, raped and threatened her with death. Physically and psychologically abused, she became pregnant. Police have refused to accept her complaint.

Samina Ayub, is also a Christian. Aged 17, she lives with her family near Lahore. Kidnapped, forcibly converted to Islam, renamed Fatima Bibi, she was coerced into marrying in the Muslim rite. Her family reported the abduction but police have not prosecuted those responsible.

Attacks have also been made on places and books sacred to those with minority beliefs. The radical Islamist party, Jamiat ulema-e-Islam recently filed an application to the Supreme Court to ban the circulation of the Bible, describing it as “blasphemous” and “pornographic”

Such intolerance and such virulent attacks pose a grave threat to Pakistan, to the region, but, also, to the UK, where around 1.2 million British citizens of Pakistani descent now reside.

Unlike the authorities who have such a lamentable record in protecting their citizens, Pakistan’s own citizens clearly understand from where the threat to their security originates. In an independent survey 90% cited religious extremism as the greatest threat to the country: which is why we have a duty to speak out for these vulnerable and preyed upon minorities, especially in the aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden, since when intolerant violence has intensified.

The former Foreign Secretary, David Miliband commented that: “It is when the international community has taken its eye off the ball in Pakistan that instability has increased…Internally, Pakistan has a duty to protect minority groups and needs the support of its allies to do so.”

Those words are in complete accord with Jinnah’s 1947 Declaration promising tolerance, respect and security for the new country’s minorities - a vision that needs to be reinserted into the political mainstream. In 2011 the grievous plight of Pakistan’s minorities is inextricably bound to its destiny as a nation.

Professor Lord David Alton is a member of the House of Lords. The author of several books, Lord Alton has been widely recognized for his work on behalf of human rights. See: http://www.davidalton.net

© Copyright Spero, All rights reserved.
URL: www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idCategory=34...minorities

One year after attack on Ahmadis

Opinion EDITORIAL

One year after attack on Ahmadis

By Editorial
Published: May 29, 2011

Local residents and rescue workers take cover during an attack on an Ahmadi worship centre in Lahore’s Garhi Shahu neighborhood on May 28, 2010. PHOTO: FILE

Ahmadis across the country remember the horror that struck Lahore a year ago on May 28th, 2010. At least 88 Ahmadis died that day in coordinated gun and bomb attacks on two places of worship used by the community in Lahore. Ahmadis are, of course, not permitted under special laws directed towards them, to call these places ‘mosques’. We wonder how many other citizens remain concerned about the terrible events that took place that day or the fact that even now no justice has been obtained for those killed by the unknown attackers. There seems to have been no determined effort on the part of authorities in Punjab to track down those responsible or to ensure that such an incident never takes place again.

In the current environment, it is more than likely that this will happen. Ahmadis in our society have been pushed to the very sidelines, and little has been done to protect them from ferocious clerics who dub them as infidels or worse on the basis of their beliefs. As a result of this the four million or so Ahmadis in the country continue to feel threatened and insecure. Dozens are killed each year in attacks based on belief. In 2010, this number stood at 99. They are also persecuted by other means. For instance, discrimination against Ahmadis in matters of employment or even admission to schools is no longer uncommon. In some communities, they have been declared outcasts, banished from marriage functions or other events.

There is only one way to change this. In the first place an example must be set by drawing the Ahmadis back into the mainstream of the population. This can best be done by removing from the statute books the specific laws that give them a diminished status. As part of the same process, it is also vital that those behind the attacks in Lahore be tracked down and brought to book. This is the only way to ensure that an example is set which prevents others from adopting a similar course of action and offers a community that has remained under siege almost since the creation of Pakistan some measure of safety.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 29th, 2011.

URL: http://tribune.com.pk/story/177737/one...on-ahmadis/

Who decides our identity and how?

Who decides our identity and how?

June 06, 2010

By Arshed H. Bhatti

When my elder sister in Lahore, who I call my instant channel for ‘heartbreaking’ news, called to inform that Friday prayer congregations of Ahmadiyya community were attacked in Lahore, I was very sad but not surprised.

When my sister used the expressions of ‘masjid’ and ‘juma ki namaz’, she was not afraid of being penalised for deliberately or inadvertently committing blasphemy according to the laws introduced by General Zia in 1984: a mala fide postscript that followed the Second Amendment to the 1973 Constitution by a decade, declaring people subscribing to the Ahmadiyya faith as non-Muslim minority.

I was sad but not surprised for two reasons. One, a few months back, the colleagues at Civil Junction informed that they had spotted some bearded men taking photographs of the Baitul Zikar (a post-1984 title given to ‘mosque’ by Ahmadis to evade penalty and punishment) which is about 100 metres from my café. Duly alarmed by this, we informed persons responsible for the security of the ‘mosque’, and held meetings with neighbours to deliberate precautions. That incident had sent a shudder down one’s spine that the faith-based hatred was about to unfold a new devious angle and Ahmadis were soon to replace shias as new kaafirs, in the eyes of the self ascribed guards of the fort of Islam who have taken it upon them to weed out all ‘others’ from the land of the pure!

The second reason is what most of us know intuitively: the harvest of hatred is ripe, ready and in our face following three decades of nurturing of reengineered, false and flawed faith-based identities of Pakistanis.

I wish to raise four points to invoke rethinking about our identities who shall decide that? Whether we may leave the verdict to Allah Almighty, for the Judgment Day, for hereafter or should we continue doing that ourselves.

First, the universal reference point of a person’s/group’s identity is primarily language and location. This was the first collective denial Pakistani in leadership succumbed to in 1949 when apprehending ‘provincialism’ they decided to base Pakistani identity atop Islam. Though in one’s view it was a deception to evade electoral politics and institute new non-people constituencies.

Second point, State can determine citizenship of its inhabitants but cannot dissect their worldviews or attempt to scout which divinity rules their imagination! In my view, State can determine or deny a person citizenship; it cannot decide or determine inner dynamics of sub-identity like faith or sexual orientation, both of which follow one’s heart, and more importantly the person is the ultimate judge, jury and benefactor of that sub-identity.

Third point, State should not meddle with (read, support or stymie) a citizen’s volitional membership of a community.

Fourth, law’s function is to determine the course of action the citizens ought to follow in order to eventually keep the social fabric of a society intact. If a certain law’s intent, prod or push goes beyond that, then this law is not a law per se. It is rather an intrusive tool to ensure social engineering of sorts.

It is about time Honourable Supreme Court under Chief Justice Iftkhar Muhammad Chaudhary had taken notice of these particular laws which, introduced by a dictator, have not only shaken the basic framework of the Constitution but are also eating up the social bonds citizens are promised as equal citizens.

Arshed is a political activist and can be reached at civil.junction.pakistan@gmail.com

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2010-weekly/nos-06-06-2010/spr.htm#7

Masked discrimination

Masked discrimination

June 06, 2010

How the persecution of Ahmadis has often been linked to
larger issues in the past

By Ameem Lutfi

One of the ongoing debates regarding the recent attacks on the Ahmadi population is whether to primarily group these horrendous acts alongside other terrorist offensives that have plagued the country since the Afghan war or to list these among acts of sectarian violence on perhaps one of the most persecuted sect. I am not arguing that it cannot be both; a terrorist attack on an already oppressed sect, but am asking if there is something different about these attacks that sets them apart from other bombings and armed attacks on civilian population?

On the surface this might seem as an inconsequential question because regardless of the answer the underlying fact of the matter is that several innocent people lost their lives in the two deplorable attacks recently. But I believe that given the rise of the politics of statistic under which legitimacy of any argument heavily depends on the numbers backing the argument, this question gains added significance especially for the Ahmadi population. If the master narrative of these incidents ends up portraying these attacks as deliberate hits on the Ahmadi population, and not just another unfortunate terrorist activity, it will greatly strengthen the case being made regarding the persecution of the Ahmadi population.

Interestingly, if one looks at the history of the Ahmadis in our part of the world, one would find quite a few such debates in which we are left to figure out if an act of aggression faced by the community was an act of religious discrimination or just a manifestation of some other resentment. For example, during the colonial period when Ahmadis were seen as being pro-British, attacks on them were often conflated with the larger anti-colonial movement. Then, in the post-partition period, Khatm-e-Nabuwat and other such anti-Ahmadi movements were often perceived as not just an attack on the community but as movements challenging the government in power.

Another such incident which I would like to narrate here maps the anti-Ahmadi sentiment on to class antagonism (or, perhaps, it was the other way around?). While conducting field work in the Okara region I came across an unwritten history of a land struggle in the area. What was different about this particular struggle was the fact that the struggle was not only about the landless peasants taking on the landed gentry but also about a largely mainstream Muslim population taking on a small number of Ahmadi land owners. According to some of the oral narratives from a particular village (6 Chak), when the canal colonies were set up in the 1920s the land in the Chak was awarded to a church which was supposed to settle Christian tenant farmers there but close to partition, the church sold off the land to an Ahmadi Anjuman which further subleased it to other mazaras (tenant farmers). Then, sometime during Ayub’s rule, one of the mazaras who was not producing sufficient crop was threatened that land would be taken away from him. In response to this threat, he started to mobilise all the mazaras (who were by this point in time predominately Sunni-Muslim) to start a movement against the ‘Ahmadi’ landlords. After a period of intense fighting, both parties reached an agreement through the local panchayat under which substantial allowances were given to the mazaraes. One is left wondering if the situation would have been different if the landlords were mainstream Muslims.

I present these various examples to show that the persecution of the Ahmadis has often been linked to larger issues. These larger issues have largely served as a way to mask the underlying discrimination against a particular sect. Also other than the recent attacks, most of these movements have been popular movements which have addressed very real issues that were impacting everyday lives; thus, opposing them became a tricky affair. For example, in the mazarae issue, supporting the Ahmadi side was seen as being in favour of the landed gentry over the landless tenants!

It seems the Ahmadi issue has served as a crutch for other kind of protests to latch on to. The constant anti-Ahmadi rhetoric that we have been fed on has made anti-Ahmadiism an easy point around which people could be readily mobilised. What is perhaps most disturbing is that even issues that are known to be popular mobilisers such as the issue of land have had to be grafted on top of the anti-Ahmadi sentiment in order to get hyper-energised activists and popular support on their side.

This time around, though, the anti-Ahmadi actions are part of a very unpopular and brutal movement and, hence, one does not have to worry about siding with the unpopular ones by supporting a persecuted sect. What we do need to do this time around is to not only see the recent attacks as part of a larger phenomenon but also recognise the underlying hatred against the Ahmadis in society that would have served as a possible motivator for the perpetrators of the attack.

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2010-weekly/nos-06-06-2010/spr.htm#5

The eternal question - A profile of Tehrik-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat

The eternal question

June 06, 2010

A profile of Tehrik-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat

By Waqar Gillani

The roots of Tehrik-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat — the leading hardliner forum of Muslim clerics in Pakistan that is directed against the Ahmadiyya community — can be traced back to the 1880s when the Ahmadiyya school of thought was formally founded.

There are a number of religious forums of Muslim clerics but it was chiefly the Deoband school that launched the movement on the local as well as the international level, to corner Ahmadis not only in India but across the world.

The movement against Ahmadis gained momentum in 1934 when Majlis-e-Ahrar arranged a big gathering called Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat Conference, held at Qadian, the headquarters of Ahmadis in the subcontinent. Attaullah Shah Bukhari of Majlis-e-Ahrar led the conference.

The movement’s history reads that after Pakistan came into being, as a result of the partition of the subcontinent, Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan, better known as Sir Zafarullah Khan, the first foreign minister of Pakistan, allegedly started patronising the Ahmadi sect and nurtured it using his office.

This was the first time that an all-parties movement to protect the finality of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) started to surface. This movement — eventually called Kul Jamaati Majlis-e-Aml Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat — had three demands: a) removal of Zafarullah Khan from the foreign ministry; b) removal of Ahmadis from top government offices; and c) declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This was in 1949, when Majlis-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat had just started working informally. The movement launched countrywide campaigns and protests resulting in a ban on Majlis-e-Ahrar in 1954. After the ban, a formal Majlis-e-Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat emerged as the substitute to lead this anti-Ahmadi campaign. The clerics also launched Aalami Majlis-e-Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat to counter Ahmadis across the world.

In 1973, the then president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Sardar Abdul Qayyum declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims, a step which the Pakistani government had not yet taken. In the same year, Rabta-e-Alam-e-Islami Conference in Saudi Arabia also gave its stamp of approval to oust Ahmadis from the circle of Islam. The unfortunate beating of the students of Nishtar Medical College, Multan, on May 29, 1974, proved to be a major incident that infuriated this anti-Ahmadi movement. The students, going on train, started shouting against Ahmadis while reaching Rabwah – the headquarter city of Ahmadis in Pakistan – resulting in a strong reaction of Ahmadis to this gathering. The incident geared up the Khatm-e-Nabuwat movement that started a violent protest, finally bowing down the parliament to make law, declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims in December 1974. Leading clerics of the time like Mufti Mahmood Ahmed, Shah Ahmad Noorani, Professor Ghafoor Ahmed and many others participated in the 15-day debate on the parliament to declare Ahmadis non-Muslims. In 1976, the Khatm-e-Nabuwat people also set up a mosque and a seminary in the jurisdiction of Rabwah to show their impact.

After meeting the first agenda, Khatm-e-Nabuwat started the next phase of their campaign – to corner Ahmadis in Pakistan. They started demanding legal sanctions on Ahmadis barring them from using the title of Muslim. This campaign was at its peak when Maulana Yousaf of Jamia Banori, Karachi, and Punjab-based Maulana Khawaja Khan Muhammad (who died recently) were leading the Majlis-e-Amal Tahafuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwat in 1984 and 1985. The then dictator, General Ziaul Haq imposed legal sanctions on Ahmadis in 1984 through an ordinance barring them from using the title of Muslim, reading and reciting the Holy Quran, and stopping them to declare their worship places as mosque. The ordinance sections later became part of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), another target achieved by the Khatm-e-Nabuwat.

In 1985, Maulana Manzoor Ahmad Chinioti and Abdul Hafeez Makki and other clerics also launched a separate organisation titled International Khatm-e-Nabuwat Conference to further corner Ahmadis and force them to follow the legal sanctions of 1984.

In December 2009, another committee called Muttahida Tehrik-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwat Raabta Committee also surfaced in Lahore.

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2010-weekly/nos-06-06-2010/spr.htm#4

When the state was secular

When the state was secular

June 06, 2010

Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954, to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, also called Munir Report, carried an incisive analysis of the Ulema’s concept of the Islamic State and of a Muslim. Justice Muhammad Munir as president and Justice Kayani as member were appointed to investigate the causes of the trouble. The report concluded that the concept of a Muslim differed for different sects and if the fatwas of the Ulema were relied upon to determine whether an individual is Muslim or Kafir, then no sect could be called Muslim because of the lack of a single, coherent and unanimous definition of a Muslim and an Islamic State. Below are excerpts from this historic document:

An Islamic State

…The Quaid-i-Azam’s conception of a modern national State, it is alleged, became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on 12th March 1949; but it has been freely admitted that this Resolution, though grandiloquent in words, phrases, and clauses, is nothing but a hoax, and that not only does it not contain even a semblance of the embryo of an Islamic State but its provisions, particularly those relating to fundamental rights, are directly opposed to the principles of an Islamic State…

The position of non-Muslims

…The ground on which the removal of Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan and other Ahmadis occupying key positions in the State is demanded is that the Ahmadis are non-Muslims; and that therefore, like zimmies in an Islamic State, they are not eligible for appointment to higher offices in the State. This aspect of the demand has directly raised a question about the position of non Muslims in Pakistan if we are to have an Islamic Constitution…

This being the position, the State will have to devise some machinery by which the distinction between a Muslim and a non-Muslim may be determined and its consequences enforced. The question, therefore, whether a person is or is not a Muslim will be of fundamental importance, and it was for this reason that we asked most of the leading ulema to give their definition of a Muslim…

The result of this part of the inquiry, however, has been anything but satisfactory, and if considerable confusion exists in the minds of our ulama on such a simple matter, one can easily imagine what the differences on more complicated matters will be…

Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Amir, Jama’at-i-Islami

“Q. Please define a Muslim.

A. A person is a Muslim if he believes (1) in tauheed, (2) in all the prophets (ambiya), (3) all the books revealed by God, (4) in mala’ika (angels), and (5) yaum-ul-akhira (the Day of Judgment).

Q. Is a mere profession of belief in these articles sufficient to entitle a man to call himself a Musalman and to be treated as a Musalman in an Islamic State?

A. Yes.

Q. If a person says that he believes in all these things, does anyone have a right to question the existence of his belief?

A. The five requisites that I have mentioned above are fundamental, and any alteration in any one of these articles will take him out of the pale of Islam.”…

Apostasy

…Apostasy in an Islamic State is punishable with death…According to this doctrine, Chaudhri Zafrullah Khan, if he has not inherited his present religious beliefs but has voluntarily elected to be an Ahmadi, must be put to death. And the same fate should befall Deobandis and Wahabis, including Maulana Muhammad Shafi Deobandi, Member, Board of Talimat-i- Islami attached to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi, if Maulana Abul Hasanat Sayyad Muhammad Ahmad Qadri, or Mirza Raza Ahmad Khan Barelvi, or any one of the numerous ulama who are shown perched on every leaf of a beautifnl tree in the fatwa, Exhibit D. E. 14, were the head of such Islamic State…

The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims, and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death, if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge the consequences of this doctrine, when it is remembered that no two ulema have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim…

The death penalty for irtidad has implications of a far-reaching character, and stamps Islam as a religion of fanatics, which punishes all independent thinking. The Qur’an again and again lays emphasis on reason and thought, advises toleration, and preaches against compulsion in religious matters…

Reaction on Muslims of non-Muslim states

…The ideology on which an Islamic State is desired to be founded in Pakistan must have certain consequences for the Musalmans who are living in countries under non-Muslim sovereigns. We asked Amir-i-Shari’at Sayyad Ataullah Shah Bukhari whether a Muslim could be a faithful subject of a non-Muslim State, and reproduce his answer:

“Q. In your opinion is a Musalman bound to obey orders of a kafir Government?

A. It is not possible that a Musalman should be a faithful citizen of a non-Muslim Government.

Q. Will it be possible for the four crore of Indian Muslims to be faithful citizens of their State?

A. No.”…

The answer is quite consistent with the ideology which has been pressed before us, but then if Pakistan is entitled to base its Constitution on religion, the same right must be conceded to other countries where Musalmans are in substantial minorities, or if they constitute a preponderating majority in a country where sovereignty rests with a. non-Muslim community. We therefore asked the various ulama whether, if non-Muslims in Pakistan were to be subjected to this discrimination in matters of citizenship, the ulama would have any objection to Muslims in other countries being subjected to a similar discrimination…

We have dwelt at some length on the subject of Islamic State not because we intended to write a thesis against or in favour of such State, but merely with a view to presenting a clear picture of the numerous possibilities that may in future arise if the true causes of the ideological confusion which contributed to the spread and intensity of the [recent anti-Ahmadi] disturbances are not precisely located.

Compiled by Minahil Zafar

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2010-weekly/nos-06-06-2010/spr.htm#3

A history of prejudice

A history of prejudice

June 06, 2010

Tracing the roots of how the level of tolerance for the belief of the
‘other’ sharply declined

By I. A. Rehman

When the Second Amendment to the constitution was adopted in 1974, the government claimed honour and glory for having settled an 80-year-old problem. Each year since then has made the conscious citizens of Pakistan wonder as to how long will it take to end the problems generated by that amendment.

By the 80-year-old problem was meant the decades of anti-Ahmadiyya agitation, largely in Punjab, carried on spasmodically by Majlis-i-Ahrar, a lower middle class party that sought political support on the strength of a mix of nationalism and a puritanical and austere Islam. Many theories have been advanced on the genesis of the Ahrar-Ahmedi confrontation.

Some said the Ahrar had reacted to the Ahmedis’ renunciation of or reservation on Jihad and the claims of the founder of their movement to be a prophet or the promised Masih or a reformer. Some others attacked the Ahmedis for the favours they were said to be receiving from the British. According to another theory, the Ahrar could not bear Ahmedis’ success in recruiting to their fold the educated Muslim youth. Yet, till the early 1930s, a staunch Islamic revivalist and widely acclaimed lover of the Prophet (PBUH) like Iqbal saw nothing wrong in sitting with the Ahmedi chief in the Kashmir Committee, formed to extend succour to the Kashmiri victims of the Dogra tyranny. The Ahrar leaders eventually walked out of the committee after accusing the Ahmedis of using the Kashmir agitation for their own ends.

As the subcontinent’s struggle for freedom entered its final phase, the parties that put belief above politics among the Muslims and the Hindus both were marginalised. Their rout in the 1945-46 general election embittered them and the Ahrar decided to beat the Muslim League with the latter’s own weapon – the baton of belief, as their leaders put it. Soon after independence, they started defying the laws while agitating against the Ahmedis. They received a boost when the Punjab Muslim League sought their support in the 1951 election. Later on, the Daultana government colluded with them in using anti-Ahmadiyya agitation to harass, and possibly topple, the Nazimuddin ministry at the centre. The result was the anti-Ahmadiyya riots of 1953 and the Pakistani people’s first taste of post-colonial martial law.

The anti-Ahmedi agitation of 1953 could be suppressed because the Daultana government had relied on shady intrigue, the central government had in its ranks influential elements that were strong enough to reject anti-Ahmedi demands, and the troops Gen. Azam sent to clear the Wazir Khan Mosque of the agitators were still following the British scheme of staying out of religious controversy. But it offered some ominous lessons. The religious parties joined hands to jointly capture Ahrar’s platform and realised the huge potential of religion-based politics.

They thought they had a chance to capture power under a religious standard when the Ayub regime collapsed and a key minister in the Yahya government was keen to do the Daultana act by patronising the religious parties in the 1970 election. Their bitterness at losing the polls exceeded Ahrar’s anger at their 1946 defeat. Nobody was surprised when they started planning for a religion-based challenge to the Bhutto government. Suddenly the government obliged them by introducing an amendment to the constitution devised as a first step towards declaring the Ahmedis non-Muslims.

The decision of the Bhutto government to adopt this measure (Second Amendment of 1974) is still a riddle. The incidents of rioting in some parts of Punjab, that were used as a pretext, were too insignificant to warrant a constitutional amendment. The identity of troublemakers was not established; they could have been Ahmedi hotheads (as alleged by officials), they could have been mercenaries hired by state minions, or they could have been provocateurs working for the anti-Ahmedi lobby.

The Second Amendment was a curious piece of drafting. Article 260, which defines the terms and expressions used in the constitution, was used to decide a momentous issue such as an 80-year-old conflict. Clause (3) added at the end of the article said:

“(3) – A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets, or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (Peace be upon him), or recognises such a claimant as a prophet, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.”

No attempt was made to conceal the purpose of the amendment – to push Ahmedis outside the pale of Islam. Some people thought any Ahmedi could escape attracting action under the new provision by simply affirming faith in the finality of the Prophet (PBUH). The commentary on the constitution bearing Justice Munir’s name says the Second Amendment “simply affirmed and declared (the) position as it existed under Shariat”. But the matter defied an over-simplified interpretation. General Zia saw the opening offered by the Second Amendment and went for the kill. In order to ensure that all Ahmedis were caught in the net of Article 260(3) he replaced the 1974 text with the following:

“(3) In the Constitution and all enactments and other legal instruments, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context; – (a) ‘Muslim’ means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets, and does not believe in, or recognise as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (Peace be upon him); and (b) ‘non-Muslim’ means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani Group or the Lahori Group (who call themselves ‘Ahmedis’ or by any other name), or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the scheduled castes.”

General Zia did not stop at that. Besides presiding over efforts to add 295-C to the PPC, he added Ahmedi-specific provisions to the Penal Code under which an Ahmedi can be punished for calling himself a Muslim or posing as such, or for calling his prayer house a mosque or for possessing a copy of the Holy Quran, or for inscribing Bismillah on his letter/invitation card.

What has added to the miseries of the Ahmadiyya community is the fact that while the liberal Muslims stopped addressing the situation caused by the consolidation of anti-Ahmedi campaigns once the Munir Inquiry Report was published, a number of factors have led to the rise of extremists who lack neither guns nor money and who use force and violence to establish their version of Islam. The level of tolerance for the belief of the ‘other’ has sharply declined. The result of these and related developments is admirably summed up by Hamid Khan in the following words:

“The Second Amendment was the beginning of the process of legal victimisation and persecution of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan, followed by Draconian laws and adverse judicial pronouncements against religious minorities in general. Members of the community have been pushed against the wall and are a constant target of threats and hyperbole on the part of political and religious bigots. Succeeding governments have failed to stem the tide of victimisation and have, at times, succumbed to the pressure. It is always an easy and convenient path for an incumbent government to gain cheap popularity and to appease the bigots by conceding their unreasonable demands without realising that political blackmail never ends. When the Ahmedis appealed to the courts for protection, they found themselves in the hands of judges who were not only totally unsympathetic to them but gave strong judgments against them, further restricting their freedom and civil rights”. (Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan.)

The biggest tragedy of Pakistan is the failure of the religious majority to realise that the persecution of a minority community will ultimately lead to its own destruction.

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2010-weekly/nos-06-06-2010/spr.htm#2

News on Sunday - Editorial

Editorial

June 06, 2010

The contrary view has been heard so loud and clear, perhaps, for the first time in the last three decades. It took about 100 odd brutal killings of Ahmadis in Lahore that allowed this to happen. But will it change things? Perhaps, when the contrary view becomes louder still.

It is ironic how we in the media who kept silent each time the Ahmadis were persecuted and discriminated against – which they are on a regular basis – have finally found the courage to acknowledge the persecution and the discrimination. And that’s not where the irony ends. It started when within the first hour, the breaking news about the attack on Ahmadi ‘mosques’ changed to their “places of worship”. It continued when the law enforcers saw the hands of RAW in the attack which could not have been conducted by a Muslim. Nor was the irony lost when the attack was seen as a way to sabotage the country’s right to celebrate its nuclear status on the Yaum-e-Takbeer or how there were no spontaneous crowds against the Lahore attacks the way there were on Facebook issue and the Israeli attack on the aid carrying ship.

Were people scared to come out and speak up? Alongside the reaction and the outcry on the media came whispers about whether it was right to say funeral prayers for the non-Muslim Ahmadis. Once again people affirmed their faith by finding fault with others.

The two reactions set the ball rolling. It has indeed been a history of prejudice but how and why did we come to this point. What were the political compulsions that changed the secular moorings of the state to religious ones? Why did we find it so easy to sign this declaration every time we filled out a form to register for an identity card or a passport that we are not ahmadis? Why couldn’t we have stood up and protested? Why did we allow the state to exercise the right to declare a group of people non-Muslims? Is that why the state still finds itself unable to protect them?

It is ironic how the brutal killing of a hundred citizens of this country has forced us to ask these questions now. It is ironic why we did not raise them in the last thirty six years.

URL: www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2010-week...2010/spr.htm#1

NU: The ‘transactional’, ‘trans-national’ and ‘progressive’ clerics

---The Jakarta Post, Indonesia

Headlines | Sat, 04/03/2010 12:42 PM

NU: The ‘transactional’, ‘trans-national’ and ‘progressive’ clerics

Muhammad Nafik, Jakarta

Despite being an organization of Muslim clerics, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) remains unable to uphold moral values and divine principles both internally and for Indonesian Muslims in general.

NU should set an example for the public, and particularly other socio-religious organizations and political parties in Indonesia that must embrace and promote clean governance and fair politics.

The reality is, however, that NU cannot rid itself of moral hazards and murky politics.

Rumors of vote buying and negative campaigning abounded at the organization’s national leadership conference in Makassar, South Sulawesi, last week.

The momentum continued to shift among voters right up until the dying minutes of the chairmanship vote at the five-day conference; a phenomenon critics attributed to a frantic campaign of last-minute under-the-table voter bribing.

The rumors, although widespread, proved hard to verify on the final night of the conference, but have since been confirmed by respected cleric Sahal Mahfudz, who was elected as chief of NU’s edict-making body after beating out rival Hasyim Muzadi.

Although many participants at the conference refused to comment on the presence of vote buying at the event, others admitted they were offered bribes in the form of airline tickets and hotel vouchers in exchange for their votes.

Bribes were not merely offered by insiders, it transpired, but also by powerful outsiders, in particular political party members, who were lobbying for support from the 40-million-strong Muslim organization in the next national and regional elections.

During recent local polls to elect regents, mayors and governors across the country, NU clerics and members’ changing political support stirred internal bickering and sparked segregation within the organization.

During last year’s national elections, several members of NU’s cleric council were seen to dramatically shift allegiance during the campaign period, leading many to believe they were being bribed.

Perceptions of this kind threaten to ruin NU’s image and diminish its credibility and integrity as an independent mass religious organization and a civil society group.

The moderate Muslim organization is also plagued by a stagnant conservatism that threatens reform and modernization, and has lost much of the support it garnered when under the leadership of pluralist figure Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid, who passed away last December.

Gus Dur turned NU into a globally recognized progressive and moderate organization. Moreover, the NU under Gus Dur commanded respect and influence in national politics.

This once bright image has been dimmed over the last decade by internal politicization and the dominance of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence)-minded clerics and old figures influenced by “transnational” ideals brought from the Middle East.

There are other examples of figures and groups who have been shaped by such transnational currents that claim to return to the roots of the Koran and who embrace hadits (Prophet Muhammad’s traditions) interpretations of Islam. Such examples include extremist or militant groups Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the Islam Defenders Front and the Prosperous Justice Party.

The late Gus Dur gained great respect and recognition from within NU and many non-Muslim organizations as a champion of pluralism. But at the national conference last week, NU appeared to dismiss its previous progressive and liberal takes on sharia issues.

It seems that Gus Dur’s philosophies, which produced an explosion of progressive and liberal young intellectuals, including Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Moqshit Ghozali and Zuhairi Misrawi, have no place in the current NU, which is under the control of fiqh-minded leaders.

While Gus Dur, for example, vehemently defended and protected the Ahmadiyah sect from frequent attacks and bullying by extremist groups, recently NU ridiculously joined the chorus condemning the minority sect as heretical for its belief that there was a prophet after Muhammad.

“What Gus Dur did was down to his personal views. NU as an institution has its own way of Islamic thinking. It should be separate, although Gus Dur was a great figure for NU,” said a senior cleric who led a discussion on contemporary religious issues during the NU conference.

Despite several discussions on contemporary religious issues during the conference, the respective juries drew largely on the puritan fiqh and salafi perspectives when constructing their theological arguments.

For example, the jurists ruled in favor of underage marriage, basing their argument on the fact that the Koran and hadits had never set a marriage age limit for Muslims.

During Gus Dur’s leadership, similar NU discussion circles typically produced progressive edicts on contemporary religious concerns.

“At the time, it was Masdar *Farid Mas’udi* who was behind these halaqoh discussions, and he greatly contributed to NU’s progressive mindset,” said contemporary Muslim societies analyst Martin van Bruinessen of the Netherlands.

To return to its once dynamic and modern thinking, young intellectuals who were inspired by Gus Dur and who studied not only kitab kuning (traditional textbooks) but also modern philosophy and social influences should be given a larger space in the new leadership of the NU.

The author, a staff writer at The Jakata Post, covered NU’s recent leadership conference.

URL: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/04/03/nu-the-...clerics.html

I will not let NU interfered by govt: Said

--- The Jakarta Post, Indonesia

National | Sat, 03/27/2010 10:20 PM

I will not let NU interfered by govt: Said

Bagus BT Saragih, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Nahdlatul Ulama chairman elect Said Agil Siradj on Saturday responded his victory by vowing not to let NU be interfered by the government.

“Indeed, the President called me several days before this congress. But it was not even close to be called as an intervention,” he told the press shortly after the voting.

Said also denied he would use his chairmanship as a political vehicle to run for presidential election.

“Any proposal to run for president or vice president candidate will not be interesting for me. I promise. No matter who is asking me [to run for presidential election],“ he said.

Asked about how he would bring NU followers to treat sects like Ahmadiyah, Said said the sect would stay harmful for Islam.

“There’s already been rules about Ahmadiyah, and NU has made its decision that Ahamdiyah is a sect that NU defies,” he said.

Slamet Effendy Yusuf, who lost the two-horse race for Said, meanwhile, said that he was ready to help Said to develop NU. “Pak Said has said he would invite me [to be involved in the organizational committee],“ he said.

Slamet who was a former legislator from the Golkar Party denied that he had gained support from the party. “No. NU is not a place for practical politics,” he said.

URL: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/27/i-will-not-le...vt-agil-sirajd.html

Court told to be firm on rowdiness, intimidating visitors

---The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

National   -   Thu, 03/18/2010 9:28 AM

Court told to be firm on rowdiness, intimidating visitors
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

The Constitutional Court must be firm on members of hard-line Islamic groups who intimidated petitioners of the blasphemy law judicial review by issuing threats and shouting religious slogans during hearing sessions, activists said Tuesday.

“There were threats against [the supporters of the review] outside the courtroom,” M. Choirul Anam, a lawyer for petitioners, told The Jakarta Post. “While protests in the courtroom were intimidating.”

Anam said the hard-liners, mostly from the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), who opposed the rights activists’ move, continually attended hearings and often yelled at those testifying in support of the judicial review, calling them “infidels” and telling them to “repent”.

“The court has the authority to take strict action against these people,” he said. “It has the authority to expel them from the courtroom.”

A number of activists and self-proclaimed supporters of pluralism filed the request for a judicial review of the 1965 blasphemy law last year.

The move was mainly triggered by the government banning of the Ahmadiyah group, regarded by mainstream Muslims as heretical.

The law’s articles in scrutiny stipulate the government’s authority to dissolve religious groups whose beliefs and practices are deemed as blasphemous by religious authorities such as the Religious Affairs Ministry and the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI).

According to petitioners, the law was discriminatory of certain religious groups, which have been denied their right to worship according to their beliefs.

Anam said the Court was firm in its approach at the first session of the hearings, with Court chief Mahfud M.D. asking loud visitors, dominated by FPI members, to quieten.

“But the Court has not been as firm of late,” he said. “We suspect that the judges are intimidated by the protestors in the courtroom.”

Choirul said activists were apprehensive the Court could not issue a fair ruling because judges were intimidated.

Hearing sessions on the blasphemy law at the Constitutional Court have often been rife with cacophony from the gallery.

Ulil Abshar Abdalla, an expert supporting the review, reportedly received death threats from the gallery at Court.

Mahendradatta of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, an Islamic group opposing the review, dismissed the belief that the Court’s ruling would be influenced by intimidation from visitors.

“The Court will not be intimidated,” he said.

He insisted that the actions of protesters at the Court had not breached misconduct.

“It is tolerable. The judges have not had to expel anyone from the courtroom.”

URL: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/18/cour...intimidating-visitors.html