A matter of faith

---Express Tribune, Pakistan

A matter of faith

By Basil Nabi Malik
May 03, 2010

The writer is a lawyer with Malik, Chaudhry, Ahmed and Siddiqi in Karachi (basil.nabi@tribune.com.pk)

It is common knowledge that we are duty bound to follow and respect the Constitution of Pakistan and each and every one of its articles. However, the same becomes a tad bit difficult when certain unpalatable clauses are added which really have no business being in the constitution.

For example, if I were to ask anyone as to the definition of a ‘Muslim’, I am guessing the last place they’d look would be in the Constitution of Pakistan. However, lo and behold Article 260 of our constitution actually defines the term. Ironically, all this happened during the time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, though he was, of course, pressured to do this by certain religious quarters.

Although it was clearly a political move, the method was unique. Rather than to go into the intricacies and complications of trying to forge a unanimously agreed-upon definition, which many thought was next to impossible and perhaps even unnecessary, he thought it fit to zero in on an exclusionary clause which ‘enlightened’ us on what a Muslim could not be.

.

However, clearly, this was the kind of medieval quackery that only ‘scheming politicians’ could think of. It took the likes of General Zia in 1985 to give us an affirmative definition of a Muslim, sans the discussions and attempts at consensus building, which in all likelihood, he probably found irrelevant. He did this in the form of the President’s Order No. 24 of 1985, whereby Article 260(3) was substituted with what can best be described as intriguing definitions of the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’.

The word ‘Muslim’ entailed: “a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (pbuh), the last of the Prophets and does not believe in, or recognise as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (pbuh)”. General Zia, however, didn’t leave it at that.

For some odd reason, he didn’t feel that the people of the country would actually be able to understand the term ‘Muslim’ and so the definition of ‘non-Muslim’ was also inserted. The term ‘non-Muslim’ was defined as: “a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Qadiani Group or the Lahori Group who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name or a Bahai and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes”.

Effectively, in one stroke, General Zia did what Justice Munir in the Munir Report of 1954 dreaded and forewarned against: the adoption of certain religious worldviews at the expense of others, thereby inducing divisions in society. To be more exact, after asking a variety of the ulema as to what the definition of a Muslim would entail and receiving varying responses, Justice Munir said in the report that: “keeping in view the several definitions given by the ulema [defining the term Muslim], need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental.”

The point is that what business is it of the state to get into this whole matter of defining who is a Muslim and who isn’t. One would have thought that this is a matter best left to individuals themselves and is something to be assessed by their conduct and actions — and in any case it is a private matter for each individual. It’s a pity that the 18th amendment chose to ignore this in the present constitution.

URL: http://tribune.com.pk/story/10274/a-matter-of-faith/

Not the business of the state — 2

--- daily DAWN, Pakistan

COLUMNISTS

Not the business of the state — 2
By Ardeshir Cowasjee
Sunday, 23 Aug, 2009 | 09:51 AM PST

On Aug 18, a letter from Citizen of Pakistan Naeem Sadiq of Karachi (naeemsadiq @ gmail.com) was printed in this newspaper of record. The subject was a ‘Request for suo moto notice’ and it was an appeal to the chief justice of the Sindh High Court.

Karachi’s Defence Housing Authority in its application form for the allotment of plots in its DHA City scheme has asked those applying to declare their religion and sect. This, states Naeem, is discriminatory and a violation of our fundamental rights. He contends that the intention of the DHA is to make segregated living zones for those of different religions and to further add to this division on sectarian grounds. The demand is at odds with Islam, the Quran and Sunnah making no mention of any ‘sects.’

As he writes: ‘Unless checked, this practice may soon extend to a declaration of religion and sect for other routing commercial transactions, such as buying a PIA ticket or obtaining a mobile telephone SIM.’ So, he has requested the chief justice of Sindh to ‘take suo moto notice and order the DHA to remove the requirement of religion and sect from its application forms and other related documents’.

Absolutely correct — it is not the business of the DHA to delve into the religion and sect of people wishing to purchase plots which it has advertised for sale.

In similar vein, Citizen Sadiq on July 25, 2009 addressed a letter to Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Chaudhry at Islamabad on the matter of compulsory zakat deductions by the banks of Pakistan, appealing to the Supreme Court in the public interest to take suo moto notice. His letter reads: ‘The Supreme Court of Pakistan in a landmark judgment on March 9, 1999 gave a ruling that members of all ‘fiqhs’ were entitled to exemption from compulsory deduction of zakat, and the federal government had no authority to reject the declaration of any Muslim seeking exemption from zakat, if it was made on a prescribed form. This judgment enables any Muslim to declare his/her ‘fiqh’ and thus seek exemption from compulsory deduction of zakat. De facto, it also recognises the right of individuals to practise their faith according to their own ‘fiqhs,’ and not be dictated by the government’s interpretation.

‘The historic judgment, while so well recognising the right of individuals in matters of their faith, made an irritating mess of how this right was to be practised. Firstly, it requires Muslims to declare their ‘fiqh.’ The great Prophet of Islam (PBUH) did not subscribe to any ‘sect’ or ‘fiqh.’ For his followers to be forced to invent, be branded and be divided by sects and ‘fiqhs’ is therefore an absolutely unethical and undesirable demand on the part of the government.

‘The second irritant relates to the requirement of making this declaration on a prescribed format, thus creating a serious bureaucratic and procedural difficulty for the ordinary citizens. They are required to fill a judicial stamped paper of Rs20 (available for Rs120), have it signed by a notary public and two witnesses before making a completely unnecessary declaration of their ‘fiqh.’ The form is also called CZ-50 affidavit.

‘This anomaly could be easily rectified if the Supreme Court, through a public interest suo moto notice, clarified its original judgment by requiring only those Muslims to give in writing (on a plain piece of paper) who do wish their zakat to be deducted by a bank. This would truly be in keeping with the Supreme Court verdict that all Muslims are entitled to exemption from compulsory deduction of zakat.’

By July 31, Naeem received a letter from the Supreme Court registrar advising him that the chief justice had been pleased to accept the application and ordered that the matter (Suo Moto Case No.12 of 2009) be heard on Aug 10 at Islamabad, and he was required to appear in person.

Two issues were raised at the hearing: (a) that the procedure for exemption from compulsory deduction of zakat was tedious, time-wasting, and cumbersome; and (b) that the state cannot compel its citizens to declare a specific ‘fiqh’ and thus be divided and boxed into one or the other schools of interpretation.

Chief Justice Chaudhry sitting with Justices Jawwad Khawaja and Ijaz Ahmad heard the submission, agreed that it was a pro bono case, and ordered the State Bank and the federation of Pakistan to appear before the court at the next hearing (which is fixed for Oct 5) and explain as to why this procedure cannot be simplified and improved in the light of issues raised by the appellant.

The state of Pakistan is intrusive when it comes to matters of religion. Why? Are we not supposed to all be equal citizens with equal rights as decreed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who founded and made the country? According to the original constitution as promulgated at noon on Aug 14, 1973 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, we were equal citizens of the state, with equal rights. But this equality was done away with in 1974 by Bhutto’s second amendment to his constitution, bending to the obscurantists and bigots, and an entire community was shorn of its rights and declared a minority.

Prior to this, in 1979 the same community was targeted by Ziaul Haq, general of the army and president of the republic, pious and God-fearing. He had decreed that all citizens, regardless of their religion, wishing to obtain a passport must sign a declaration that it is his/her belief that the Prophet of Islam is the final prophet and that any pretender that follows him is false.

Such is the business of the state.

arfc@cyber.net.pk

©2009 DAWN Media Group. All rights reserved

URL : www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/...the-business-of-the-state-2-3891

Maududi’s Children

---Dawn.com Blog, Pakistan

Maududi’s Children

Posted by Nadeem F. Paracha in Featured Articles, Pakistan on 06 11th, 2009 |

How the intellectuality of Political Islam turned into the brutality of faithful fascism: Nadeem F. Paracha

In Pakistan even the traditional Muslim practice of reasoning in matters of religion – originally introduced by the 9th century Mutazilites – is at times treated like some kind of an abomination to be feared, discouraged and repressed.

It is easy to accuse the proverbial mullah for this. And it is equally easy to blame him for being anti-intellectual and regressive.

However, over the years the conventional mullah has already lost a lot of face and respect. But this seemingly anti-mullah trend didn’t always mean the opening up of society to a more enlightening and pluralistic alternative.

On the contrary, the gap created by the conventional mullah’s gradual downfall was filled by religious scholars who only seemed to have intellectualized, modernized and politicized obscurantism. [1]

In Pakistan, Islamic scholars like Abul Ala Maududi and the far more moderate, Professor Fazalur Rahman Malik, were some of the first to occupy this gap.

Their tirades against the conventional mullah were welcomed by the more ‘educated Muslims.’ [2]

Working as the head of the Central Institute of Islamic Research formed by the Ayub Khan dictatorship in 1961, Prof. Fazalur Rahman laboured hard to find that elusive middle-ground between Pakistan’s colonial secular heritage and its somewhat ambiguous ‘Islamic Republic-ism.’

Maududi’s elaborate treatises however, concentrated more on undermining the constructive role being played by the less puritanical Islamic sects in Pakistan. [3]

And even though both Maududi and Fazalur Rahman were staunchly anti-left in equal degrees, Maududi soon turned his intellectual weaponry against Rahman as well after the later published his short but highly acclaimed book ‘Islam’ in 1968.

Maududi and his Jamat Islami accused Rahman for undermining the importance of the hadith and for claiming that not all text of the Qu’ran was eternal and (thus), it should be understood allegorically. [4]

Maududi’s staunch stance against the non-puritanical strains of Islam was a counterproductive move. Because in an ethnical, sectarian and religiously pluralistic society like Pakistan, the factions that Maududi challenged were/are comparatively moderate in essence: Barelvi-ism, Sufism and the Hanaifi school of jurisprudence – which is the most liberal of the four schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam – are still at the forefront of faith in Pakistan, boasting a large following. [5]; [6]; [7]; [8]

Many believe they are the very reasons that help keep tensions between religions, and religious sects in the country at a bare minimum. At the root of this is the pluralism-friendly factor emerging from these strains’ historical make-up generated from a healthy cultural fusion between distinct peoples in the subcontinent. [9]

That’s why a ‘progressive Muslim’ in a country like Pakistan must be more pragmatic than either idealistic or political. He may be aesthetically and theologically opposed and repulsed by the more ‘superstitious’ strains of the faith, but he must understand that ironically, the large number of adherents that such strains have in Pakistan, they remain to be the social engine behind the consensual need in the society at large to keep matters like sectarianism and inter-Islamic polarisation in the country largely de-politicised. [10]

But Maududi not only shunned these ‘superstitious’ strains, his alternative of a more ‘unembellished’ and concrete version of Islam was also highly political and compartmentalized. [11]

This meant that not only were the more ‘blemished’ strains of Islam challenged by him, modern western philosophical and political ensembles like democracy, liberalism, socialism and especially Marxism too were rejected.

Maududi’s alternative was an ‘all-encompassing Islam.’ He purposed a single, exclusive version of the religion; a version that discouraged any previous interpretation of the Qu’ran and the Islamic Law (Sharia) that his own analysis did not approve of. And though he was skeptical of all modern secular concepts of ideology, paradoxically, he wasn’t all that allergic to the notions of modern state politics. [12]; [13]; [14].

Calling for the imposition of this politicized and puritanical version of Islam in a socially pluralistic and religiously sectarian society like Pakistan was not only Utopian, it was also dangerous.

Not surprisingly, ever since the late 1960s, Maududi’s philosophy has off and on found itself being used to encourage self-righteous coercion, political intrigues and violence - as seen in Jamat Islami’s role in the 1953 and 1974 anti-Ahmadiyya violence (for which Maududi was imprisoned); the role of the party in supporting (and taking part) in the Pakistani Army’s controversial actions in the former East Pakistan; and the role of the party’s student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-Taleba (IJT), which was accused (in the 1980s) of introducing the violent ‘Kalashnikov Culture’ on the country’s campuses. [15]; [16].

Worst of all, Maududi-ism (as it is sometimes called), was also exploited by dictators (General Zia-ul-Haq), ulema and, of course, the Jamat Islami, as a way to deflect, deflate and denounce any other form of Islamic reformism. It actually eschewed tolerance. [17]

A number of politico-religious forces in Pakistan, as well as many television anchormen, print journalists and publications, are both directly and indirectly influenced by Maududi.

That’s why one is not surprised to watch most of them dutifully derailing any idea that looks inwards at the present state of Islam as a cause for the violence perpetuated in its name.

These gentlemen and publications continue to offer hyperbolic Maududist tracts pointing at ‘western powers’ and faith-based ‘distortions’ for all the ills befalling religion and society in Pakistan.

Outdated Maududist thoughts are being aired in a reality where Communism, Cold War tussles, ‘secret societies,’ and ‘distorted sects’ are not the ‘problem’ anymore. On the contrary, most of the present crises are clearly stemming from a violent, psychopathic and totalitarian version of the faith. Thus, the socio-political disconnect in these gentlemen’s otherwise widely published and televised arguments is now starker than ever.

The fact is, Maududism in the post-9/11 Pakistan stands to be little more than an outdated relic of the Cold War, offering what now sound like rhetorical and hyperbolic clichés.

What’s more, Maududi’s ideas are also being used to make a veneered defense of the actions of anarchic militants in the North (as heard from politicians like JI’s Munawar Hussain and Qazi Hussain Ahmed; PTI’s Imran Khan, and even from some PML-N leaders who were once part of JI’s student-wing, the IJT. [18]

It is interesting to imagine how Maududi himself would have reacted in the current scenario. However, there is no doubt that the way his thoughts and ideas have evolved, they have been at least one reason why the current trends of reformism in Islam have failed to find any valid expression in Pakistan.

The backlash

The present-day reformist inclinations in Islam include two variations. One is being led by staunch secularists and the other by ‘progressive Muslims.’

Both may disagree with one another but their aim and goal seem to be common: To expunge Islam as we know it from laws and exegeses that, though man-made, have been handed down through the centuries as being ‘divine’ and thus unalterable. [19]

One of the many examples in this context is the law of stoning adulterous men and women that is practiced in some Islamic societies as ‘God’s law,’ but it is actually not found in the Qu’ran - (the law was formed in the 8th century from a hadith whose credibility many scholars have questioned). [20]

Another is the literalist way the hudd or Hudood laws have been interpreted. Even though most Islamic countries (through the process of ijtihad/collective consensus), have avoided enacting ‘Hudood Laws’ due to these laws’ incompatibility with changing times and circumstances, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (until 2007) were the only two countries having these laws as part of their respective legal cannons.

Nevertheless, the Hudood Ordinances (enacted by the Zia dictatorship in 1979 in Pakistan), were finally scrapped by the Musharraf regime in 2007.

This was one of the foremost acts by the state of Pakistan directly challenging the ‘Islamisation’ milieu left behind by Zia who had been a staunch ‘Maududist.’ [21]

Yet another example suggesting a gradual backlash against the Maududist politico-theological model was the recent unprecedented verdict by the Federal Shariat Court that declared drinking alcohol as a comparatively minor crime in Islam, and changed the punishment (of drunkenness) from 80 lashes (from a whip) to light strokes from a stick (made from a date tree leave). [22]

Alcohol had always remained a largely tolerated indulgence in Muslim societies across the centuries. Many scholars maintain that though the Qu’ran has ‘advised’ Muslims to stay away from wine (as opposed to forbidding it like it does pork, carrion meat, blood and idolatry), it does not prescribe any punishment for its usage. [23].

In Pakistan too, alcohol was freely sold and consumed until 1977, when first (under pressure from the Jamat Islami), the secular government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto banned its sale, and then the reactionary dictatorship of Gen. Zia turned its consumption and sale (by Muslims) as a crime punishable under his controversial Hudood Ordinances.

Ironically, Zia’s ban on alcohol gave birth to a thriving bootlegging mafia - even though cities like Karachi have licensed liquor stores that have successfully checked the bootleggers’ influence in this city.

Zia’s ban on alcohol also triggered the widespread usage of addictive drugs like heroin.

For example, until 1979, Pakistan literally had just a single reported case of heroin addiction. But by 1985, it had the second largest population of heroin addicts! [24]

Though no Pakistani has been flogged for the offence of consuming and selling alcohol ever since 1981, the Shariat Court’s verdict must have come as a blow to the architects of Zia’s Islamisation process that was largely based on Maududi’s politico-religious thesis of an ‘Islamic state.’ A state whose blueprint, many Islamic scholars opposed to Maududi-ism maintain, does not exist in the Qu’ran and is only a generation of Maududi’s imagination.

Waiting for reason

There are a number of progressive Muslim scholars, especially in Turkey, Egypt, Malaysia, Algeria and Indonesia, who seem to be making deeper inroads in the 21st century Islamic reformist psyche. In Pakistan Javed Ahmed Ghamdi, the London-based Ziauddin Sardar and respected intellectual, Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy can be named.

In their work on Islam they have taken a scientific and a strictly academic approach, and are not immune to openly question the historicity of the Laws of Islam that have been handed down to us from the 8th century onwards; or a history and versions of the Shariah that started to appear almost two centuries after the demise of the Prophet.

To them the Muslims need to have an interpretative relationship with the Holy text. According to Sardar, for example, we have been relying on an age-old interpretation of the Qu’ran, one that is ice-capped in history. The context of this interpretation is of the 8th and 9th century Muslim societies. It needs to be radically updated through ijtihad.

Most current Islamic reformists are also concerned about the retrogressive tendency in some recent so-called modern Islamists to determine ‘scientific miracles in the Qu’ran.’

According to Dr. Hoodbhoy, by doing this they undermine all the hard work undertaken by early Islamic scientists and philosophers and that this practice in a way also suggests that present-day Muslims should stop getting their hands dirty in labs and universities, thinking they know everything. [25]; [26].

Respected Muslim scholars like Prof. Sardar, and monumental Algerian scholar, Muhamad Arkun, have been particularly harsh on French writer, Maurice Bucaille’s controversial book, The Bible, Qu’ran & Science and how this book (financed by the Saudi government), has given birth to a navel-gazing cottage industry of half-baked ‘experts’ distracting Muslims from learning real science. They say the Qu’ran encourages the acquiring of science, instead of creating a pseudoscience by reading wrongly into the meanings of certain surahs of the Holy Book. [27]

Turkish pseudo-scientist Harun Yahya (Adnan Oktar) – who has recently gained fresh new following among Pakistani TV news anchors like Shahid Masood and so-called ‘security analysts’ and TV personalities like Zaid Hamid – too has come under the hammer of neo-Islamic rationalists and secularists alike.

The rationalists have accused Yahya of encouraging Muslims to shun secular sciences as if this act of shunning was ordained by God. [28]

Interestingly, unknown to most of his Pakistani followers, Yahya has been a constant receptor of police arrests for various drug and sex related scandals. [29].

Many critics of this trend have described such men as ‘Islamic quacks’ who are discouraging a rational and scientific mindset in present-day Muslims.

Today’s reformists also insist that there never was just one correct way to be a Muslim. As Sardar suggests, the propagation by any group of the single correct way is a totalitarian act. It will eschew plurality, democracy and tolerance, leading the ummah towards a totalitarian situation.

That’s why to modern Islamic scholars like Muhammad Arkun, it is of vital importance that Islamic history and law be critiqued and thoroughly explored in the light of reason and current times. [30]; [31].

According to Arkun, it is only then that reason in Islam can be liberated from man-made dogmatic constructs - constructs that have played the foremost role in derailing Islam from its early philosophical and rational path, landing its fate in the clutches of biased power politics and, eventually, in the gun barrels of the fascistic and irrational mutations of the faith (such as the Taleban and Al-Qaeda).
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

1. The Forgotten Swamp — Navigating Political Islam: Guilain Denoeux (http://www.mepc.org/journal_vol9/denoeux.pdf)
   
2. Islam & Modernity: Fazalur Rahman Malik (http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=FJcyIeHeeZwC&dq=Islam+%26+Modernity+fazlur+rahman&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=gelbRTMzKz&sig=SnwIHjyOPXOJ9Z2CVK9E5cXQ-CU&hl=en&ei=-aksSoyeIpeIkQW8yqjoCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1)
3. Encyclopedia of the Middle-East: (Entry) (http://www.mideastweb.org/Middle-East-Encyclopedia/abul-ala-maududi.htm)
4. Revisiting Fazalur Rahman’s Ordeal: (Non-Skeptical Essays) (http://hangingodes.wordpress.com/2006/11/10/revisiting-fazlur-rahmans-ordeal/).
5. Islamic Extremism in Pakistan: Khaled Ahmed (http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/islamicextremism_pakistan.htm)
6. Hanafi Madhub: Shaikh Siddiqui (www.islamawareness.net/Madhab/Hanafi/hanafi_intro.html)
7. Berelvi Islam: (Entry) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-barelvi.htm) (http://www.geocities.com/pak_history/sufi.html?200622)
8. Maududi & Islamic Revivalism (Pages : 122-125) : Syd ValiReza Nasr (http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=I07ykFUoKTUC&dq=Mawdudi+and+the+making+of+Islamic+revivalism&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=Kb4sSvvuFYrm6gO7-rSDCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5)
9. The Sufi Movement & Pakistan : (Entry) (http://www.geocities.com/pak_history/sufi.html?200622)
10. Pakistan’s Pluralist Traditions: Lisa Curtis (http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg2268.cfm)
11. Syed Abul Ala Maududi : Prof. Ziauddin Sardar (http://www.newstatesman.com/200307140017)
12. Tajdeed O Aya-e-Deen: Abul Ala Maududi (http://www.scribd.com/doc/6800776/Rasayl-Wa-Masayl-4)
13. How Islam sees itself: Warren Larson (http://www.ciu.edu/library/document/HOW_ISLAM_SEES_ITSELF.pdf)
14. Radical Islam’s Missing Link: John Shaffer (http://www.pwhce.org/maududi.html)
15. Munir Report on 1953 Riots: Javaid Aslam. (http://www.civilservice.org.pk/DMGArticles/65_MunirRptRelevance.pdf)
16. The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution (Pages:: Syed Vali Reza (http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft9j49p32d&chunk.id=ch3&toc.depth=1&toc.id=ch3&brand=eschol;query=IJT#1)
17. Towards a Fundamentalist State: Bjarne Skov (http://folk.uio.no/bjarnes/urdu/Skov-Zia-ul-haq-04052005.pdf)
18. Split on the Taliban: Dr. Hassan Askari (Daily Times) (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\24\story_24-5-2009_pg3_2)
19. Rethinking Islam: Prof. Ziauddin Sardar (http://www.islamfortoday.com/sardar01.htm)
20. FAQ about stoning: (Entry) (http://stop-stoning.org/node/9)
21. Musharraf Signs Bill: (Dawn). (http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/02/top7.htm)
22. A Good Decision: (Daily Times Editorial) (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\30\story_30-5-2009_pg3_1)
23. Islam, Its Laws & Society (Page:38): Jamila Hussain (http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=_IdBJ0m53n8C&dq=Islam+its+law+and+society+By+Jamila+Hussain&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=Bc1FtPN8gM&sig=euE1E3Xmge43wa586b08dKMrQl0&hl=en&ei=7_AsSuzMLKbm6gOG8PGBCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1).
24. Heroin, Taliban & Pakistan: B. Raman (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/\papers3\paper288.html)
25. Science and Islamic Philosophy: Ziauddin Sardar (http://www.cgcu.net/imase/islam_science_philosophy.htm)
26. A Review of Pervez Hoodbhoy’s Islam & Science: Dr. Ahmed Shafaar (http://www.mukto-mona.com/Articles/hoodbhoy/book_review_islam_science.htm)
27. Weird Science: Ziauddin Sardar (http://bearsite.info/Articles/Science/Weird%20science.pdf)
28. Harun Yahya & Islamic Creationism: Francois Tremblay (http://www2.truman.edu/~edis/writings/articles/hyahya.html)
29. Police cracks down on obscure sect: (Turkish Hurriyat) (http://web.archive.org/web/20010217142739/www.turkeyupdate.com/
    adnan.htm)
30. Islam-To Subvert or Reform: Muhammad Arkun (http://www.libertybooks.com/books/current-affairs-politics/islam-to-reform-or-to-subvert.html).
31. Philosophers of Arab: (Entry) (http://www.arabphilosophers.com/English/philosophers/contemporary/contemporary-names/Muhammad_Arakoun/English_Article_Arakoun/English_Article_Arakoun.htm).

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URL : http://blog.dawn.com:91/dblog/20...s-children/