Showing posts with label Hizbut Tahrir. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hizbut Tahrir. Show all posts

Monday, May 2, 2011

Is Dislike of SBY Driving Military Old Guard to Hard-Liners?

Jakarta Globe, Indonesia
NEWS
Is Dislike of SBY Driving Military Old Guard to Hard-Liners?
Nivell Rayda | May 02, 2011

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s speeches often leave many Indonesians mystified, and the one he made shortly after a series of book bomb scares across the capital last month was no exception.

“To that group, [I say] if you don’t like me, don’t sacrifice the people. Don’t let them become victims,” he said on March 18, shortly after police discovered a fourth bomb sent to the house of a prominent music mogul.

To some, the president appeared presumptuous for assuming that he was the target, but Mufti Makaarim, executive director of the Institute for Defense, Security and Peace Studies, thinks that there is more to the remark than meets the eye.

“He knows that there are some people who benefit from religious violence and acts of terrorism. He senses that there are a few retired generals who would love to see him lose legitimacy to run this country,” he said. “For me the speech was clear. As vague and intriguing as it may seem to the rest of the nation, he was addressing military retirees.”

Connecting the Dots

Two other incidents that took place shortly after that speech seemed to crystallize what Yudhoyono meant.

On March 20, a little-known Islamic political analyst named Wachiduddin received thunderous applause from an audience of 500 veiled women and bearded men at a talk show organized by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a hard-line group that seeks the formation of an Islamic caliphate.

Wachiduddin on that day said that it was important for hard-line Muslim activists to establish ties with warmongers and military officials. Excerpts and video recordings of the show have been circulating online since.

“Gaining support from ahlul quwwah [bearers of military might] in a revolution is a method exemplified by the great prophet, Muhammad,” he said. “The prophet and his disciples once convened with ahlul quwwahs throughout Mecca, asking them to convert to Islam and join his holy struggle.”

Muhammad eventually gained the support of Sa’ad bin Muaz, a prominent seventh-century warlord from Medina, Saudi Arabia, the self-proclaimed expert added. “Muslim activists [in Indonesia] must visit these generals. We must convince them that Islam is the only system blessed by Allah. Generals must become the 21st century Sa’ad bin Muaz,” Wachiduddin said.

On March 22, two days after the speech, Al Jazeera reported that “senior retired generals” were supporting the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and other hard-liners to incite religious violence and overthrow Yudhoyono.

The report included an interview with retired Army Chief Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, a staunch government critic who acknowledged his support for the groups that he said aimed to topple Yudhoyono in a “revolution.”

Coming Out

Besides Tyasno, there are more military men backing the hard-liners, according to Chep Hernawan, head of the Islamic Reform Movement (Garis). In an interview with the Jakarta Globe, he identified them as retired Maj. Gen. Muchdi Purwoprandjono, former commander of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus); retired Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen, former commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad); and retired Gen. Fahrul Razi, a former deputy chief of staff.

Chep said several meetings had already taken place since January between the ex-generals and conservative Muslim leaders to discuss their plans.

“We’re united by the Ahmadiyah issue, since these retired generals have also lost faith in how the president is managing the country. They are Muslims too and know very well that Yudhoyono’s hesitance in banning Ahmadiyah could spark public anger, particularly from Muslims,” Chep said.

He was referring to the minority sect deemed deviant by mainstream Muslims that has faced increasing persecution over the years, including from the state.

Islamic People’s Forum (FUI) secretary general Muhammad Al Khaththath had also acknowledged its movement to seek the dissolution of the sect was supported by retired generals but refused to divulge details into what sort of arrangements the hard-liners had with the generals.

‘Awan Merah’

A source inside the military retiree circle told the Jakarta Globe that the hard-liners had benefited financially as well as politically from the relationship.

“These generals always finance pesantrens [Islamic religious boarding school] and madrasahs [Islamic schools] owned by hard-line figures. Their houses are always visited by hard-line groups and some return with plenty of donations,” the source said on condition of anonymity.

“In return they pledge allegiance and consider these generals as their patrons. [Hard-liners] are often exploited for a certain political gain.”

But the source said that the retired generals had a more sinister plot. “The other retirees are calling their actions ‘Awan Merah’ [Red Cloud], short for ‘Aksi Purnawirawan Militer Berdarah’ [Bloody Actions of Military Retirees],” he told the Globe.

“Their aim was to create another religious conflict like the ones in Ambon [North Maluku] or Poso [Central Sulawesi]. But this time, they want it to be close to the capital. It is likely that their target would be Kuningan or Parung.”

Around 2,000 followers of the Ahmadiyah faith live in Manis Lor village in Kuningan district, West Java, making it the largest Ahmadi community in Indonesia. An attack on the community occurs almost every year.

Parung, a small town about halfway between Jakarta and Bogor, is home to an Ahmadiyah center. It was last attacked in 2008.

“Other retirees are not too sure about their strategies. Toppling a president is not that easy,” the source said. “But what these generals have in common is that they all hate SBY, they’re devout Muslims or what some would describe as ‘green generals,’ they have close ties with hard-liners and in the past they had their hands dirty in cases of religious violence.”

Mufti of the IDSPS said the retired generals were discontented with Yudhoyono because he had failed to provide enough political positions for members of his former corps.

Only two retired generals sit in Yudhoyono’s administration: State Secretary Sudi Silalahi and Deputy Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsuddin.

“The aim is to topple Yudhoyono through de-legitimization of his rule, to show that civilian-controlled government is failing and that we should go back to military rule,” he told the Globe. “That has happened during the administrations of [former presidents] [B.J.] Habibie and Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid].”

Mutual Interests

Muchdi, the retired major general, has confirmed that he has close relationships with hard-line Muslim figures. “I have friends from almost every Muslim organization and yes, some of them are radicals,” he told the Globe.

He was cautious, however, about revealing the extent of those ties with radicals. “All I can say is that these [hard-liners] don’t have a political vehicle to channel their aspirations. They just want their voices heard by the government,” he said.

“I don’t agree with violence and every Muslim organization that I have talked to feels the same way. There is not a single political party that can facilitate their needs, that is why some rogue elements within the organizations feel frustrated and do [violent] things.”

Muchdi, the former head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) who was controversially acquitted in 2009 of the murder of rights activist Munir Said Thalib, has also been cited as a senior adviser of FUI publication Suara Islam and of Media Dakwah, a publication tied to the Indonesian Islam Propagation Council (DDII).

Although he is open about opposing the existence of the Ahmadiyah, he denied playing a part in religious violence.

“After the cases in Cikeusik [Banten] and Temanggung happened, text messages began circulating saying that me and Tyasno Sudarto were behind the melees,” he said, referring to a mob attack on Ahmadis in Banten that left three sect members dead and the violent riot in the West Java town after a blasphemy trial.

“To me, rumors like that happen almost on a daily basis. Some issues we have to fight back but some I chose to ignore. I don’t know why, but people see me as a hard-line Muslim myself.”

A long time critic of Yudhoyono, Tyasno has been participating in various rallies and activities to oust the president. His disapproval for his former classmate in the military academy had led him to form an unlikely bond with radical Muslims, secular nationalists and other groups frustrated with the sitting administration.

In March 2010, Tyasno joined hard-line Muslim activists in an event organized by HTI to denounce the growing economic influence of the United States in Indonesia.

The retired Army chief did little to hide his alliance with hard-line groups during the interview with Al Jazeera.

“We work together to enlighten each other. Our angle is different. They fight in the name of Islam, we use national politics. But we have a common goal, which is change. We want to save our country, not destroy it. The revolution should be peaceful, not anarchist or bloody,” he said.

Al Jazeera cited a Web site that detailed a proposed cabinet line-up for the so-called Islamic government — which included Tyasno — drafted by FUI’s Al Khaththath, himself a member of the HTI and former chairman.

Like Muchdi, Kivlan denied sponsoring religious violence and suggested Muslim groups channel their resentment toward the Ahmadiyah in a court of law.

“For me, the solution is simple. Launch a legal action [against the sect]. The same with Ahmadiyah, if they feel intimidated, report it. Don’t take this problem to the street … let the court decide. Only then will all problems be solved,” he told reporters after his name circulated as a mastermind of attacks against members of the sect.

Old Ties

But despite the denials, it is hard not to question how hardliners have continued to enjoy impunity without the presence of political support from powerful figures.

In February, hard-line groups began demanding that Yudhoyono step down unless he issued a decree banning the Ahmadiyah, just days after the president announced plans to disband organizations that used violence to further their goals.

“The fact that the government is reluctant to dissolve hard-line groups suggests that these organizations have support from powerful people. He wouldn’t even touch HTI, which is clearly trying to establish an Islamic state and replace our national ideology. That’s treason,” human rights activist and noted military critic Usman Hamid told the Globe.

In 1965, the military began establishing close ties with Muslim groups in order to fight communists. It is widely estimated that close to a million people were killed in an ensuing witch hunt for Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) supporters.

During the Suharto regime, the military maintained the relationships, including with former elements of the Darul Islam and the Islamic Troops of Indonesia (TII), which launched a widespread rebellion during the Sukarno era in a failed attempt to establish a theocracy.

The military allegedly capitalized on the relationships during the final days of Suharto’s 32-year regime by inciting hatred toward the Chinese ethnic minority through rumors that they had caused the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. A widespread riot occurred in May 1998, targeting Chinese businesses and homes.

After the fall of Suharto, the ethnic violence spread throughout the islands of Java, Borneo, Sulawesi and the Malukus.

Witnesses detected a similar pattern in the seemingly separate conflicts and reported the presence of unidentified men provoking an attack on other religious groups. “What we are seeing today is a re-establishment of old ties. There is a good chance that similar conflicts would occur again,” Usman said.

In a recent interview with the Globe, Mahmudi Haryono, alias Yusuf, a former terrorism convict who once participated in religious violence in Poso, said that the best possible way to disrupt national stability in Indonesia would be to incite another violent religious conflict.

“There are thousands of us who ‘graduated’ from Moro, Poso and Ambon. This is a time of peace so most of us just carry on with our daily lives. But when there is another conflict, they would leave their job and everything they have and fight. A lot of people that I know feel that way,” he said.

“I realized, even back then, that the jihadist movement has been exploited by political power to destabilize the government. But blind faith and the notion that Muslims are under attack can prompt radical Muslims to do just about anything.”

Copyright 2010 The Jakarta Globe
URL: www.thejakartaglobe.com/indonesia/is-dislike.../438560

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Communities join to combat violence

CITY
Sat, 03/12/2011
1:12 PM
Communities join to combat violence
Bagus BT Saragih and Irawaty Wardany, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Without using the government’s repressive tactics for handling sectarian violence, some community groups are joining hands to promote a pluralist and humanistic face for religions in the country.

“We can see that the government has been ignorant in handling cases of religious violence that have frequently occurred in this country recently, therefore we are making our own way by working with other moderate groups in society to improve conditions,” Moderate Muslim Society chair Zuhairi Miswari told The Jakarta Post on Friday.

He said they were working together to promote the peaceful and humanistic face of religion by participating in various anti-violence dialogues with religious communities in the city.

Aside from promoting understanding through interreligious dialogues, the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP) is also reflecting this principle by allowing people from any religion to join them.

“Anyone from any religion can join us because religion is something related to somebody’s freedom to make a choice,” ICRP general secretary Johannes Hariyanto said.

He said people in the ICRP considered religion basically a personal choice and not something somebody is born with, which cannot be changed.

Both Zuhairi and Johannes regretted the actions of some who have perpetuated violence in the name of religion.

“They are not only violating the law but also the constitution. Unfortunately those violations are justified by some laws and decrees,” Johannes said.

He was referring to regional regulations and bylaws, the 1965 Blasphemy Law and the 2008 joint ministerial decree banning members of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia from propagating their religious beliefs, but which allowed them to maintain their faith and perform their daily religious duties.

“Any efforts to bar Ahmadiyah followers from performing their rituals are against not only the 1945 Constitution but also a number of laws,” Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) coordinator Haris Azhar said Friday.

He cited Article 28 of the Constitution, which guarantees every citizen religious rights.

Regulations made by provincial, regency and city administrations can be reviewed by the Supreme Court if they are considered out of line with higher regulations or laws.

As of March 2011, 12 local administrations have issued regulations banning Ahmadis from practicing their religion. The latest regions include East Java province, West Java province, South Sumatra province, Pandeglang regency and Samarinda municipality.

One province where religious violence has frequently occurred is West Java province.

On Friday, another assault of Ahmadis took place in Ciaruteun, Bogor, when hundreds of people suddenly attacked four homes of Ahmadiyah members.

According to Ahmadi spokesman Firdaus Mubarik, hundreds of people, including the perpetrators of Cisalada incident that took place in November of last year, suddenly ran over an Ahmadi after a provocative Friday sermon at the local mushollah (small mosque).

Fortunately, no casualties occurred during the incident, and the police took six people into custody.

That incident was only one in a series of violence in the name of religion, including the brutal murder of three Ahmadis in Cikeusik, Banten, last month.

Zuhairi blamed the joint ministerial decree, saying it was a “license to kill” for people who opposed Ahmadiyah. “The joint decree plus its derivatives became justification for [people] to do violence towards Ahmadis”.

According to the Center for Legal and Policy Studies (PSHK), most of the local bans on Ahmadiyah were made based on the 1965 Blasphemy Law. A number of NGOs filed a judicial review with the Constitutional Court last year to challenge that law. But, the court rejected the request and upheld the law

“The law is already too old and no longer in line with the current situation,” Fajri Nursyamsi from the PSHK said.

Therefore, Fajri urged the government and the House of Representatives to speed up deliberations of the religious tolerance bill. “The bill can accommodate more relevant situations and replace the old blasphemy law,” he said.

Copyright © 2008 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved
URL: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/12/communities...

Does SBY have the guts to ban violent groups?

OPINION
Sat, 03/12/2011
1:03 PM
Does SBY have the guts to ban violent groups?
Pandaya, Jakarta
It looked like there would be a showdown when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono promised to ban violent organizations and the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) — the obvious intended target — retorted that it would start a revolution if the President failed to meet their demands that Ahmadiyah be dissolved by March 1.

The timing of the war of words has never been more critical, occurring only a few days after violent hard-line Muslims stormed an Ahmadi residence in Cikeusik, Banten, and killed three people and others attacked three churches in Temanggung, Central Java.

But, as of today, the President has yet to do anything to make good on his promise, which received mixed reactions from the weary public. It could be just another bluff given that he has made the same threat at least three times since 2006.

But, the FPI has not done anything yet either, apart from a small street demonstration it jointly organized with other radical Muslim groups like the Muslims Forum and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Jakarta late last month.

In numerous interviews with the media, FPI leaders promised to topple President Yudhoyono should he refuse to ban Ahmadiyah, the way the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia thrashed the authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

In fact, the whole affair has only revealed how weak Yudhoyono’s government is.

When addressing the National Press Day celebration on Feb. 9, SBY ordered his aides to ban violent organizations.

But, none of his most authoritative aides: Home Minister Gamawan Fauzi, Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali, Attorney General Basrif Arief and National Police chief Gen. Timur Pradopo seemed to heed his orders.

Instead, Gamawan hosted a meeting with top leaders of the notorious FPI at his office on Feb. 16, exactly a week after Yudhoyono made his threat. Smiling broadly, Gamawan told waiting journalists that he and FPI leaders Habib Rizieq and Munarman exchanged opinions on how deal with Ahmadiyah.

Meanwhile, Suryadharma has been busy blaming the Ahmadis for the Cikeusik tragedy and wanting to ban Ahmadiyah entirely.

Even more mind boggling, the Attorney General’s Office spokesperson Marwan Effendi lauded local governments that caved in to radical demands and banned Ahmadiyah in their areas.

Yudhoyono has not made any comments on these glaring insubordinations. What has happened is that more regencies and cities are toying with the idea of banning Ahmadiyah in the name of regional autonomy.

Gamawan, like Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali, is known for his anti-Ahmadiyah stance. Along with then attorney general Hendarman Supandji, they issued a joint decree banning Ahmadis from conducting religious activities outside their community. When Gamawan was the governor of West Sumatra, he was one of the regional heads who introduced the controversial sharia-inspired morality bylaws.

Ahmadiyah followers have suffered from discrimination and physical attacks since the Indonesian Ulema Council called the cult heretical in a 1980 fatwa and reaffirmed it in 2005.

For hard-liners, the controversial decree has become a license to bully Ahmadis with the tacit support of the local police and government bureaucrats. They vow there will be no peace until Yudhoyono formally bans Ahmadiyah, which they consider heretical because it does not recognize the Islamic orthodoxy that Muhammad is the last prophet.

Interestingly, while Yudhoyono has yet to prove he was not bluffing, such provinces as Banten, East Java, West Java, Lampung and South Kalimantan have boldly announced that they have banned Ahmadiyah.

This is a worrying development that can give way to more cases of violence against Ahmadis, whose numbers are estimated at 200,000, living in enclaves across the archipelago.

Yudhoyono’s inaction in banning violent vigilante groups as he promised to do has given added credence to the perception that he is afraid of the small but noisy hard-line groups.

It has also left many wondering if violent radicals are enjoying the backing of some extremely powerful but corrupt individuals in the police, military, political parties or interest groups who are using terror for their personal or institutional interests.

Yudhoyono has mishandled the FPI’s threat to topple him like the Tunisians did with their despot. He was ridiculed when his spokesperson Julian A. Pasha promised to take measures against the FPI.

His critics argue that the President should have ignored the FPI threat because the group is just too small to make an impact politically, because moderate majority Muslims do not share its brand of Islam. His overreaction has made it as if the FPI were so important that mainstream politics has to reckon with it.

Political analyst Hermawan Sulistyo says the FPI, which has only a few thousand members, has no financial and human resources to mobilize the masses for a revolution as it brags that it has.

To start a revolution it would need at least 100,000 people militant enough to demonstrate for at least four weeks, which would also require a lot of money, he says.

Hermawan may be right. The gargantuan anti-Yudhoyono demonstrations that the FPI promised have not manifested. And, Yudhoyono seems to have forgotten his threat as well, for pressing new issues keep arising.

This whole political comedy should not distract Yudhoyono from the real issue: protecting minorities and punishing people who break the law, not banning organizations, as the right to organize is guaranteed by the Constitution.

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post

Copyright © 2008 The Jakarta Post - PT Bina Media Tenggara. All Rights Reserved
URL: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/12/does-sby...groups.html

Friday, February 18, 2011

Crowds of FPI demonstrators arrive in Central Jakarta

JAKARTA
Fri, 02/18/2011
3:11 PM
Crowds of FPI demonstrators arrive in Central Jakarta
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Hundreds of people representing various Islamic organizations crowded around the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in Central Jakarta at midday on Friday, demanding the government disband the Ahmadiyah sect.

The demonstrators represented, among others, members of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), Islamic Peoples Forum (FUI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.

A report on kompas.com says the protesters carried flags and banners that read “Cut off those who contempt Islam”, “Muslims are ready to guide victims of Ahmadiyah infidels” and “Muslims [must] disband Ahmadiyah”.

The demonstration is a reaction to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s recent statement in which he said that unlawful and violent organizations must be disbanded.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Indonesia under fire for upholding scripture over rights

---Yahoo News (via AFP)

Indonesia under fire for upholding scripture over rights
by Stephen Coates Stephen Coates – Tue Apr 20, 2:16 am ET

JAKARTA (AFP) – Human rights groups pilloried Indonesia’s constitutional court Tuesday after it upheld a 1965 blasphemy law, ruling in favour of orthodox religions over basic freedoms.

The court on Monday rejected a petition by moderate Muslims, religious minorities, democracy advocates and rights groups against the law, in a case seen as a major test of the mainly Muslim country’s pluralism.

By a margin of eight to one, the judges ruled that the law was imperfect but did not contravene the constitution of the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, which guarantees freedoms of belief and expression.

The law carries a maximum punishment of five years for beliefs that deviate from the orthodox versions of six sanctioned faiths: Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Confucianism.

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom, a non-partisan body that advises the US government, said the ruling may embolden religious extremists and foster sectarian strife.

“Hopefully, the Indonesian government will recognise that overturning the blasphemy decree advances its fight against terrorism and extremism, and enhances its reputation for religious tolerance and pluralism,” commission chairman Leonard Leo said.

The law – which effectively outlaws blasphemy as well as heresy – was used in 2008 to force followers of the Islamic Ahmadiyah sect to go underground and is often cited by minorities as a source of discrimination and intimidation.

Islamic extremists packed the court throughout the hearings, heckled witnesses for the petitioners and allegedly assaulted their lawyers on the last day. They greeted the ruling with shouts of “Allahu Akbar” (God is greater).

About 500 police were deployed around the court due to concerns that a ruling against the law would trigger violence by militants from the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), a vigilante group.

Several of the judges said they agreed with the testimony of Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali and Justice and Human Rights Minister Patrialis Akbar that the law was needed to protect minorities from violence.

FPI official Sobri Lubis also claimed the law was vital to maintain religious harmony in the vast archipelago of 234 million people, 90 percent of whom are Muslims.

“We’re very happy with the verdict… This will bring peace of mind to the people,” he said.

US-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) however said the ruling “dealt a severe blow to religious freedom” in the world’s third-largest democracy, which President Barack Obama is scheduled to visit in June.

“Indonesia?s laws should protect those who peacefully express religious views and punish those who threaten to use violence against others, not the other way around,” HRW deputy Asia director Elaine Pearson said.

“If the government wants to prevent violence, it should send a message by punishing violent behaviour.”

US expert Professor Cole Durham, who testified via videolink on behalf of the petitioners, said the decision “represents a missed opportunity” to reconcile the law with Indonesia’s international treaty obligations on human rights and bring the country into line with the trend in other democratic countries.

“This legislation empowers those in dominant religions to persecute and discriminate against those holding divergent views, and this in turn will exacerbate religious tensions in society,” he told AFP.

Moderate Muslim scholar Ulil Abshar Abdallah said the court did not seem to understand the constitution.

“Our constitution clearly guarantees freedom of expression. The law will become a time bomb in the future as it will muzzle minority groups that are different from the six mainstream religions,” he said.

Indonesia court upholds blasphemy law

---Yahoo News (via AP)

Indonesia court upholds blasphemy law
By CHRIS BLAKE, Associated Press Writer – Tue Apr 20, 12:19 am ET

JAKARTA, Indonesia – A decision by Indonesia’s constitutional court to uphold a controversial blasphemy law has dealt a severe blow to religious freedom in the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, a rights group said Tuesday.

The court ruled Monday that the 1965 law, which allows for criminal penalties and bans on people or groups that “distort” the central tenets of six officially recognized religions, was in line with the constitution and was vital to religious harmony.

The law was challenged by a coalition of rights groups and civil society organizations who consider it discriminatory. But it is supported by religious conservatives, including the radical Islamic Defenders Front, which had gathered at the court and threatened to protest if the judges didn’t uphold it.

Although the law recognizes six official religions in the country — the standard forms of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism — rights activists say it discriminates against minority religions, including Muslims whose beliefs differ from the mainstream.

The vast majority of Indonesia’s 235 million people are moderate Sunni Muslims.

Opponents say the law, which carries penalties of up to 5 years in jail, should be struck down because it limits religious freedom — which is constitutionally protected in this secular country.

The court rejected those concerns in its 8-1 decision. The majority said the law was in place to protect all religions from desecration and to ensure religious harmony between faiths. They said the law did not bar other religions such as Judaism from being practiced, but simply protected those covered by the law.

“The law should be upheld because if it is annulled … Islam and the Quran could be interpreted at will and people and figures could declare new prophets and establish new religions,” Minister of Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali said ahead of the ruling.

Critics say the law is vague, allowing authorities to interpret and enforce it how they choose. It has largely been used against those seen as offending mainstream Islam.

They also say hard-line Islamic groups have used the law as justification for violent attacks on minority religious groups.

The government has used the blasphemy law in the past to outlaw religious groups, including Ahmadiyah, a minority Islamic sect banned in 2008 whose members identify themselves as Muslims but don’t believe in the core tenet of Islam that Muhammad is the last prophet.

Elaine Pearson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, said in a statement Tuesday that the court decision “poses a real threat to the beliefs of Indonesia’s religious minorities.”

“The blasphemy law criminalizes the peaceful expression of certain religious beliefs,” she added.

The dissenting judge called the law weak, saying it could be interpreted in multiple ways that lead to discrimination. The judge said the law was written during a revolutionary era when Indonesia’s authoritarian rulers were worried about social unrest and that the law wasn’t needed in modern Indonesia.

“The judges closed their eyes and hearts,” said Chairul Annam, one of the lawyers arguing for the law’s repeal. “We are very sorry that discrimination suffered by minorities in this country was not recognized by the court.”
___
Associated Press writer Niniek Karmini contributed to this report.

URL: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100420/ap_on_re_as/as_indonesia_blasphemy

Monday, April 19, 2010

Indonesian court upholds blasphemy law

---MSN News, Malaysia

By Agence France-Presse, Updated: 4/19/2010

 
Indonesian court upholds blasphemy law

Indonesia’s Constitutional Court on Monday rejected a petition by moderate Muslims, minorities and rights groups against a 1965 blasphemy law, in a ruling seen as a test of the country’s pluralism.

The court ruled that the law was imperfect but did not contravene the constitution of the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country.

“The application has been rejected entirely as the reasons given by the applicants… have no legal basis and are completely unfounded,” chief judge Mahfud MD told the court.

“It’s not contrary to the basic articles in the constitution but it needs to be made clearer.”

The law makes it illegal to “publicise, recommend or organise public support” for any religion other than or different to the orthodox versions of six sanctioned faiths: Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Confucianism.

It was used in 2008 to force followers of the Islamic Ahmadiyah sect to go underground and is regularly cited by minority groups as a source of discrimination and intimidation.

Rights groups and civil society organisations that value the country’s secular traditions say it forces people to adhere to government-sanctioned faiths and limits religious freedom.

About 500 police were deployed around the court due to concerns about violence by Islamist extremists should the judges rule in favour of the petition.

Militants from the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), a vigilante group, had jeered witnesses for the petitioners during the hearings and clashed with their lawyers on the last day, leading to complaints of intimidation.

One of the witnesses, US legal expert Professor Cole Durham, told the court by videolink that “except in most repressive regimes, apostasy and heresy fall under religious, not civil, jurisdiction”.

Speaking on behalf of the petitioners, Setara Institute chairman Hendardi told AFP the court’s decision was disappointing but expected.

“The existence of this law will continue to snatch away the rights of the people to embrace any religion they believe in and to practise it freely,” he said.

FPI secretary-general Sobri Lubis applauded the court’s decision and said the law was needed to maintain religious harmony in the vast archipelago of 234 million people, 90 percent of whom are Muslims.

“We’re very happy with the verdict. This shows the commitment from the government and the religious groups to maintain the religious purity of the recognised faiths in Indonesia including Islam,” he said.

“This will bring peace of mind to the people.”

Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali and Justice and Human Rights Minister Patrialis Akbar publicly opposed the petition.

Ali warned that the law was needed to maintain social harmony and prevent an explosion of “new religions”.

URL: http://news.malaysia.msn.com/regional/article.aspx?cp-documentid=4038366

Court beefs up security ahead of ruling

---The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Headlines | Mon, 04/19/2010 9:28 AM
Court beefs up security ahead of ruling
Arghea Desafti Hapsari, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta


To prepare for possible clashes when it announces its verdict on a judicial review petition on the Blasphemy Law, the Constitutional Court is beefing up security at the building.

The court’s general bureau chief, Noor Sidharta, told The Jakarta Post on Sunday that he had requested Jakarta Police deploy 500 officers to guard the court building complex this afternoon when judges will read out their much-awaited verdict.

Previous hearings of the controversial judicial review request of the law were guarded by 300 officers.

“We learned from [the incident] the other day. Now we are preparing twice the usual number of police officers,” Noor said, referring to an altercation during recess at the last hearing between followers of the hard-line Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and several members of a team of lawyers for the petitioners.

Officials fear violence could break out, especially in the wake of last week’s deadly brawl in Koja, North Jakarta, where the FPI and other organizations joined hundreds of local residents in street battles with security officers over an Islamic shrine.

FPI supporters also attacked activists from the National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion who had gathered at Monas Park in the middle of 2008.

The activists were conducting a peace rally supporting religious pluralism. A court found an FPI leader guilty of the violence and sentenced him to 18 months in prison.

Muslim scholar Azyumardi Azra warned of a repeat of the attacks by hard-line groups.“Those involved in any demonstrations should refrain from breaking the law,” he said.

He also called on the police to be extra vigilant.


“Those [hard-line] organizations have leaders. The police have to grow a pair and take action against them if they get violent. Don’t let them walk away without being held responsible for their deeds. If police let them off the hook, they will keep doing it,” he told the Post.

He criticized the fact that members of Muslim organizations were too easily mobilized in the name of Islam.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization, is among those who have voiced concern over possible violence if the court rules in favor of the petitioners and repeals the 45-year-old law.

“Violence should not be a means to force one’s viewpoint on others. Everyone has to view the ruling with an open mind, regardless of the ruling,” Masdar Farid Mas’udi, a member of NU’s lawmaking body, said.

Indonesians, Masdar added, trusted the court to solve the legal dispute, so “we must respect its decisions”. Islamic organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) said it would not stage a rally ahead of Monday’s ruling, although it would object to a ruling in favor of the petitioners.

“We understand the [court’s] decision will be based on facts presented in the hearings,” HTI spokesman Ismail Yusanto said.

URL: http://beta.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/04/19/...head-ruling.html

Monday, March 15, 2010

Bangladesh: Checking Islamist Extremism in a Pivotal Democracy

--- The Heritage Foundation, USA              RESEARCH
 

This is a Backgrounder On Asia, National Security and Defense, Worldwide Freedom and Human Rights, South Asia, Southeast Asia and War Against Terrorism

Bangladesh: Checking Islamist Extremism in a Pivotal Democracy

Published on March 15, 2010 by Maneeza Hossain and Lisa Curtis

Abstract: Bangladesh , the world’s third largest Muslim-majority nation, is facing challenges from violent Islamist groups. The government is cracking down on radical groups and emphasizing the democratic principles of the country’s founding, but radical Islamism still threatens to undermine stability in Bangladesh. Radicalization and terrorism are directly linked to government corruption and a lack of trust in the representative political process. To build trust in the political process, Bangladesh needs to strengthen its democratic institutions and develop a culture of transparency in the government that fosters accountability and restrains corruption.

The restoration of democratic government in Bangladesh, the world’s third largest Muslim-majority nation, has helped to counter the immediate threat from Islamist extremists. Three years ago, when elections were postponed due to escalating political violence, observers warned that Bangladesh’s traditional culture of tolerance and moderation was threatened by the political clashes as well as by rising Islamist militancy. Since the December 2008 election, the new government led by Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League, has taken steps to stem Islamist extremism in Bangladesh by cracking down on radical groups and emphasizing the democratic principles of the country’s founding.
However, like many nations in the “Muslim world,” Bangladesh continues to struggle to define the role of Islam in society and governance. A robust civil society, a vibrant community of nongovernmental organizations, an independent judiciary, and active participation of women in the social and economic sectors have thus far contributed to denying extremists a foothold in the country. Yet Washington needs to remain closely engaged with Dhaka and continue to encourage democratic trends and steady development of the country’s economy.

Until millions of Bangladeshis are raised out of poverty, governing institutions are strengthened further, and corruption is controlled, Bangladesh will face a threat from Islamist extremists seeking to undermine the country’s democratic institutions and tolerant traditions. Preventing Bangladesh–a nation with 140 million Muslims–from falling prey to a volatile mix of radicalization and political unrest should be a top priority for Western policymakers. The U.S. should seek new ways to partner with the Bangladeshi government to stem the influence of Islamists so that they do not become an urgent threat to the country.

A Return to Democracy

More than a year has passed since the elections that put Bangladesh back on the democratic path. On January 11, 2007, the Bangladeshi military intervened in a precarious democratic process, effectively removing Bangladesh from the list of recognized democracies. One more Muslim-majority nation seemed to be heading toward prolonged autocratic rule. In December 2008, however, Bangladeshi democracy received another lease on life with elections that international observers deemed credible.

The return of democracy to Bangladesh is a welcome development, but the country continues to face challenges from groups that support Islamist ideologies as well as from groups that violently oppose the state. Without concerted action by government authorities and increased awareness among the Bangladeshi public about the agendas of these groups, the political center of gravity in Bangladesh could shift increasingly toward Islamism.[1]

While moderation and religious tolerance continue to be defining features of Bangladeshi politics, the secular discourse and ideals upon which Bangladesh was founded in 1971 have been diluted. Arguably, the process of integrating Islam more fully into the political sphere began as early as 1975, after General Ziaur Rahman assumed the presidency. He removed the reference to “secularism,” a fundamental principle of Bangladeshi nationhood, from the preamble of the Bangladeshi constitution and replaced it with a new clause asserting that “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah” should be “the basis of all actions.” Zia also lifted the ban on religious political parties, thus allowing Islamists a role within the political realm. Furthermore, to prove his own Islamic credentials, General Hussain Ershad, Zia’s successor, declared Islam the state religion in 1988.[2] These military regimes, which took power through coups in 1975 and 1982, respectively, generally pursued policies of Islamization to gain political legitimacy.[3]

Islamist ideas have thus become more prevalent in the country’s political discourse, a process spurred by the rising fortunes of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the predominant Islamist political party. The two major political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League, have found it politically expedient to create space for political Islam in their own campaign rhetoric and to form short-term and long-term alliances with Islamist political parties. When the BNP ruled the country from 2001 to 2006, it formed an alliance with the JI, allowing JI members to hold cabinet positions for the first time. Although the JI has captured only about 6 percent to 8 percent of the vote in the past four elections, it is considered a kingmaker in Bangladeshi politics. Just before the 2007 election, the Awami League, which trumpets its secular credentials, found it politically expedient to reach out to the Islami Okiyo Jote, a smaller and more radical Islamist party.

The emergence of violent Islamist groups in Bangladesh over the past decade is another worrisome trend, although the Bangladeshi authorities have demonstrated a willingness to deal firmly with the threat. A handful of transnational terrorist groups, some with connections to Pakistan-based groups, stepped up attacks against the state in 2004-2005. On August 17, 2005, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) conducted the most spectacular of these attacks, a coordinated series of bombings throughout the country. On November 29, 2005, at least nine people were killed in another series of attacks on Bangladeshi courts, which further demonstrated that Islamist groups were seeking to weaken the state.[4] The bombings served as a wake-up call to the Bangladeshi government about the need to control Islamist terrorist groups. In March 2007, the military-backed caretaker government tried and executed six JMB leaders for their involvement in the August 2005 bombings.

While violent groups increased their attacks against the state, Islamist political parties initiated a campaign against the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh and demanded that the government declare them non-Muslims.[5] In 2004, the Bangladeshi government, then led by the BNP, banned the publication, sale, distribution, and preservation of all books and booklets on Islam published by the Ahmadiyya in Bangladesh. In June 2005, Islamists set fire to an Ahmadiyya mosque in Brahmanbaria and detonated more than two dozen bombs, injuring two people.[6] As Bangladesh scholar Dr. Ali Riaz noted in 2004, “The accommodation of political Islam [in Bangladesh]…has created a context within which political radicalism and social intolerance are increasing and soon may become the mainstay of politics.”[7]

However, the U.S. State Department reported in its 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that the Bangladesh government has improved its protection of religious minorities, including the Ahmadiyyas. The report also noted that the Bangladesh High Court stayed the government ban on publishing Ahmadiyya literature, effectively allowing Ahmadiyyas to publish.[8]

The current Awami League government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has demonstrated its determination to deal firmly with violent Islamist groups and to roll back Islamist trends within the country’s politics.[9] The Hasina government’s October 23rd banning of the Islamist extremist group Hizbut Tahrir is one indicator that the Bangladesh government is taking a tough stance toward extremism and is committed to ensuring the country remains on a democratic and peaceful path. The Appellate Division of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court also recently upheld the 2005 High Court decision to reinstate the ban on religious political parties, which was lifted in 1979 by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Appellate Division dismissed two petitions challenging the High Court ruling, which had found the Fifth Amendment “illegal and unconstitutional.” It is unclear whether the decision will lead to the official banning of religion-based parties.

Evolution of Bangladeshi Identity

Bangladesh (previously East Pakistan) was born in 1971 as a reaction to perceived exploitation and repression by the country’s leaders located in West Pakistan (now Pakistan). Two main elements of identity have shaped the people in this land: the Islamic faith and Bengali culture. The cultural element gained prominence immediately after the War of Liberation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed this local conflict as another manifestation of their proxy confrontation, and Bangladesh became a battlefield for competing regional and international interests, with Pakistan supporting local forces to counter India’s influence. An ally of India and the Soviet Union, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the charismatic figure at the founding of the Bangladesh nation, incorporated secularism and socialism as national ideals enshrined in the Constitution. However, in its early years, the Bangladesh government failed in its nation-building tasks, and Sheikh Mujib even resorted to the one-party rule.

Bangladesh became a sustained democratic system only in 1991, with the election of Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The two subsequent elections were bitterly contested, but the results were still accepted. Regrettably, democratic government further amplified corruption, which was an endemic problem that predated the democratic era. The economic opportunities of the globalizing world of the 1990s also brought a modest prosperity to some Bangladeshis. The democratic era thus became a breeding ground for the vicious circle of corruption, patronage, and popular resentment.

In the context of democracy’s eroding credibility, support for Islamist ideas began to grow in Bangladesh. The fading memory of the War of Liberation diluted the importance of nationalism in the political identity of Bangladesh and allowed the Islamic element of this identity to gain ascendancy. Globalization also enhanced Middle Eastern influences, both through the influx of funds from Islamic charitable organizations seeking to foster new Islamic learning and social services institutions and through migrant workers who returned from Gulf states with new ideas about the relationship between state and religion.[10]

Impact of the Caretaker Government (2007-2008)

The army takeover of January 11, 2007, was carried out in the name of cleansing the political process of both corruption and terrorism. Most Bangladeshis initially supported the Bangladesh Army’s action as the only option to save the country from political disaster and a potential bloodbath. Three years later, however, the army appears to have failed to root out corruption. Indeed, Bangladeshi media has reported some cases of corruption by the military-backed civilian rulers.[11]

On the issue of terrorism, the military-backed government of 2007-2008 made notable progress, arresting and executing Islamist activists involved in terrorism. The military-backed government also commissioned a report on effective ways to address the terrorism issue. As such, the government’s main thrust in handling the terrorism problem was to view it as a criminal phenomenon. This tendency has influenced the approach subsequently adopted by the Hasina government.

A less helpful legacy of the military-backed government is the precedent that it set by suspending the democratic process. This plays into one of the ideological underpinnings of extremism and terrorism, the political proposition that questions the validity of democracy and the legitimacy of popular sovereignty. Although the Bangladeshi people initially viewed the state of emergency as necessary given the rising political tensions in the country, they nevertheless welcomed the 2008 elections and the return to democracy.

The imposition of military-backed rule for 18 months has increased doubts of many Bangladeshis about civilian authority over the army. Rumors of an impending coup flourish in the country, and faith in Hasina’s leadership fluctuates accordingly.

Mutiny Challenges Hasina Government

Sheikh Hasina faced the most severe challenge to her leadership in February 2009 when a mutiny in the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), one corps of the armed forces, degenerated into a massacre. The government’s handling of events had the potential to create a confrontation with the military. However, it managed the crisis deftly and averted a catastrophe.

The exact circumstances that led to the mutiny on February 25-26, 2009, have not yet been fully uncovered. The BDR is a border guard force of about 67,000, led by Bangladeshi army officers. While government and military investigations have explored the events at length, many questions remain unanswered, and competing narratives are circulating in different segments of the Bangladeshi political spectrum. What is known is that BDR elements took over a portion of the Dhaka Cantonment, the main concentration of military offices and residences in the country, and made public demands for parity with the Army on benefits and promotions. By the second day, the unrest had spread to at least 12 other towns. The mutiny ended with the mutineers surrendering their arms and releasing their hostages after negotiations with the government.

No solid evidence yet indicates exactly who instigated the mutiny or whether the purpose of the mutiny went beyond the stated demands of the mutineers for higher pay and better employment benefits. The intensity of the atrocities–including the massacre of dozens of high-ranking military officers, disfiguration and dismemberment of army personnel, and rape of female family members of the officers–was clearly disproportionate to the mutineers’ demands.

Several questions remain: Were the atrocities the results of miscalculations and uncontrollable excesses, or were they part of a deliberate attempt to weaken the army? If it was an attempt to weaken the army, who is behind the conspiracy? One member of Hasina’s cabinet has called the mutiny a “deep-rooted conspiracy” by people intent on destabilizing the country.[12]

Islamism as an Existential Threat

The largely socialist and secular background of today’s Bangladeshi cultural elite contrasts with broader society, which is growing more conservative in religious practices and mores. The reasons behind this trend are numerous. Locally, the emergence of distinct social classes and the identification of some segments of the elite with a Western way of life have triggered a reaction toward a more conservative outlook. Contributing factors include the abundance of satellite television channels that preach more dogmatic forms of the religion and the large number of Bangladeshi migrant workers returning home from Gulf states where they acquired different values. Islamists have injected themselves into this environment of greater religious conservatism, adding components of activism and intolerance.

This sociocultural dynamic is significant and needs to be monitored. Islamists do not generally state a political vision at the outset, but the socioeconomic needs of the people provide the Islamists with an opening to begin influencing the grassroots of society. Islamists engage in a bait-and-switch process, entering through a social question and then eventually promoting a political formula. In reality, their political formula is negation of the existing system. They argue that the current order is illegitimate and needs to be changed and that Islam is the solution, but leave the specifics of this solution unexplained. Still, in their relentless rejection of the current order, Islamists capitalize on and amplify the resentment toward the ruling elite. They also undermine the legitimacy of the state and question the foundations of democracy.

Bangladesh is grounded in a tradition of pluralism and its aspiration for sound democratic governance. Furthermore, indications are that Bangladeshis have become increasingly devout in their religious practices, but are uncomfortable with any notion of increased state engagement in religious affairs. However, there are some signs that Bangladeshi confidence in democratic values has receded. Islamists are actively seeking to uproot these values further, and the trend may be toward losing the pluralistic values of liberal society, unless proactive steps are taken. Radical Islamism should be treated as an existential threat to the country.

Three Types of Islamism

Islamism as a political ideology, which aims at redefining sovereignty in Islamic terms, has coalesced into three main approaches globally.[13] These approaches can be described as evolutionary, revolutionary, and opportunistic.

Evolutionary Islamism. The evolutionary model is represented in Bangladesh and the rest of South Asia by the Jamaat-e-Islami. The JI seeks to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic state, in which the people and the parliament no longer have sovereignty, but JI seeks to achieve this goal by working within the existing laws and conventions of the country.[14] The JI Islamist project proceeds incrementally from individual to family to society to state through a process of Islamization that seeks to reshape everyday life according to the Islamists’ understanding of Islam.

Evolutionary Islamism is accommodating of existing systems and institutions, but operates with the underlying belief that these structures will naturally dissolve as the project moves forward. JI is willing to contest elections and assume responsibilities of government–behaving as any other political party–with the implicit conviction that this is merely a temporary framework until the Islamist ideal is realized. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is another evolutionary Islamist group.

Revolutionary Islamism. In the revolutionary model, Islamists reject the temporary compromise on principal or simply make no space to accommodate it. Instead, they choose to openly confront the existing system. The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh follows this model.

Opportunistic Islamism. The opportunistic model, which is less prominent in global Islamism, also rejects any legitimacy outside the Islamic framework. Opportunistic Islamists do not seek an immediate open confrontation with the existing order, but instead are inclined to seed state institutions, particularly the military, with their own activists to usher in a momentous transformation when the time is right.

The Hizbut Tahrir can be called opportunistic Islamists. Any effort to counter the effects of these groups in Bangladesh needs to be informed by their global ideological context, but the idiosyncratic histories of these groups in Bangladesh may also be important in devising ways to contain them.

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami is by far the oldest, largest, and most deeply rooted Islamist organization in Bangladesh. It has maintained a constant presence in the Bangladeshi National Parliament since the restoration of democracy in 1991, although it secured only two seats in parliament in the December 2008 elections. Its youth organization has branches nationwide and is an effective recruitment arm for the political party. Its network of social services offers impoverished constituents basic health and an invitation to political patronage. The JI has faced two main handicaps in the past few years: the revival of political interest in reexamining its role in the 1971 War of Liberation and its long-term association with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), a political party that faced a serious setback in the most recent elections.

While it can be argued that any liberation war is also a civil war, the cultural consensus in Bangladesh is to draw a clear line between those who sought independence and those who supported the Pakistani Army’s repression of the independence movement. In 1971, supporters of Pakistan as the Muslim state of the Indian subcontinent argued that the independence movement in East Pakistan was a secessionist action instigated by India to undermine the integrity and power of the Islamic state. The JI’s role in supporting West Pakistan and the repressive measures of its army has since been recast by political opponents as collaboration in genocide. The JI leadership, largely due to political circumstances and military rule, has so far largely escaped being stigmatized by this accepted version of history. However, the constant threat of being tarred by these accusations indirectly helps to prevent the JI from overtly undermining democracy in Bangladesh.

From the point of view of the Awami League and its allies, the JI’s active participation in the BNP government from 2001-2006 justified the invocation of the anti-JI weapon of raising the issue of the 1971 war crimes. In an attempt to court the Awami League and the left-leaning part of the political spectrum, the 2007-2008 military-backed government reintroduced the question of a special tribunal for the war criminals of 1971. Over the past few decades, the military’s apparent oscillation on questions relating to the JI and the targeting of Islamists likely reflects internal divergences within the military. On the other hand, the interactions between the military and JI demonstrate the army leadership’s ability to balance and manipulate the political system. During two years of military-backed rule, the army leadership seemed to explore various approaches in managing the diverse political forces, finally choosing to endorse much of the Awami League’s program.

Today, having inherited the war crimes issue from the military-backed caretaker government, the Awami League finds it advantageous to raise the issue in its quest to dismantle the BNP, its opposition. Prosecution of the 1971 war crimes has limited support in some segments of Bangladeshi society, but it is widely seen as a political issue aimed primarily at discrediting the JI, rather than as a societal issue to be resolved in the interest of national reconciliation.

Supporters of holding trials view them as a means to curtail the JI’s influence and as a potentially fatal blow to the organization. However, seeking to counter the JI only through the courts would be misguided. The JI, as an evolutionary Islamist group, is engaged in a generational quest to change Bangladeshi society and government. Court actions may distract it, but they are unlikely to derail its long-term project. It is noteworthy that JI’s leaders consider the December 2008 elections a victory, even though its representation in parliament dwindled to just two seats. Jamaat-e-Islami representatives instead highlight the fact that JI candidates received more votes in 2008 than they did in 2001. These votes may not have translated into parliamentary seats, but they demonstrate that the party is making incremental gains in the electorate.

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh

On August 17, 2005, the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh staged a spectacular series of coordinated bombings across the nation, detonating approximately 400 devices within the space of 45 minutes in 63 of the country’s 64 districts, but killing only three people. The JMB apparently believed that this dramatic action would usher in the rise of a revolutionary Islamist insurgency. Sporadic terrorist operations followed the August bombings, further demonstrating the JMB’s goals in the country. The language that the JMB used to justify its attacks was sharp, unyielding, and consistent with global jihadist discourse. The JMB argued that the Bangladesh government was corrupt and that its democratic system should be rejected.[15]

The military-backed government of 2007-2008 tried the JMB ringleaders in court and eventually executed them without taking special legal measures. Vigorous enforcement against the JMB seems to have largely curtailed the group’s operations, although Bangladeshi authorities discovered a JMB-connected bomb factory in an Islamic school in the Bhola district in the spring of 2009. Local villagers had noticed suspicious activity at the school and alerted the authorities.[16] The JMB has thus far shown little ability to penetrate social environments in Bangladesh that could be tapped to sustain an insurgency. Yet the JMB’s possible revival into a renewed threat to the Bangladeshi state and society cannot be ruled out, especially with international players seeking a foothold in murky Bangladeshi politics. The spectacular character of the JMB’s “baptism of fire,” the series of coordinated bombings, seems also to have created a well-known brand name for the group among international extremist networks, as evidenced by the group’s technologically savvy presence on the Internet.

Sources in the Bangladesh government have indicated that many operational aspects of the synchronized bombings were outsourced to other insurgent groups, such as a hard-line communist insurgency that operates in Bangladeshi rural areas. However, this should be viewed as a strength, not a weakness, of the JMB. In fact, the JMB has demonstrated sophistication in its Web presence, elusive networks, and associations with unlikely partners.

Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh

The Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HuJI-B) is an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), a pan-Islamist terrorist group that has the stated goal of combating worldwide oppression of Muslims. The HuJI originally formed to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It then focused its militant activities against India in Jammu and Kashmir throughout the 1990s, and it now fights alongside the Taliban and al-Qaeda against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan-based HuJI leader Ilyas Kashmiri has been targeted by U.S. drone missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas and was recently named by the FBI as co-conspirator in plots to attack India and Denmark.

The HuJI-B was formed under the leadership of Shafiqur Rehman in 1992 by Bangladeshi veterans of the 1980s war in Afghanistan, and it likely maintains close connections with the Pakistan-based HuJI.[17] The U.S. State Department designated HuJI-B as a foreign terrorist organization in March 2008. In late January 2010, Indian authorities reportedly arrested a HuJI-B operative who had planned to attack Hyderabad, India, on Indian Republic Day.[18]

Hizbut Tahrir

Between JI’s temporary acceptance of the democratic process and the JMB and HuJI-B’s unequivocal rejection is qualified coexistence with the system, as practiced by the Hizbut Tahrir (HUT). This group presents itself globally as the party of the restoration of the Caliphate, the universal Islamic state that transcends nationalities and political borders.[19] Hizbut Tahrir seeks to achieve its goal through de facto acceptance of established order in Muslim majority societies, while aggressively questioning the legitimacy of any system other than the universal Islamic state.

Globally, Hizbut Tahrir has only rarely been implicated in violent or terrorist actions, but it has been banned in Germany, Russia, Kazakhstan, and a handful of other countries. The Bangladesh government banned HUT’s Bangladesh chapter after an unidentified group bombed a ruling party parliamentarian on October 21, 2009. The government said it would not punish HUT activists for past offenses, but warned them not to continue “anti-state” activities. Mohiuddin Ahmed, the HUT chief coordinator in Bangladesh and a professor at Dhaka University, was put on “forced leave indefinitely.”[20]

HUT is the fifth militant organization to be outlawed in Bangladesh since 2001.[21] Previously, it was suggested that leaders in the Bangladeshi Armed Forces viewed HUT in its discipline and professional outlook as a counterproposition to the revolutionary Islamism of the JMB and similar groups.[22] However, this view ignored the potent radicalization effect of HUT. As described by former HUT members in the United Kingdom, the organization instills in its youthful recruits a sense of alienation and isolation from the wider society.[23] HUT leads its members on a path to radicalization and rejection of the established order. It is unclear whether HUT engaged directly in terrorism in Bangladesh, but it has staged intimidating demonstrations that apparently provoked people to violence.[24]

HUT originally drew the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities after a grenade attack on British High Commissioner to Bangladesh Anwar Choudhury in May 2004. Bangladeshi press reported that, two days before the incident, HUT supporters had posted anti-British and anti-U.S. posters at the shrine where Choudhury was later attacked. Although HUT may not be a force of insurgency, it is a major driver of radicalization.
 
 What the U.S. Should Do

As Bangladesh seeks to limit the influence of radical Islamists and to prevent extremist ideologies from taking root in the country, the U.S. should:
 
  • Assist Bangladesh in improving its democratic process. Bangladesh is an imperfect democracy. Radicalization and terrorism are directly linked to corruption and a lack of trust in the representative political process. Thus, it is important for the U.S. to help Bangladesh to engage in a long-term reform of its democratic practices and to address endemic problems, such as strong-arm politics and the perpetual rejection of electoral defeat. The Hasina government can help this process by focusing on developing a common civic sense that places nation and state ahead of party and dynastic politics.
  • Urge the Bangladesh government to develop a culture of transparency that fosters accountability and restrains corruption. One way to encourage greater transparency is to require all government agencies and departments to issue periodic reports detailing their activities and disbursements of funds. Disclosure should become the norm, and withholding information should require justification. The current administrative culture of Bangladesh remains afflicted by both secrecy and ad hoc reporting. Transitioning to a more predictable, more transparent relationship with the citizenry is essential to establishing good governance. 
  • Support Bangladesh in strengthening and streamlining its judicial system. In Bangladesh there is a critical vacuum in the law and order system. Even secular liberal democrats do not trust the legal system. The legitimacy of the political process has largely relied on charismatic leadership, rather than strong and enduring institutions. The evolution of Bangladeshi democracy into a reliable system based on consistent laws and individual accountability remains a major challenge.
  • Support Bangladesh in developing a comprehensive approach to countering extremism and terrorism. Dhaka needs to resist the temptation to view terrorism as solely a criminal issue or an imported ideology. It is a combination of the two. Bangladesh needs to recognize the importance of addressing the radicalization as more than a criminal issue.[25] For example, the main leaders of the JMB were prosecuted and executed, but the organization continues to exist and evolve. In addition to decapitating the organization, the government needs to pursue the JMB’s ideological links to other organizations and individuals and work to prevent the spread of extremist ideas. The Hasina government is starting to grasp the complexity of the terrorism issue. Washington should support the Bangladesh government in adopting a comprehensive approach to dealing with the challenges posed by extremist ideologies.
  • Support Bangladesh in working with other Muslim states and societies that are countering radicalism. Initiatives to counter radicalism are best conceived and implemented at the nongovernmental level, with local civil society actors assuming the primary role. While radical Islam has a global narrative, the most efficient responses to it are formulated at the local level, with regional and international counterradicalism networks providing support and sharing ideas. Bangladesh can also contribute to building up international networks to counter radicalism by sharing its own experiences of fusing local culture with Islam in a way that upholds democratic values, supports religious tolerance and pluralism, and serves as a bulwark against violent groups seeking to weaken the state.
  • Support the Bangladesh government in developing a reintegration program for migrant workers returning to Bangladeshi society. Bangladeshi religious leaders should take a role in ensuring that Bangladeshi laborers returning from the Gulf region understand that there is no dichotomy between Bengali culture and the religion of Islam. Returning migrant workers from the Gulf have often been exposed to new ideas about the relationship between state and religion and/or have been influenced into thinking that Islam as practiced in Saudi Arabia is somehow superior to Islam as traditionally practiced in Bangladesh. Insistence on the validity of Bengali Islam can counter the destructive impulse of reductionist Islamist ideas, the seeds of which can be planted in Bangladeshi laborers during extended stays in the Gulf.
  • Encourage Bangladesh to build on the strength of its culture to offer women relative freedom and choice in both the public and the private spheres. Since independence, women, regardless of social class, have assumed important roles in Bangladeshi society and have been active participants in socioeconomic life. Confronting Islamism in the social sphere should focus on the empowerment of women as individual, productive, and full members of society, not on the type of clothing they wear. The success of microfinance programs in Bangladesh that primarily lend to women demonstrates the benefits of women’s active involvement in economic life. Bangladesh should build on this success.
  • Support the depoliticization of the debate surrounding radical Islam. The issue of radicalization should not be politicized for short-term gains against political opponents. Trials of the 1971 war crimes, in particular, could easily be misused for narrow political purposes, undermining a process of recovery and national reconciliation that is still lagging. The U.S. government should encourage Bangladesh to openly debate issues of national import, but discourage the parties from exploiting such issues for narrow political purposes.
Conclusion

While Bangladesh has so far met the challenges from creeping Islamist radicalization, the situation inside the country remains somewhat precarious. The local challenges in Bangladesh have been amplified by the injection of an internationally minded radicalization process. However, the assets that Bangladesh has accumulated over the past four decades remain a solid base for a potential recovery and reversal of Islamist radicalization.

The U.S. should stand ready to support local Bangladeshi actors, while recognizing that a free Bangladeshi society and democratic government must take the lead role and responsibility in meeting these challenges.

Maneeza Hossain is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

APPENDIX

SOURCES FOR TABLE 1: TEN KEY ISLAMIST GROUPS IN BANGLADESH

Islamist Political Groups

Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami: Jamaat-e-Islami, “Maulana Motiur Rahman Nizami,” at http://jamaat-e-islami.org/index.php?option=com_popup_org&Sub_Menu=PR&Info_Id=12 (February 5, 2010); Bangla2000, “Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh,” at http://www.bangla2000.com/Election_2001/Manifesto_Jamaat-e-Islami.shtm (February 9, 2010); and Anis Ahmed, “Former PM Hasina Wins Landslide in Bangladesh Poll,” Reuters, December 30, 2008, at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4BR0KL20081230 (February 24, 2010).

Islami Oikyo Jote: “Salauddin Qader on PM’s India Visit: People Want to See Positive Outcome,” The New Nation, January 8, 2010, at http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/01/09/news0687.htm (February 9, 2010); Ali Riaz, Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008), p. 159; and Swati Parashar, “Engage Bangladesh Before It Is Too Late,” Asia Times, April 4, 2006, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South _Asia/HD04Df01.html (February 24, 2010).

Islamic Democratic Party: Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); Islamic Democratic Party, Dhaka City Branch, Web site, at http://www.islamicdemocraticpartydhakacitybranch.blogspot.com (February 5, 2010); U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, April 2009, pp. 297-298, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf (December 30, 2009); and Indo-Asian News Service, “12 Militant Outfits Active in Bangladesh: Home Ministry,” Thaindian News, March 17, 2009, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/wrld-news/12-militant-outfits-active-in-bangladesh-home-ministry_100167313.html (February 8, 2009).

Islamist Grassroots Organizations

Hizbut Tahrir: Khilafat.org, “About Us,” at http://www.khilafat.org/newPages/Contact/contact.php (February 9, 2010); Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def (February 9, 2010); BBC News, “Bangladesh Islamist Group Banned,” October 23, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south _asia/8321329.stm (February 8, 2010); and South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Bangladesh Timeline Year 2008,” at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2008.htm (February 9, 2010).

Islami Chhatra Shibir: “24 Key Shibir Leaders ‘Quit’ over RU Violence,” The Daily Star (Dhaka, Bangladesh), February 23, 2010; Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir, “Central President’s Profile,” at http://shibir.org.bd/indexeng.php/organization/presidentbiography (February 24, 2010); “Rampage at RU,” The Daily Star, February 10, 2010 at http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=125635 (March 2, 2010); and “Shibir, BCL Trade Gunfire on RU Campus,” bdnews24.com, February 9, 2010, at http://bdnews24.com/details/php?id=153204 (February 10, 2010).

Islamist Militant Groups

Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh: Animesh Roul, “Islam-O-Muslim and the Resilience of Terrorism in Bangladesh,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, July 27, 2009, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35326 (February 9, 2010); National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh,” at http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4497 (January 6, 2010); and DAWN, “Six Militants Executed in Bangladesh,” March 31, 2007, at http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/31/top14.htm (February 9, 2010).

Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh: South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Jangrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh,” at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm (February 9, 2010); National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh,” at http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4587 (December 30, 2009); and Paul Cochrane, “The Funding Methods of Bangladeshi Terrorist Groups,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 5 (May 2009), pp. 17-23, at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss5.pdf (February 9, 2010).

Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh: Chaitanya Chandra Halder and Kailash Sarkar, “Huji Founder Makes Startling Confession,” The Daily Star, December 4, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=116253 (February 9, 2010), and U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, April 2009, pp. 297-298, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf (December 30, 2009)

Shahadat-e al Hikma: Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); and Indo-Asian News Service, “12 Militant Outfits Active in Bangladesh: Home Ministry,” Thaindian News, March 17, 2009, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/wrld-news/12-militant-outfits-active-in-bangladesh-home-ministry_100167313.html (February 8, 2009).

Hizbut Touhid: Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, “Islamist Militancy Group Hizbut Towhid in Action in Bangladesh,” American Chronicle, October 3, 2009, at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/120840 (March 2, 2010); Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/ modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); Amanur Aman, “31 Hizb-ut Towhid Men Arrested in Kushtia,” The Daily Star, April 18, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=84464 (February 9, 2010); South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Bangladesh Timeline Year 2009,” at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2009.htm (February 10, 2010); and Indo-Asian News Service, “12 Militant Outfits Active in Bangladesh: Home Ministry,” Thaindian News, March 17, 2009, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/wrld-news/12-militant-outfits-active-in-bangladesh-home-ministry_100167313.html (February 8, 2009).



  1. For further details on this process, see Maneeza Hossain, Broken Pendulum: Bangladesh’s Swing to Radicalism (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2008).
  2. Ali Riaz, “‘God Willing’: The Politics and Ideology of Islamism in Bangladesh,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East , Vol. 23, Nos. 1-2 (2003), pp. 310-312, at http://www.cssaame.com/issues/23/34.pdf (March 1, 2010).
  3. Ali Riaz, Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008), p. 139.
  4. Ali Riaz, “Bangladesh in 2005: Standing at a Crossroads,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 1 (January/February 2006), p. 107, at http://my.ilstu.edu/~ariaz/as.2006.46.1.pdf (March 1, 2010).
  5. The Ahmadiyya Jamaat has approximately 10 million followers in the world, but only about 100,000 are in Bangladesh. Toward the end of the 19th century, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), founder of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat, broke with centuries-old Islamic dogma by claiming to be an Islamic prophet. (Mainstream Muslims believe that the Prophet Mohammad was the last prophet.) In the 1950s, Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, published the controversial pamphlet “The Qadiani [Ahmadi] Question and the Finality of Prophethood,” which argued that Ahmadiyya was an entirely new religion that should not be associated with Islam. The Ahmadis have been declared non-Muslims in Pakistan.
  6. Riaz, “Bangladesh in 2005,” p. 110.
  7. Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Landam, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), p. 143.
  8. U.S. Department of State, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices , s.v. “Bangladesh,” February 25, 2009, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119132.htm (March 1, 2010).
  9. Such recent actions include the banning of Hizbut Tahrir and Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami and the arrest of the leadership of the latter. See BBC News, “Bangladesh Islamist Group Banned,” October 23, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8321329.stm (March 1, 2010).
  10. Riaz, Faithful Education, pp. 142-143.
  11. Rashidul Hasan, “Ministry to Sue Matin for Container Deal: Accused of Graft, Violation of Constitution,” The Daily Star (Dhaka, Bangladesh), August 14, 2009.
  12. Julhas Alam, “Bangladesh Mutiny: 1,000 Guards Charged over Massacre,” The Huffington Post, March 1, 2009, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/01/bangladesh-mutiny-1000-gu_n_170864.html (January 5, 2010).
  13. In this paper, Islamism, or political Islam, refers to an ideology that supports the goal of establishing an Islamic state or government. While different Islamist groups vary as to which tactics they support to reach their goals, they share common beliefs, including opposition to political and/or religious pluralism and rejection of democracy as un-Islamic. Hassan Mneimneh, “Convergence? The Homogenization of Islamist Doctrines in Gaza,” Hudson Institute, Current Trends, December 16, 2009, at http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gaza (March 1, 2010).
  14. Riaz, God Willing , p. 15.
  15. Hassan Mneimneh, “Seven Years Later: The Jihadist International,” American Enterprise Institute Middle Eastern Outlook No. 6, September 2008, at http://www.aei.org/outlook/28598 (October 28, 2009).
  16. “Out of Action: Bangladesh Cracks Down on Terrorists,” Asia Pacific Defense Forum, Vol. 34, Issue 3 (3rd Quarter, 2009), p. 11.
  17. Ali Riaz, testimony before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on Bangladesh, December 4, 2008.
  18. Press Trust of India, “Huji Man’s Arrest Spares Another Terror Attack on Hyderabad,” Daily News and Analysis (India), January 19, 2010, at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_huji-man-s-arrest-spares-another-terror-attack-on-hyderabad_1336729 (March 1, 2010).
  19. Hizbut Tahrir, “About Us,” at http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/1-19-about-us.aspx (March 4, 2010).
  20. “2 Hizbut Offices Raided,” The Daily Star, October 26, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=111369 (March 4, 2010).
  21. The other four outlawed military organizations are HuJI-B, JMB, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, and Shahadat-e-Al Hikma.
  22. Private conversation with confidential source, Dhaka, Bangladesh, August 21, 2009.
  23. Quilliam, “Quilliam Outreach and Training Unit,” at http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/quilliam-outreach-and-training-unit.html (March 4, 2010).
  24. When the Caretaker Government considered amending inheritance laws to institute equality between men and women in Bangladesh, HUT showed its ability to mobilize intimidating mobs. “Violent Clashes with Cops Leave 200 Hurt,” The Daily Star , April 12, 2008, at http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=31858 (March 1, 2010).
  25. Sharier Khan and Abul Kalam Azad, “Government Takes on Terror Socially, Politically,” The Daily Star , August 25, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=102755 (March 1, 2010).

URL : www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010..mocracy
 
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