Incitement goes unchecked as hatred is spewed at rallies

Pakistan

Incitement goes unchecked as hatred is spewed at rallies

By Saba Imtiaz
Published: October 7, 2011

KARACHI: The judge who sentenced former Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer’s assassin, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, to death has been forced to go on leave after threats, banners and slogans at rallies proclaiming him a non-Muslim and an Ahmadi.

His court in Rawalpindi was also attacked by lawyers.

The irony is that the judge of an anti-terrorism court (ATC) is dealing with an ‘action’ of terrorism that is defined in the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA).

The law states that acts of terrorism include the “[incitement of] hatred and contempt on religious, sectarian or ethnic basis to stir up violence or cause internal disturbance”.

This basic definition has not stopped the ongoing campaign of inciting hatred.

But building a case against these individuals requires determining violations of the ATA, particularly incitement. While law enforcement and intelligence agencies are tasked with the job, their assessments are often based on their operatives’ views and biases.

For example, a Jamaat Ahmadiyya representative told The Express Tribune that when police officers entered the places of worship in Lahore after scores of Ahmadis were massacred in 2010, among their first few words were: “Saare hi marr gaye ho ya koi bacheya vi aye?” [Are all of you dead, or did someone survive?].

Former IG Sindh police Aftab Nabi says that the police should depute officers with different backgrounds to get a broader analysis. This, he says, would help overcome any limitations the officer has.

Despite this, law enforcement agencies have monitored people known for inflammatory speeches, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s (LeJ) Malik Ishaq, who was recently detained under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) Act.

Secondly, provincial governments also allow and provide security to rallies where incitement occurs. Rallies in Lahore supporting Qadri continue to be held, highlighting state complicity.

In a United States Institute of Peace report on police reforms, author Hassan Abbas referenced analysis by Khaled Ahmed on the issue: “Throughout the 1990s one or two intelligence officers in each district of Pakistan were tasked to help out members of the state-supported militant groups if the police ‘create[d] any problems for them’.”

The report further adds, “In private discussions police officers routinely mention apprehending militants and criminals but quickly receiving ‘requests’ from intelligence agencies (civilian or military) to let them go. Although the intensity of such practices has decreased in the post-9/11 environment, even today the police hesitate to pursue militants and activists associated with groups generally known for their close relationship with the intelligence services.”

Criminal lawyer Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi disagrees with the perception that the ATA is insufficient or that the courts and police don’t do their job. “The real issue is of evidence. People need to come forward and testify. They do have fears, but what they don’t realise is that they may be setting a murderer free who will later either shoot them or someone else. A man will be caught red-handed kidnapping someone but the victim will say in court, ‘I don’t recognise this person.’ What is the court supposed to do?”

A witness protection programme has been in the works in Sindh for several months now, but has not been implemented yet.

Naqvi says suspects have also become savvier. “Suspects in terrorism cases are often picked up by the intelligence agencies who detain them for one or two months. During this time, their organisations file writ after writ about the illegal detention and rile up the public. By the time the police make a formal arrest, the court will not accept their reasons for the delay. To avoid this, the police should make the initial arrest and then the agencies can interrogate the suspect. They could also amend the period of remand.”

Published in The Express Tribune, October 7th, 2011.

Copyrighted © 2011 The Express Tribune News Network
URL: http://tribune.com.pk/story/268509/incitement...at-rallies/

Murshid, Marwa Na Daina

Home » News & Politics

Murshid, Marwa Na Daina

13 JUNE 2011By Mohammed Hanif

What is the last thing you say to your best general when ordering him to conduct a do-or-die mission? A prayer maybe, if you are religiously inclined. A short lecture underlining the importance of the mission if you want to keep it businesslike. Or maybe you just say ‘good luck,’ accompanied by a clicking of the heels and a final salute.

On the night of July 5, 1977 as Operation Fair Play, meant to topple Z.A. Bhutto’s elected government, was about to commence, the then army chief General Zia-ul-Haq took his right-hand man and the Corps Commander of 10th Corps, Lt General Faiz Ali Chishti aside and whispered to him: “Murshid, marwa na daina.” (Murshid, don’t get us killed.)

Zia was indulging in two of his favourite pastimes: spreading paranoia among those around him, and cosying up to the junior officer he needed to do his dirty work. General Zia had a talent for that; he could make his juniors feel as if they were indispensable to the running of this world. And he could make his seniors feel like gods – as Bhutto found out at the cost of his life.

General Faiz Ali Chisti’s troops didn’t face any resistance that night; not a single shot was fired and like all military coups in Pakistan, this was dubbed a ‘bloodless coup.’ There was a lot of bloodshed in the following years though; in military-managed dungeons at Thori gate, in Bohri Bazar, around Ojhri camp and finally at Basti Laal Kamal near Bahawalpur, where a plane exploded killing General Zia and most of the Pakistan army’s high command. General Faiz Ali Chisti, of course, had nothing to do with this. General Zia rid himself of his murshid soon after coming to power. Chishti had started to take that term of endearment – murshid – a bit too seriously, and dictators can’t stand anyone who thinks of himself as the king-maker.

Thirty-four years on Pakistan is a society divided at many levels. There’s the beghairat bunch throwing economic statistics at the ghairat brigade, there are laptop jihadis and liberal fascists and fair-weather revolutionaries. There are Balochi freedom fighters up in the mountains and bullet-riddled bodies of young political activists in obscure Baloch towns. And of course there are the members of civil society with a permanent glow on their faces, presumably on account of all their candlelight vigils.

All these factions may not agree on anything, but there is a consensus on one point: General Zia’s coup was a bad idea. When was the last time anyone heard Nawaz Sharif or any of Zia’s numerous protégés thump their chest and say, ‘Yes, we need another Zia?’ And have ever you seen a Pakistan military commander who stood on Zia’s grave and vowed to continue his mission?

It might have taken Pakistanis 34 years to reach this consensus, but we finally agree that General Zia’s domestic and foreign policies didn’t do us any good. They brought us automatic weapons, heroin and sectarianism; they also made fortunes for those who dealt in these commodities. And they turned Pakistan into an international jihadi tourist resort.

And yet somehow, without ever publicly owning up to it, the army has continued Zia’s mission. Successive army commanders, despite their access to vast libraries and regular strategic reviews, have never actually acknowledged that what they started during the Zia era was a mistake. Clearly, the late Dr Eqbal Ahmed wasn’t off the mark when he said that the Pakistan Army is brilliant at collecting information, but its ability to analyse this information is non-existent.

Looking back at the Zia years, the Pakistan army begins to appear like one of those mythical monsters that chops off its own head, but then grows an identical one and then proceeds on the only course it knows.

In 1999, two days after the Pakistan army embarked on its Kargil misadventure, Lt General Mahmud Ahmed gave a ‘crisp and to-the-point’ briefing to a group of senior army and air force officers. Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, who attended the meeting, later wrote in an article that they were told that it was nothing more than a defensive manoeuvre and the Indian Air Force would not get involved at any stage. “Come October, we shall walk into Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” General Mahmud told the meeting. “Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Commodore Abid Rao to famously quip, ‘After this operation, it’s going to be either a court martial or martial law!’ as we walked out of the briefing room,” Air Commodore Tufail recalled.

If Rao Abid even contemplated a court martial, he must have lacked leadership qualities because there was only one way out of this mess; a humiliating military defeat, a world-class diplomatic disaster, followed by yet another martial law. The man who should have faced the court martial for Kargil appointed himself the country’s president for the next decade.

General Mahmud went on to command ISI, Rao Abid retired as Air Vice Marshal; both went on to find lucrative work in the army’s vast welfare empire and Kargil was forgotten as if it was a game of dare between too juveniles who were now beyond caring about who had actually started the pointless game. The battles were fierce and some of the men and officers fought so valiantly that two were awarded Pakistan’s highest military honour, the Nishan-e-Haider.

But nobody seems to remember the amount of bloodshed during the mission And where were hundreds of others whose names never made it to any awards list, whose names were, in fact, not mentioned at all, and whose families consoled themselves by saying that their loved ones had been martyred while defending our nation’s borders. Nobody pointed out the basic fact that there was no enemy on those mountains before some delusional generals decided that they’d like to ‘mop up’ hundreds of Indian soldiers after starving them to death.

The architect of this mission, the daring commando, General Musharraf, who didn’t bother to consult his colleagues before ordering his soldiers to their slaughter, doesn’t even have the wits to face a sessions court judge in Pakistan, let alone a court martial. During the entire episode the nation was told that it wasn’t the regular army that was fighting in Kargil, it was the ‘mujahideen.’ But those who received their loved ones’ flag-draped coffins, and those that didn’t even get a corpse to mourn, had sent their sons and brothers to serve in a professional army, not a freelance lashkar.

The Pakistan army’s biggest folly has been that under Zia it started outsourcing its basic job – soldiering – to these freelance militants. By blurring the line between a professional soldier who, at least in theory, is always required to obey his officer, who in turn is governed by a set of laws, and a mujahid who can pick and choose his cause and his commander depending on his mood, the Pakistan army has caused immense confusion among its own ranks. When soldiers who cry ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ when mocking an attack are ambushed in real life by enemies who shout ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ even louder, can we blame them if they waver in their response? When the naval chief Nauman Bashir calls the PNS Mehran attackers “very well trained,” is he just giving us hollow justification for what transpired, or admiring the creation of the institution he serves? When naval officials tell journalists that the attackers were “as good as our own commandos,” are they giving themselves a back-handed compliment?

In the wake of the attacks on PNS Mehran in Karachi, some TV channels pulled out an old war anthem sung by Madam Noor Jehan and started playing it against the backdrop of images of the young, hopeful faces of the slain officers and service men. Written by the legendary teacher and creator of childrens’ Tot Batot stories, Sufi Tabassum, the anthem carries a stark warning: Aiay puttar hatan tay nahin vick day, na labh di phir bazaar kuray (You can’t buy these brave sons from shops, don’t go looking for them in bazaars).

Whereas Sindhis and Balochis have mostly composed songs of rebellion, Punjabi popular culture has always lionised its karnails and jarnails and even an odd dhol sipahi. The Pakistan army has, throughout its history, refused to take advice from politicians, as well as thinking professionals from its own ranks. It has never paid heed to historians and sometimes ignored even the esteemed religious scholars it has used to whip up public sentiment for its dirty wars. But the biggest strategic mistake it has made is that it has not even taken advice from late Madam Noor Jehan, one of the army’s most ardent fans in Pakistan’s history. You can probably ignore Dr Eqbal Ahmed’s advice and survive in this country, but you ignore Madam at your own peril.

Since the Pakistan army’s high command is dominated by Punjabi-speaking generals, it is difficult to fathom what it is about this advice that they don’t understand. Any which way you translate it, the message is loud and clear – and lyrical: soldiers are not to be bought and sold like a commodity in shops. “Na awaian takran maar kuray” (That search is futile, like butting your head against a brick wall), Noor Jehan goes on to rhapsodise.

For decades the army has not only been shopping for these private puttars in the bazaars, it has also set up factories to manufacture them. It has, in fact, raised entire armies of them. When you raise the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish Mohammed, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Sipah-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Al-Badar Mujahideen, others encouraged by the thriving marketplace will go ahead and create outfits like the Anjuman Tahuffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat and Anjuman-Tahuffuz-e-Namoos-e-Aiysha. And it’s not just Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya they want to liberate; they want to go back in time and seek revenge for a perceived slur that may or may not have been cast by someone more than thirteen hundred years ago in a country far, far away.

As if the army’s sprawling shopping mall of private puttars in Pakistan wasn’t enough, it has also actively encouraged the import and export of these commodities and even branched out into providing rest and recreation facilities for the ones who want a break. The outsourcing of Pakistan’s military strategy has reached a point where mujahids have their own mujahids to do their job and, inevitably, at the end of the supply chain are those poor, faceless teenagers with explosives strapped to their torsos being despatched to blow up other poor children.

Two days before the Americans killed Osama bin Laden and took away his bullet-riddled body, General Kayani addressed army cadets at Kakul. After declaring a victory of sorts over the militants, he gave our nation a stark choice. And before the nation could even begin to weigh the pros and cons, he went ahead and decided for them: we shall never bargain our honour for prosperity. As things stand, most people in Pakistan have neither honour, nor prosperity. They will readily settle for merely being able to survive in their little worlds without being blown up.

The question people really want to ask General Kayani is that if he and his army officer colleagues can have both honour and prosperity why can’t we, the people, have even a tiny bit of both?

The army and its advocates in the media often worry about Pakistan’s image, as if we are not suffering from a long-term serious illness, but a seasonal bout of acne that just needs better skin care. The Pakistan army has, over the years, cultivated an image of 180 million people with nuclear devices strapped to its collective body, threatening to take the world down with it. We may not be able to take the world down with us and the world might defang us or manage to calm us a bit, but the fact remains that Pakistan as a nation is paying the price for our generals’ insistence on acting like, in Asma Jahangir’s immortal words, “duffers.” And they are adding insult to inquiry by demanding medals and golf resorts for being such consistent duffers for such a long time.

What people really want to do at this point is to put an arm around our military commanders’ shoulders, take them aside and whisper in their ears: “Murshid, marwa na daina.”

Mohammed Hanif is a journalist, novelist and playwright who worked as reporter for Newsline before joining the BBC. He is the author of A Case of Exploding Mangoes.

© 2009 Newsline Publications (Pvt) Ltd
URL: www.newslinemagazine.com/2011/06/murshid-marwa-na-daina/

Sectarian Clashes Surge in a City in Pakistan’s Heartland

Asia Pacific

Sectarian Clashes Surge in a City in Pakistan’s Heartland

Pakistanis gathered recently in Faisalabad outside a Presbyterian church damaged in riots after two Christian brothers were killed.

By SALMAN MASOOD

Published: August 7, 2010

FAISALABAD, Pakistan — This industrial city, famous for its textile exports, has lately become renowned as the center of a new wave of sectarian violence that has gripped Pakistan as militancy and extremism have taken firm root here in central Punjab Province.

Last month, violent clashes broke out between Muslims and Christians after two Christian brothers — Rashid and Sajid Emanuel — were shot dead outside the district courthouse after showing up to face charges of blasphemy.

The New York Times

Faisalabad, in Punjab Province, has become the center of a new wave of sectarian strife.

Immediately, there were fears of rioters’ setting fire to the Christian neighborhood where the brothers had lived, Warispura, a poor suburb with about 100,000 people — as they had done in a similar episode last year in a district nearby.

Blasphemy is a capital crime in Pakistan, and rights activists say the allegations are usually spurious and used to settle personal vendettas or to score political points.

In this case, for instance, the troubles started on July 1 when a handwritten letter defaming the Prophet Muhammad was distributed in a marketplace; it contained the address and telephone numbers of both brothers.

“A thief does not leave behind an ID card,” said Aslam Pervez, 60, a Christian teacher and a neighbor of the brothers. “A grave injustice has been done. The charges were not even proven, and they were killed. Is it justice? Where is the law?”

Analysts say the communal and sectarian clashes often have a local spark — an economic grievance, for instance — that is easily ignited in an atmosphere in which militant groups have been allowed to thrive for years by politicians who use them as a base of support, or have little to gain by standing up to them.

Looking to expand their influence, the groups, too, read the political winds as astutely as they do the local political terrain.

Such groups have thrived for decades in Pakistan, though sectarian violence has ebbed and flowed. Some groups, like Sipah-e-Sahaba, a Sunni militant organization, have largely domestic agendas, while others, like Lashkar-e-Taiba, focus on jihad in India and Afghanistan.

But it can be hard to draw a firm line, and sometimes the domestic groups channel militants to the others.

Under the nearly 10 years of military government that ended in 2008, sectarian violence was relatively subdued, in part because the military did not need to manipulate domestic schisms to maintain control. But civilian politics and sectarian tensions work hand in hand in Pakistan, and recently the violence has flared again. The last bad spasm was also under civilian rule in the 1990s.

Christians are not the only targets of the violence. In February, one person was killed during armed clashes between two Muslim sects. One of the sects then burned down the homes of several leaders of the other sect. Then in April, four members of the minority Ahmadi sect, declared non-Muslim by the country’s Constitution, were gunned down in Faisalabad by masked gunmen thought to be from Sipah-e-Sahaba.

Amir Rana, a terrorism expert, said the level of radicalization had grown and spread across Punjab Province, the country’s heartland. Residents say banned Islamic militant groups have managed to increase their presence and clout in Faisalabad, a city of nearly three million, and its surroundings.

Both Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group that India and the United States have blamed for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India, maintain offices in neighboring districts, which also serve as recruiting grounds.

As riots broke out on July 19, groups of agitated men, many of whom were said to be armed, tried to make their way to Warispura, the Christian neighborhood, from a neighboring village, Malkhan Wala, which is a known stronghold of Lashkar-e-Taiba, residents of the Christian neighborhood said.

Mr. Rana speculated that local economic competition might have been a motivator. Christians in Faisalabad are settled on land close to roads and railway tracks. “This is precious land,” he said. “Industrialists and builders have their eyes on such properties.”

Mr. Rana said Sipah-e-Sahaba had a strong base among the working class of the city; most Christians are in the working class, too.

Khalid Rashid, vicar general of the Cathedral of SS. Peter and Paul in Faisalabad, said the acts of violence against minorities, especially Christians, were on the rise, as the militant groups wanted “their presence to be felt.”

Religious minorities are feeling vulnerable and insecure. Christians make up only 5 percent of the population.

Neighbors and family members said the two Christian brothers who were killed had enmity with nobody. Rashid, 31, was a pastor who ran a local prayer group. Sajid, 28, was pursuing an M.B.A. degree.

They were taken into custody after a case was registered against them at the urging of local traders. On July 19, after a court appearance, an unidentified gunman entered the court premises and opened fire in the hallway. Both brothers were shot in the back and died at a hospital. A police officer was wounded. The attacker escaped easily.

The government has ordered a judicial inquiry into the killings. The Punjab police suspended two police officers for security lapses. But the family of the brothers is in hiding. The father, a retired government employee, and his three other sons and a daughter fear being singled out and are afraid to pursue the case.

Joseph Coutts, the bishop of the Cathedral of SS. Peter and Paul, attributed such attacks to the growing intolerance and militancy in Pakistani society.

“These groups have become so strong that they have become a law unto themselves,” he said. He added: “There is a lot of anger amongst Muslims, and there is a revival of militant Islam. Local Christians are seen as linked to the West, the United States, and therefore the fallout.”

Indeed, a city resident, Khurram Shahzad, who lodged the initial complaint with the police against the brothers, claims not to know them personally. Muslims in the Warispura neighborhood said that Christians had been provided financing from abroad to spread Christianity and convert Muslims.

“They had been given money to spread their religion,” said Muhammad Nadeem, 25, an electrician. A crowd of onlookers nodded in agreement.

Waqar Gilani contributed reporting.

A version of this article appeared in print on August 8, 2010, on page A10 of the New York edition.

URL: www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/world/asia/08faisalabad.html?_r=1

Setting their house in order

Tue 15 June, 2010

Editorials

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Setting their house in order

Hindustan Times
June 15, 2010
First Published: 22:03 IST(15/6/2010)
Last Updated: 22:06 IST(15/6/2010)

When the topic of terrorism-related threats is discussed, most of us think of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The scene of activity is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) and the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are visions of Predators stalking the region to search and kill. When this is not the scene, then it is the threat to the US from the likes of Times Square wannabe-bomber Faisal Shahzad, their mindsets and their mentors.

When an angered and frightened US speaks of retaliation to this, it speaks of the wrath of America the next time around. Pakistan’s rulers pretend anger and insult, and they let loose their leg men on the streets shouting ‘Death to America!’. The Americans are in a dilemma. They cannot attack their favourite ally and justify to Congress that they need to give more arms and financial assistance to it. Pakistan’s rulers feel they have a winning game — of threatening to lose the match and country if they are not given steroids. Pakistan’s battle is not only on its western frontiers; it is now in the Punjabi heartland.

Since the Lal Masjid episode in Islamabad in 2007, the murderous terrorist attacks on the Marriot Hotel, the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Special Service Group establishments as well as the police show the reach of the terrorists. The twin attacks on the Garhi Shahu and Model Town Ahmadiya masjids in Lahore on Friday, May 28, the attack on Jinnah Hospital on the night of May 31 and the June 9 attack on the Nato convoy outside Islamabad are manifestations of a virus that is radicalising Pakistani society faster and deeper than we realise — or Pakistan’s rulers care to admit. The recent ban on social websites YouTube and Facebook by the Pakistani government indicates its nervousness in dealing with radicals.

True, there is a section of Pakistani society that finds events like violence in the name of religion, or medieval practices foisted upon it by self-styled guardians of the faith, abhorrent. The other truth is that these hordes have muscle power, are financially well-endowed and — what has become increasingly evident — there is either benign neglect by the State or active connivance most of the time. One does not have to go too far back to the Zia years to see what has been happening to Punjabi society even in the post-Zia years.

President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq had left in place not only the madrasa system of obscurantist education, but he had also mainstreamed this. So while the ISI diverted its experience and jihadi hordes from the Afghan front to the Kashmir one, Pakistan’s military rulers also created new terrorist outfits in the 1990s for specific action in Jammu and Kashmir. These were all Punjabi in origin and base. Recruitment has continued for the ‘jihad’ from various parts of Pakistan, notably from southern Punjab.

All these terrorist organisations have become interlinked and inter-dependent and an estimated 3,000-8,000 Punjab-based jihadis do service jointly alongside the Punjabi Taliban in Fata and Punjab. The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) are also suspected to be linked with al-Qaeda. Politicians being politicians, the Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif brothers have been flirting outrageously with the SSP in Punjab to queer the pitch for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Sheikh Akram, an opposition MP from Jhang, fears that there could be ten Swats in Punjab if the extremists are not checked.

So, today, we have a situation in which powerful terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), the JeM and others, along with Sunni sectarian outfits like the SSP and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), have recruits from the same village, district or area. Recruits for the mostly Punjabi Pakistani army also come from the same region and possibly from the same madrasas. Punjab is also the province that has many of Pakistan’s formidable troop concentrations against India — and it is here that all of Pakistan’s vital nuclear facilities are located.

Should Punjab get destabilised by Islamic radicals, this will have devastating consequences for Pakistan. Many wonder how the young and educated are getting affected by jihadi philosophy. Even today the curriculum established during the Zia years for the mainstream schools has not changed. In the Punjab University campus too, there is greater stress on Islamic tenets. The Daily Times, in its column ‘Campus Window’ (April 11, 2007), noted that while the world “heads towards modernisation and scientific knowledge, Punjab University, which is one of the oldest educational institutions in South Asia, is rapidly turning into a hub of Islamism”.

There are innumerable examples of attempts to introduce extreme religious ideologies in the discourse and in outward symbolism. These range from some very regressive and muscular moral policing on the campus to the downright ridiculous — like seeking to ban Alexander Pope’s poem ‘The Rape of the Lock’, as the title was considered vulgar.

Leading the campaign so far has been the students’ wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islami Jamaat Tulaba, a rabid Sunni organisation. Its monopoly is now being challenged by an equally rabid students’ organisation, the new Tulaba Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the students’ wing of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the mentor of the LeT. When two extreme organisations compete, the result can only be increased radicalisation, as each is competing against the other to establish its Islamic credentials.

What has been apparent for long to many of us here — but is clearly emerging now — is that Afghanistan will have a chance at peace only if the virus in Pakistan is eradicated. The next few months are going to be a major challenge for Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, if the declared intention is to take military action against the SSP, the JeM and the LeJ. Pakistan must fight its own demons urgently and not selectively. This will depend upon how long Pakistan’s rulers remain in denial about the home-grown existential threat to them and their country.

(Vikram Sood is former Secretary, Research & Analysis Wing. The views expressed by the author are personal)

Copyright © 2010 HT Media Limited. All Rights Reserved
URL: www.hindustantimes.com/Setting-their-house-in-order/Article1-558213.aspx

Agencies blame Punjab for non-cooperation

Pakistan Punjab

Agencies blame Punjab for non-cooperation

By Asim Awan
June 07, 2010

ISLAMABAD: Officials of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) complain that the Punjab government has not been cooperating with them in fighting terrorism.

A senior military officer of a leading intelligence agency claimed that the attitude of the Punjab police has been “of almost non-cooperation” in response to advance information provided by his agency regarding a number of terrorism suspects belonging to banned outfits Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba.

On the other hand, the three intelligence agencies have been receiving “excellent cooperation” from the government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa as well as the administration of the Islamabad Capitol Territory, he added. The official pointed out that as a result of the effective co-ordination between the ISI, MI, IB and the district administration, there has been no major terrorist attack in Islamabad since the Marriott and Police Lines bombings.

There had been many terrorist plans to attack targets in Islamabad, he said, but they had been foiled and the suspects arrested because of the harmonious coordination among all the concerned departments.

“Whenever we provide a lead or a tip to the Khyber-Pakhunkhwa police or the Islamambad police, immediate action is taken. Unfortunately, this is not the case in Punjab,” he said.

To stress his point, the official recalled an incident that took place about one-and-a-half years ago involving the arrest of Major (retired) Haroon on the motorway as he was headed towards Peshawar after having kidnapped an Ahmadi businessman. He said that Major Haroon was also wanted in the assassination of former head of the Special Services Group (SSG) Major-General (retired) Amir Faisal Alvi.

He said that, during interrogation, Major Haroon, himself a former SSG man, revealed that the Taliban had decided to expand their target list, and that the Ahmadis would now also be marked for killings and kidnapping for ransom. He said that this information was provided to the Punjab government but no action was taken by it. He said there had already been some incidents where Ahmadis had been robbed and killed in Faisalabad last year as well as this year. He said, “Now these attacks on Ahmadi places of worship and on Jinnah hospital in Lahore should open the eyes of the Punjab government”.

The official was of the opinion that one reason that the Punjab government has not been interested in taking action against elements linked to the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is that it is counting on their vote bank for the next general elections. The account provided by the senior officer was also confirmed by officials of the other two intelligence agencies.

Spokesman of the Punjab government Senator Pervez Rashid has dismissed the allegations leveled by the intelligence officials. “Why do these intelligence officials remain unnamed? Why don’t they hold a news conference to say this?” said an angry Pervez Rashid, adding that, “If any intelligence official from the armed forces has such a problem, then he should talk to the chief of the army staff and he should bring it up with the chief minister of Punjab. If any civilian intelligence officer has a problem, then he should get the prime minister to talk to the chief minister. And if the chief minister does not listen to them, then they should complain”.

The senator said that the Punjab police had its own complaints of non-cooperation on the part of the federal intelligence agencies. He said the federal agencies only provide vague warnings to the Punjab police. “They may write a letter that there is a threat of a terrorist attack on Friday, but they don’t specify when and where so how can we take action on such a vague warning?” he said.

Senator Rashid also said that the Punjab government’s intelligence arm, the Crime Investigation Department (CID), does not have sophisticated equipment such as mobile phone tracking devices. He said the federal government does not allow such advanced equipment to be provided to provincial departments. “The Punjab police have sacrificed many officers and Jawans in fighting terrorists. How can it be non-serious!” he questioned.

Rashid stressed that what matters is that all concerned should unite in fighting terrorism instead of resorting to the blame game.

Published in the Express Tribune, June 7th, 2010.

URL: http://tribune.com.pk/story/19386/agencies-blame-punjab-for-non-cooperation/

The enemy within

Opinion » Editorial	June 2, 2010

The enemy within

The massacre by terrorists in Lahore last week followed by a raid on a hospital in the same city has reiterated what is obvious to many but still denied by powerful decision-makers in Pakistan — that the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ distinction between militant groups is not tenable. The Pakistan Interior Minister named the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Jaish-e-Mohammed as the organisations suspected to have carried out the attacks during Friday prayers on two mosques of the Ahmadiyya community, killing more than 80 worshippers. Extremists see the Ahmadis as non-believers and therefore fair game. Both groups are linked to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which claimed responsibility for the attacks. They are also believed to be behind the hospital attack. It is no secret that jihadist groups have flourished in the Punjab heartland undeterred by a 2002 ban, all the while building links with the Taliban. Pakistan’s softly-softly approach towards groups with so-called strategic value against India gave the JeM, much like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, special privileges. Islamabad has always said it does not know the whereabouts of JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar. It has maintained that since the ban, the group itself has ceased to exist. Yet a Faisal Shehazad, arriving all the way from the United States, had no problem getting in touch with it. Pakistan Army operations against the Taliban in the north-western regions may have helped reduce the number of incidents in that area, and a new operation is on the anvil in North Waziristan, under pressure from the United States. But given the Taliban’s links with the Punjab-based jihadist groups, it is no surprise that the monster rears its head elsewhere.

A military strike by the U.S. on Pakistan, reported to be under contemplation should a terrorist attack on American soil succeed, is no solution. Any such action would be extremely foolhardy, and New Delhi should oppose it. But clearly, Pakistan itself must take urgent steps. This means nothing less than what India has been demanding for years: uprooting the infrastructure of terrorism built with state patronage for the jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Some arrests were made after the mosque attacks. This is hardly enough. As the track record shows, many arrested terror suspects in Pakistan are let off by the courts because of the prosecution’s failure to come up with evidence. It is unfortunate that at a time like this, instead of facing up to the reality, influential sections in Pakistan’s political parties, the Army, and media remain in expedient denial. If Pakistan means to win this battle, it must clear its vision and recognise the enemy within.

URL: http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article444953.ece

Pakistan: Abuse of Christians and Other Religious Minorities (Part Two)

October 7, 2009

Pakistan: Abuse of Christians and Other Religious Minorities (Part Two)

Adrian Morgan

Click here for Part One

Methodology of Oppression

Christians are not the only group to have been affected by Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. These statutes have been used against Hindus, Muslims, and members of the Ahmadiyya (or Ahmadi, Qadiani) sect, who consider themselves “Islamic” yet are shunned as heretics. The laws are also used to “punish” people as a result of feuds, arguments over land, and other reasons. In these cases, innocent Muslims are often the victims of the blasphemy statutes. But there are other ways of oppressing minorities in Pakistan.

Forcibly converting people is one means of oppression that has been used against minority groups. On May 26, 2006, a conference was held in a Lahore hotel, sponsored by the Minority Rights Commission of Pakistan (MRC). It was claimed at this meeting that although only 100 cases of forced conversions were reported in the Pakistan media, the true annual figure ranged between 500 and 600 a year.

I.A. Rehman, a member of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) told the conference: “In Pakistan we do not have any law against forced conversion and converting from Islam to any other religion means death. To change this state of affairs, we must consider the issue as a struggle for democracy and invite Muslims as well to these meetings, so they can help us to better understand all points of view of the argument.”

The practice of forcing Hindu girls to convert has been documented in Pakistan. In November, 2005, there had been 19 such cases reported in Karachi, the main city in Sindh province. Hindus are generally in low numbers in Pakistan, but in Sindh, there are two districts (Jacobad and Larkana) where (according to the 1998 census) they comprise about 40 percent of the local population. Hindu girls were abducted, converted to Islam and hastily married to young Muslims before their families could trace them.

The most offensive method of forcible conversion is gang-rape. In the fall of 2005, a young Christian girl was allegedly gang-raped to force her to convert to Islam. The 12-year-old girl was abducted from her home and forced to have sex with numerous men. The case was presented by the All Pakistan Minorities Alliance (APMA). One former influential member of APMA, Shahbaz Batti, is now the Minorities Minister in the current government.

Christian news sites have several details of such cases of forcible conversions through rape that have taken place in Pakistan. A report by the Asian Human Rights Commission from March 2007 describes how a 15-year-old Shia Muslim girl was gang-raped in Layyah in Punjab province, as a means to force her to convert to Sunni Islam.

Ahmadis

Ahmadis are said to comprise less than one percent of Pakistan’s population. They are treated by the majority population and by the establishment in a manner that should invoke the outrage of “rights groups” like CAIR, but strangely, few groups are prepared to defend the rights of the Ahmadis. The group has as its slogan: “Love for All, Hatred for No One,” yet the group has received vilification from conventional Muslims. In Pakistan in 2005, more than 1,300 reports containing hate material against Ahmadis were published in the Urdu press. The group has also been subjected to violent attacks in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia.

The persecutions of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan are similar to those endured by Christians. Occasionally villages are attacked, or individuals are accused of blasphemy, often in an attempt to invoke sectarian violence against the community of the “blasphemer.” Such an instance happened on June 24, 2006, when a village was attacked after allegations were made that two Ahmadi youths had burned a copy of the Koran. Seven Ahmadis had been arrested under Section 295-B of the Penal Code (desecration of Koran), but a mob nonetheless rampaged through the village of Jhando Shai in Punjab province. Thirteen Ahmadi families lived in the village. Twelve families were forced to flee, while their homes (and some shops) were burned down. The Ahmadi families who fled could not return to register complaints against those who had vandalized their abodes — the police had banned them from coming back.

Between 1986 and 1999, a total of 189 Ahmadis were imprisoned for contravening Section 295-C of the Penal Code. This outlaws blasphemy against the Prophet Mohammed, and is the most serious of the religious statutes, potentially meriting the death penalty.

In 2002, Ahmadi political candidates in the general election were forced to sign a pledge confirming that Mohammed was the final prophet (khatm-e-nabbuwat), essentially forcing them to deny the prophethood of their founder Ghulam Ahmad. The Ahmadis do, however, state that Muhammad was the last law-giving prophet.

The discriminatory oath seemed designed to oust Ahmadis from the political process. Not only are Ahmadi candidates placed in the uncomfortable position of either denying the tenets of their faith or sacrificing their rights to stand for election, the same oath must be signed by voters. As a result, Ahmadis are denied the right to partake in the political process.

The Ahmadiyya were officially declared to be non-Muslims on September 21, 1974. This declaration was made by the National Assembly, and became the second amendment to the constitution. The government then was under the leadership of Fazal Elahi Chaudry, of the PPP party.

The official demonization of the Ahmadis obviously contradicts Jinnah’s original vision of Pakistan as a nation where people of all faiths should be equal. The machinations of anti-democratic fanatics and dictators have betrayed not only Jinnah, but the first government after independence. The first foreign minister of Pakistan was Sir Zafrullah Khan (1893 - 1985), who was an Ahmadi. A figure of international politics, and champion of the Third World, Zafrullah Khan’s religion seems to be the reason why he is not remembered in Pakistan.

Political discrimination continues. The leaders of Pakistan’s Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam party (JUI) follow strict Deobandi beliefs. Sami ul-Haq, who leads the “S” wing of the party, heads the Haqqania madrassa which educated most of Afghanistan’s Taliban, including Mullah Omar (even though the latter did not finish his course). The “F” wing of JUI is led by Fazlur Rehman. Both have argued for Sharia law to replace Pakistan’s democracy. On September 29, 2009, Senator Dr. Khalid Mehmood Soomro of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (F) publicly condemned the exiled leader of the MQM party for supporting the Ahmadi. Soomro also condemned the governor of Punjab for supporting the Ahmadis, and vowed that JUI activists would ensure people knew about khatm-e-nabbuwat.

In December 2004, the Pakistani authorities removed the necessity of a column in a person’s passport that declared one’s religion. Briefly, it seemed that Ahmadis would be able to join the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca. However, in March 2005 government ministers restored the religious identification section on all Pakistani passports. They had apparently been pressured by fundamentalist groups.

Scattered as they are across Pakistan, the cohesion of Ahmadis as a group is maintained through publications. Now, the Internet is used to keep Ahmadis aware of what is happening to their communities both nationally and globally. On September 9, 2006, the offices of an Ahmadi newspaper in Rabwah, Punjab, were raided by police. The Blasphemy laws (298-B and 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code), introduced in 1980 by dictator Zia ul-Haq to deny Ahmadis the right to present themselves as “Muslims,” were invoked to justify the raid. Additionally, the newspaper was said to have published “hate literature.” Arrests were made, some staff escaped. The Daily Alfazl newspaper, which was founded in 1911, was forced to stop printing. It continues, and has an online edition.

The Ahmadis face discrimination even after death. When an Ahmadi is buried in a Muslim graveyard, there are often protests, leading to exhumations and reburials, as happened to a 60-year old-woman in June 2007 and a 17-year-old Ahmadi girl in March 2006. This girl, Nadia Hanif, was reburied because local clerics, supported by extremists, campaigned against her body lying amongst “true” Muslims. A family spokesman said: “How can peace and harmony be built in society?” Between 1988 and 2006, there were a total of 28 Ahmadi exhumations from Muslim cemeteries. Attempts by Ahmadis to expand or alter their own cemeteries are limited by the actions of fanatical Muslims.

In April 2007, when Ahmadis wished to place a fence around a graveyard at Wagah Town near Lahore, a radical cleric declared this unacceptable. The cleric, Dr. Sarfaraz Ahmed Naeemi, promised retaliations if the government allowed it. He said that as the cemetery was near the Indian border, having it enclosed appeared to suggest they wanted a headquarters. Naeemi added: “The government should remember that according to our belief, apostates should be killed within three days. It is only the difference of opinion on this decree within Muslims that has stopped us from doing so.”

Ahmadis — like Christians — are killed for the sake of their faith. Between 1984 and 2004, at least 79 Ahmadis were killed. On March 1, 2007 a senior police officer shot dead Muhammad Ashraf, an Ahmadi man who was eating his breakfast in a hotel in a village near Lahore, Punjab province. Before shooting him, the policeman shouted: “You are an infidel, and are preaching an infidel creed in the area.”

Early on Friday October 7th, two gunmen burst into an Ahmadi mosque in Mong, Mandi Bahuddin town, 60 miles south of Islamabad, the capital. The assailants fired Kalashnikovs at Ahmadis who were offering morning prayers. Eight people were killed and 14 more were injured. The gunmen fled on a motorcycle of a third man, who waited outside. A witness said: “The floor of the one-room place of worship was littered with blood.”

On Monday January 19, 2009 a 55-year-old Ahmadi shopkeeper was shot dead in Kotri district, Sindh province. Saeed Ahmed had been returning home from work when he was shot in front of his house. The only reason for his killing, claimed an Ahmadi spokesman, was his faith. The spokesman blamed a media fatwa for allowing such killings to happen (see below).

Killings are horrific but when children are criminalized under the law on account of their faith, there can be no moral justification. In February 2007, it was revealed that police in Khushab district in Punjab province had registered a case against five young Ahmadis. Their “crime” had been to subscribe to an Ahmadi children’s magazine called Tasheezul Azhan. The police officer who made the case claimed the magazine was “banned” and contained “hate material,” even though it had been printed since 1906. Two of the accused were preteens. One was an 11-year-old girl, Nusrat Jahan, and one was an 8-year-old boy called Umair Ahmed.

In Layyah district in Punjab province, another incident involved children being criminalized. Four Ahmadi boys from the district were arrested on January 28th this year. The boys, named Muhammad Irfan, Tahir Imran, Tahir Mahmood and Naseeb Ahmad, were said in the FIR (First Information Report) to have written “blasphemous material” in the latrines of the Gulzar-e-Madina mosque in Kot Sultan. They were all charged under Section 295-C of the Blasphemy Laws. This statute, which outlaws the use of “derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet”, is the most serious, as it can lead to the death penalty.

Following a well-established pattern, the accusations of blasphemy were followed by mob violence. On January 29, 2009, a day after the arrests, a mob tried to burn Ahmadi houses in Layyah district. The protagonists of the violence were said to be banned Islamist extremist groups.

The case is serious. It is the first time since 1986, when Section 295-C of the PPC was introduced, that it has been used against children. The “banned groups” who led the agitation against the Layyah Ahmadiyya community, were the Sipah-i-Sahaba. Apparently a retired schoolteacher called Noor Elahi Kulachi, who is a member of the Sipah-i-Sahaba, led the campaign to have the children arrested. Kulachi approached a relative of a member of the National Assembly, who then convened a meeting. This had the boys branded as “guilty.”

On Friday January 30 a 45-year old man called Mubaser Ahmed was also arrested. The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) released a statement. This asserted that the boys had not been part of the mosque where the graffiti was found, nor were they from the area.

The AHRC statement also read: “After contacting Dr Muhammad Azam, the district police officer (DPO) of Layyah, family members were told that the police were under pressure from fundamentalists to act against the children. If he did not arrest them, Azam said, the group had threatened to close down the whole city and attack the houses of Ahmedi sect members. Worried about civilian deaths, the officer arrested the children.”

On February 7, 2009, it was revealed that the four accused children had been sent to Dera Ghazi Khan Central Jail. A local community leader sent them books in jail, so they could review for their examinations. Members of the banned Islamist groups that were said to be responsible for attacking Ahmadiyya homes in Layyah were not charged or arrested.

I contacted a British Ahmadiyya mosque and was told that the four Ahmadi boys have since been bailed. Even though they are no longer in prison, they are still awaiting their trial for blasphemy.

In a country that receives so much money from Western nations, particularly from the United States, it is shocking that some officials and politicians flout the rule of law and show no respect for the human rights of others. On September 7, 2008, a former government minister repeatedly declared that as Ahmadis did not believe Mohammed to be the last prophet, it was necessary under Islamic teachings to kill them. He also persuaded his two guests to agree with the statement. Within 48 hours, two Ahmadis had been murdered.

Dr. Amir Liaquat Hussain had formerly been the religious affairs minister for Pakistan, and used to be with the MQM party. On July 4, 2007, he was forced to resign from his post as religious affairs minister, on the orders of the MQM party. The party was unhappy with Liaquat Hussain’s comments that Salman Rushdie should be killed for blasphemy.

Liaquat Hussein made his comments on the popular religious show that he had fronted as anchorman, called “Aalim Online,” This show is on Geo TV. Shortly after his calls for Ahmadis to be killed, the MQM party also dropped Liaquat Hussein from their main committee.

Eighteen hours after Liaquat Hussein called for Ahmadis to be killed as a “religious duty” (Wajib ul Qatal), six people walked into a clinic in Mirpur Khas, Sindh province. Here, Dr. Abdul Manan Siddiqui had a medical practice. They called for the doctor, an Ahmadi, to come to assist a patient. When the doctor came down to see them, he was shot eleven times and died. A woman and a guard were injured by gunfire. On September 9, 2008, a 75-year-old man was killed in Nawab Shah, Sindh province. Mr. Yousaf was a rice trader and head of his local Ahmadi group. He was shot at by men on motorbikes, hit three times, and died in an ambulance before it reached hospital.

On May 29, 2009 the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat issued a press release. This stated that a 54-year-old Ahmadi man from Faisalabad in Pakistan had been killed in what appeared to be a targeted assassination. Mian Liaq Ahmad was driving home when he found a car blocking access to the road where he lived. Men jumped from a car and shot Mr Ahmad in the head. The press release stated: “He becomes the 5th Ahmadi to be martyred in 2009 and the 101st to be killed in Pakistan since anti-Ahmadiyya laws were introduced by the Government of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1984.”

Christians

In Part One I mentioned the case of Fanish “Robert” Masih, who was apparently murdered in his jail cell. His extra-judicial killing is not without precedent. On May 28, 2004 a Christian called Samuel Masih died from injuries. Samuel had been a suspect in a blasphemy case, and while incarcerated, he had developed tuberculosis. On May 22, 2004, he had been escorted to hospital by police guards. One of these police officers, Faryad Ali, hit Samuel on the head with a brick-cutter. Apparently, the police constable claimed that he wanted to gain a place in heaven by killing Samuel.

Christians are most frequently murdered in connection with blasphemy cases, but occasionally acts of naked sectarian violence are used against them. On Christmas Day 2002, three girls were killed in a grenade attack at a church. The incident happened in Chianwala, north of Lahore in Punjab province. The assailants who threw the grenade wore burkas. Two girls died instantly, and another died later. The victims were aged 6, 10 and 15.

The grenade attack happened after a local Muslim cleric told his congregation: “It is the duty of every good Muslim to kill Christians. You should attack Christians and not even have food until you have seen their dead bodies.” The cleric, Nazir Yaqub, was a supporter of banned group Jaish-e-Mohammed, which is linked with al Qaeda.

On September 25, 2002, seven Christians were killed in Karachi, Sindh province. On March 17, 2002 another church was attacked with grenades in Islamabad. Five people were killed and 45 were injured.

On Monday August 5, 2002, six people were killed at the Murree Christian School near Islamabad. On August 9, 2002 grenades were thrown into a Christian hospital in Taxila, 25 miles from Islamabad. Three nurses died.

The worst sectarian attack against Christians happened on October 28, 2001 when 18 people died after gunmen attacked a church service in St. Dominic’s church in Bahawalpur in Punjab province. In July 2002, four people were arrested in connection with the incident. Two of these belonged to the banned group Lashkar-i-Jhvangi.

Challenging the Blasphemy Laws

In May 2007 Christians in Charsadda in North-West Frontier Province, close to the Afghan border, were threatened by Islamists. A letter telling them to convert or die was circulated in the town. The threats came after a legal attempt to change the blasphemy laws had failed.

Attempting to challenge the blasphemy laws has always invoked the ire of Islamic fanatics. These are highly organized. Lashkar-Jhvangi comprises former fighters who were in Afghanistan, fighting the Soviets. Other groups, such as Tehrik-e-Tahafuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat, have been instrumental in oppressing the “heretical” Ahmadiyya, and also challenging any proposed changes to the blasphemy legislation. The Tehrik-e-Tahafuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat reappeared in the news in May last year demanding that Pakistan cut ties with the Netherlands and Denmark.

The aggression of this group was expressed by its leader, Hanif Tayyab, who said: “We put the government on one-month notice to expel these envoys and recall our ambassadors from the two countries, otherwise we will ask our followers to march on Islamabad.”

Lashkar-i-Jhvangi and Sipah-i-Sahaba appear to have been instrumental in many notorious instances of communal violence against Pakistani Christian communities (as well as their documented attacks upon Ahmadi and Shia Muslim communities). Often they invoke “blasphemy” accusations against individuals to better mobilize groups to violence against whole communities. This appeared to have happened at Sangla Hill in Punjab province in 2005, and also at Gojra in August this year.

The first major case of such communal violence happened against the Christian village of Shanti Nagar near Karachi, Sindh province. On February 6, 1997, thousands of Islamic protesters descended on the village with placards stating: “Kill the Christians because they are Blasphemers towards the Holy Quran and Holy Prophet.” In the village of Shanti Nagar 785 houses were destroyed, four churches were burned, and 2,500 people forced to flee. Two days before, Muslims had run riot in the town of Khanegal. In all, 13 churches were destroyed and 2,000 Bibles were destroyed. The mob violence, in which incendiary devices were used, had stemmed from the discovery of a ripped Koran, which had Christians’ names written on the pages.

The problems with attempting to challenge the blasphemy laws are plain: Anyone who attempts to alter the laws is seen as an “enemy of Islam,” and the Islamist groups can mobilize support with little resistance from the authorities.

Lawyers who have acted to defend those accused of blasphemy have been threatened. Aslam Pervaiz is one individual who had received death threats and had been assaulted for defending those accused of blasphemy. Sheikh Anis A Saadi is the Chairman of a free advocacy service and said in November 2008 that he has been subject to social stigma from defending alleged “blasphemers.” His office had been set on fire, he had been assaulted, and his family had received written threats from a “jihadi” group.

The Asian Human Rights Commission reports that a lawyer has been mentioned in a printed Urdu advertisement, placed in several newspapers. The lawyer in question is called Rao Zafar Iqbal, and he is head of the National Council for Human Rights. He received threatening letters in July 2009. These demanded that he stop defending religious minorities. They came from Jan Nisaran-e-Nabuwat and Aqeeda-e-Tahafuz-e-Kathme Nabuwat. When he went to Faisalabad police to request protection, they refused. He was then shot at.

On August 4, 2009, an advertisement appeared in the Daily Pavel newspaper. It is reproduced above. This advertisement declared that Rao Zafar Iqbal is deserving of death, because he defended a man called Mohammed Ayube who claims to be Prophet Mohammed. Even though Ayube appears to be mentally ill, fatwas appeared against him in the Daily Pavel and Daily Express newspapers. The advertisement mentioning Rao Zafar Iqbal stated that murdering the lawyer would be doing a service to Islam.

The police appear to have taken no action against the newspapers, and in so many cases of alleged “blasphemy,” as well as when sectarian riots occur, the police are said to have stood back and done nothing.

When lawyers have been successful, and their clients are freed, the acquitted individuals have to flee for their lives. Several have been killed after gaining freedom. For example, Manzur Masih, Rahmat Masih and Salamat Masih had been arrested in May 1993, accused of blasphemy, under Section 295-C of the PPC.

The Christians were said to have passed pieces of paper into a mosque in Punjab province. The slips of paper allegedly bore insulting comments about Mohammed. The three had been accused by a cleric, Maulvi Fazl-e-Haq, who was a leader of the militant group Sipah-e-Sahaba, which at that time was not banned. Fazl-e-Haq claimed the three had also scribbled graffiti on the mosque wall.

At Lahore High Court, the three were acquitted, and set free, accompanied by another young man who had been falsely accused. Standing on the steps of the courthouse, the four were shot at by gunmen. Manzur Masih was killed. The judge who had acquitted him would also later be killed by extremists for freeing the Christians.

Bishop John Joseph, the first ethnic Pakistani to become Bishop of Faisalabad, attended the funeral of Manzur Masih, and even kissed the feet of the dead man. He vowed that he would be the next person to die under the blasphemy laws. Later, in his frustration, Bishop Joseph would give his own life. But even his own sacrifice brought no change to the laws.

FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Adrian Morgan is a British based writer and artist. He has previously contributed to various publications, including the Guardian and New Scientist and is a former Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Society. He is currently compiling a book on the demise of democracy and the growth of extremism in Britain.

URL: www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.4464/pub_detail.asp

Pakistan: Abuse of Christians and Other Religious Minorities (Part One)

October 6, 2009

Exclusive: Pakistan: Abuse of Christians and Other Religious Minorities (Part One)

Adrian Morgan

This year, Christians in Pakistan have suffered their worst persecutions for a decade. As a percentage of the population in the predominantly Muslim country, Christians number less than five percent. This year, seven Christians were burned alive in mob violence at Gojra in Punjab province. Four of these were women and one was a four-year-old child. In other parts, homes and churches have been destroyed and hundreds of Christians have been forced to flee their homes.

Pakistan’s discriminatory blasphemy laws have continued to be used to oppress minorities. As soon as a police complaint (FIR or First Information Report) is made about blasphemy the accused is compulsorily remanded in custody until trial. One Christian individual who was detained in this manner died violently on September 15th, even though the police who incarcerated him attempted to pass off his death as a suicide. In almost all the cases of legislative oppression and mob violence against Christians, blasphemy has been invoked as justification.

Recently Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari was on an international diplomatic tour, in which he visited Rome for three days. On Wednesday September 30th, he met with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and signed an agreement on intelligence-sharing and military cooperation. The persecution of Christians in Pakistan was briefly mentioned.

Zardari said: “We are confronting the problem of religious minorities in Pakistan. We support all religious minorities in our country. They have the same rights, whether it is their religious practices or political rights.” Berlusconi confirmed this, noting that he “found president Zardari to be very attentive.”

The following day (October 1st) Zardari visited Pope Benedict XVI at the Apostolic Palace of Castelgandolfo. The Vatican Press Office stated: “The cordial discussions provided an opportunity to examine the current situation in Pakistan, with particular reference to the fight against terrorism and the commitment to create a society more tolerant and harmonious in all its aspects.”

The Blasphemy Laws

The blasphemy laws as they are now employed derive from amendments made in the 1980s to Pakistan’s Penal Code (PPC). This legislation derives from 1860, as a set of statutes introduced by the British Raj for the governance of West Pakistan, then a predominantly Urdu-speaking region of India. The controversial amendments were introduced by the Islamist military dictator General Zia ul-Haq. This individual deposed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and imposed martial law.

In 1980, ul-Haq introduced a Majlis-e-Shura (a council) of unelected advisers — many from the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party — to replace parliament. Later, he enacted sham elections. Zia ul-Haq retained connections with religious extremists, such as Maulana Muhammad Abdullah Shaheed who was imam at the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad. Ul-Haq gave himself the role of President, with power above prime minister, and ruled Pakistan until his death in a plane crash on August 17, 1988. The main blasphemy amendments were introduced while Pakistan was under a military dictatorship, and not under a civil democracy.

Part XV of the PPC lists offenses involving religion. Originally, there were only four laws of this nature, numbered from 295 to 298, but these have been expanded to number 10. The laws generally invoked to oppress Christians (and also Hindus and the Ahmadiyya, an Islamic sect deemed by some to be heretical) are all the results of amendments. These are Sections 295-B, 295-C and less frequently Section 298-A.

Section 295-B which outlaws “Defiling, etc., of Holy Qur’an” originally arose as an amendment introduced in 1927 and revised in 1982. This states: “Whoever willfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.”

Section 295-C prohibits “Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet” and was introduced with the approval of General Zia ul-Haq and the Islamist Jammat-e-Islami party in 1982 and revised in 1986. This statute reads: “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

The death penalty option to Section 295-C was added in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, III of 1986, S. 2

Section 298-A deals with “Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages”. This amendment was introduced in 1980, and states: “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of any wife (Ummul Mumineen), or members of the family (Ahle-bait), of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), or any of the righteous Caliphs (Khulafa-e-Rashideen) or companions (Sahaaba) of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.”

Other sections of the PPC - 298-B and 298-C specifically target the Ahmadiyya. The first of these, introduced in 1980 prevents the Ahmadiyya from using devotional names to anyone other than Prophet Mohammed and his companions, and from calling any place of worship associated with anyone other than Mohammed as a “masjid” (mosque).

Section 298-C was also introduced in 1980, with a further amendment made in 1984. This forbids any Ahmadiyya from calling him or herself a “Muslim” and forbids any proselytizing of their religion. Sections 298-B and C both carry penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

Events Leading Up to the Gojra Violence

The violence in Gojra, in which Christians were burned to death, stemmed from a dispute that involved accusations of blasphemy. On Tuesday June 30th, a month before the atrocities, more than 110 Christian families were forced to flee their homes in the village of Bahminwala (Bahmina Wala) in Kasur district in Punjab province. The Christians were forced to hide in the fields around the village. They were driven out because Muslim mobs, encouraged by the local mosque, accused them all of blasphemy after one of their number had been listed in an FIR report.

The rampaging began after an incident that had occurred on the previous day. An argument broke out between a Christian farm laborer, 38-year old Sardar Masih (Arif Mashi), who was driving a tractor, and a Muslim riding a bicycle who came by and demanded that he should be allowed to pass. When this did not happen, the Muslim (Muhammad Riaz) apparently accused the Christian of being lower caste and a fight broke out.

According to Pakistan Christian Post, a mosque imam called Qari Lateef (Qari Latif) was consulted, and charges were filed against Sardar Masih at the local police station. These charges did not — it seems — include blasphemy, but the imam used his mosque loudspeaker system to make such accusations. In the ensuing unrest, electricity meters on Christian houses were smashed, Christian villagers were beaten, and houses were looted and burned.

The Daily Times newspaper sent journalists to the region. They met Shaan Ali and his brother Imran, who had both led the mob that attacked the Christians. Shaan Ali claimed, “The Christians had committed blasphemy.” He could not specify who had committed this blasphemy. Ahmed Ali Dhillon of the provincial assembly confirmed that Qari Latif, imam at the village mosque, had instigated the violence against the Christians.

A few days later after the violence, while Christians made public protest at their treatment, Pakistan’s minority minister Shahbaz Bhatti visited the village. Bhatti promised compensation to victims of the violence. Chief Justice Khawaja Mohammed Sharif at the Lahore High Court demanded that the local police chief for Kasur district appear to give their account of the events.

The events at Gojra followed — like so many similar cases of mob violence — the same trajectory as at Kasur, but the outcome was more horrific. Gojra is situated 99 miles west of Lahore in Punjab province. The spark that triggered the rampage began with an accusation that blasphemy had occurred. It was alleged that three Christians, Mukhtar Masih, Talib Masih and Talib’s son Imran, had desecrated pages of the Koran at a wedding ceremony in Korrian, outside Gojra town.

A case was registered against the three men under Section 295-B of the Pakistan Penal Code, but they were not immediately arrested. It is traditional for money to be presented at a wedding, and for those who are poor, “pretend money” is displayed. The Christians had allegedly cut up pieces of paper to look like money. There was no evidence from any sources that a Koran had actually been desecrated.

On Thursday July 30th, fearing reprisals for the alleged desecration, residents had fled from Korrian, leaving many houses empty. A mob gathered, and set fire to about 50 houses, also burning cattle. A kangaroo court was held in which Talib Masih was asked to apologize for desecrating Islam’s holy book. He denied having desecrated pages from the Koran and refused to apologize. Two churches were also set ablaze. The mob blocked the main road to the village, to prevent fire engines from putting out the fires.

Imran Masih was officially charged under Section 295-B of the Penal Code. Pages of the Koran were allegedly found among garbage outside the scene of the wedding on July 26th.

A second incident followed, on Saturday August 1st, which filled international newswires for the scale of its ferocity. The police did nothing as a mob of fanatical Muslims entered the town of Gojra and started to shoot. They threw Molotov cocktails at houses, burning down forty domiciles. The assailants were said to be from Lashkar-e-Jhvangi or its associated group Sipah-e-Saba. These groups have been involved in previous instances of sectarian violence against any minority that is not Sunni Muslim, including attacks upon Shia civilians.

Six of the individuals who died came from one family, that of Almass Hameed. A week after the event, Almass Hameed spoke from his hospital bed: “I think there were thousands. My elderly father went out to see what was happening and they shot and killed him. We were all shocked and crying. Before we knew it, they were breaking into the house.”

Mr. Hameed described how he and nine members of his extended family hid in an upstairs bedroom, and heard members of the mob breaking in, smashing items and dividing valuables between them. Some intruders beat on the bedroom door where Almass and others were hiding. The intruders threatened to burn them alive, and soon he could smell smoke as flames spread. He recalled: “We just couldn’t breathe. I grabbed my eldest son and managed to get out of the room through the flames, my brother came out with one of my daughters, but the rest were stuck and we had no way of rescuing them.”

Those who remained in the bedroom were Almass’ four-year old son Mousa, his 11-year-old daughter, his wife, her sister and her mother. Unable to escape, they were burned to death.

A Muslim youth blamed the event upon the Christians. He said: “We Muslims are the victims. We gathered to protest about what they did to the Koran in Korrian and just wanted to walk through their area, but they threw stones at us and fired shots. Of course it is bad that Christians died. But they provoked the Muslims here. I don’t understand why everyone is on their side.”

In the aftermath of the atrocity at Gojra, missionary schools were closed on Monday August 3rd.

A total of 800 individuals were charged with murder, including the local chief of police and the District Coordination Officer. Only 17 of these were actually named and placed in custody, with the remainder listed as “unknown” individuals. The charges had been brought by a local bishop. Shahbaz Sharif announced that 500,000 Rupees ($6,002) would be awarded for each family member that had died in the August 1st rioting.

The events in Gojra were to precipitate further attacks in a wave of “blasphemy hysteria”. At Mudrike in Lahore, immediately after the Gojra arson deaths, a Muslim factory owner was falsely accused of blasphemy. The incident took place on Tuesday August 4th. It involved Mian Najib, the owner of East Leather, a leather-processing factory at Khatiala Virkan near Muridke. Najib removed an out-of-date Islamic calendar from the wall of the factory and, it is alleged, burned it. Calendars of this nature often have verses or quotations from the Koran upon them, and as such, any destruction of these quotations is seen as destruction of the Koran.

A worker at the factory called Moulvi Shabber claimed to have seen this act, and incited revenge for this act. A crowd of hundreds attacked the East Leather factory. In the ensuing violence, a security guard was killed, along with a security guard. Several others were injured.

On Wednesday, August 5th at Sanghur in Sindh province, a 60-year-old Muslim woman was accused of blasphemy, and her home became surrounded by a mob, led by a local shopkeeper who accused her of blasphemy. The shop owner had said that Akhtari Begum had thrown around some pages of the Koran inside his store. She, for her part, claimed that she had thrown the book in which her credit entries had been kept by the shopkeeper, onto the ground. Police took the woman into custody, apparently sparing her life.

Other Incidents

The fact that Muslims too can become innocent victims of mob violence may perhaps be the key to having the Blasphemy Laws revoked. Traditionally, extremist Islamic groups, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami party, which had a part in writing the laws, have campaigned successfully for blasphemy laws to remain. In March 2008, for example, the Jamaat-e-Islami party (which seeks Sharia law and wants apostates from Islam to be executed under law) condemned political parties for ignoring its rallies in favor of enforcing the Blasphemy statutes.

The mention of agitation by the groups Lashkar-i-Jhvangi and Sipah-i-Sahaba in some of the recent attacks against the Christian minority suggests that the extremes of violence have been deliberately manipulated.

While the victims of the Gojra violence were buried, police took action against suspects and arrested 65 people, including Qari Abdul Khaliq Kashmiri, a leading figure in Sipah-i-Sahaba. The residence of Abid Farooqi, another member of the banned terror group, was raided, but Farooqi had fled. His father and two brothers were apprehended and taken into custody.

On November 12, 2005, a similar incident had taken place in Sangla Hill in Punjab province, where a false allegation of blasphemy had been made. Yousaf Masseh was accused of desecrating pages from the Koran, though it was claimed that he had been accused by two men who owed him money from gambling debts, and did not wish to pay. Masseh had been imprisoned, while a mob of about 1,500 Muslims, encouraged by loudspeaker announcements from a mosque, descended upon the Christian homes in Sangla HIll. Three churches, including a Catholic and a Protestant house of worship, a school, a youth hostel, a nunnery and two homes belonging to Protestant priests were destroyed.

Shortly after the orgy of destruction, Christian community leaders in Sangla Hill had been threatened over the phone by a man who identified himself as a member of Lashkar-i-Jhvangi. He warned them to accept his “deal” within two days or to “get ready to die.”

Lashkar-i-Jhvangi was the group believed responsible for the kidnap and decapitation of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. An offshoot of Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-i-Jhvangi came into existence in 1996. It was designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization on January 30, 2003. Both Lashkar-i-Jhvangi and Sipah-i-Sahaba had been banned by President Musharraf in Pakistan on August 14, 2001. Sipah-i-Sahaba had been formed in Punjab province in the 1980s. Both groups have a Deobandi philosophy (the ideology which governs the actions of the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan) aimed for a Sunni state in Pakistan under sharia law.

In April 2009, Christians came under threat from Taliban-supporting militants in a community near Sarjani Town in a suburb of Karachi, in Sindh province. Buildings, including two houses and about six shops, were set on fire. Roadside traders’ stalls and carts were destroyed by fire. Gunfire broke out between groups and four people were injured. The violence broke out after graffiti on the walls of a church had been found on Wednesday April 22nd. The graffiti comprised of pro-Taliban slogans.

Christians responded by burning tires and throwing stones at passing vehicles. The two groups — Pakhtoons (Pashtun migrants from the Afghan borderlands) and Christians — faced each other down, and then gunfire broke out. Four people were injured, including an 11-year-old boy. One of the individuals who had been shot, a man called Irfan Masih, died later in hospital.

The graffiti which was chalked onto the wall of the Roman Catholic church in Sarjani town included: Taliban are coming,” “Long live Taliban” and “Be prepared to pay Jizya or embrace Islam.”

Jizya is a tax, listed in the Koran and the Hadiths, which non-Muslims were traditionally obliged to pay to Muslim overlords when a community was fully controlled by Islam and governed by the precepts of Sharia. In the Koran, Sura 9, verse 29, it is written (Yusufali’s translation): “Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.”

During the incident in the Christian settlement (called Khuda ki Basti) near Sarjani Town, police were present but had done nothing to stop the incident. When the shooting began, only Christians were injured.

On August 28th in the city of Quetta in Baluchistan, southwestern Pakistan, six Christians were shot dead and seven more were injured. For months before the atrocity, Christians in the region had been receiving letters from Islamic fundamentalists which ordered them to convert to Islam or to die.

The most recent incident of prejudice against the Christian community involved the Blasphemy Laws. A 25-year-old Christian man from Sialkot in northeastern Punjab province, close to the Indian border, was arrested on Friday September 11th, accused of desecrating the Koran. A mob of about 100 people, most of them young men, made the accusations against Fanish Masih, who sometimes went under the name of Robert. The mob went on the rampage through Sambrial district and attacked a Roman Catholic church, setting it alight.

The alleged incident that provoked the violence was a claim that a Christian had snatched a Koran from a 10-year-old girl and had then desecrated it. No authentication of the incident has appeared from other sources, and it seems that — like almost all alleged cases of Koran desecration — it could be a baseless myth.

On Tuesday September 15th, police announced that Fanish Masih had committed suicide in his cell. The young man had been kept in a separate cell, and police maintained that he had tried to commit suicide by hanging himself with a narrow cord. This version was immediately contested. Asma Jahangir, the head of HRCP, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, claimed that “This is death in custody and the police authorities are responsible.”

Kamran Michael, the Punjabi provincial Minister for Minority Affairs said: “I have seen the body and there were torture marks on it.” It is obvious that there is a deep gash on Robert’s forehead, which appears to have been caused by impact from a sharp-edged object. The body was taken away by local Christians who demanded a private autopsy.

At the funeral of Fanish Masih on Wednesday September 16th, there was discontent. The body could not be buried in Fanish’s native village of Jaithikey-Sambrial for fear of inflaming tensions again. Instead, a memorial service was held in the grounds of a Christian school in the industrial city of Sialkot. There was ill feeling on the night before the funeral, and some Christians blocked roads, threw stones at vehicles and trashed 13 shops. On the day that Fanish was interred, there were clashes with police, and nine Christians were arrested.

The day of the funeral, the National Assembly Standing Committee on Minorities demanded an official inquiry into the circumstances of Robert Fanish Masih’s death in police custody.

While Pakistani newspaper editorials carried sincere expressions of regret about the treatment of Christian and other minorities in Pakistan, a bizarre turn of events took place in Toba Tek Singh, the district that included Gojra. On September 26th, it was announced that an individual called Ghulam Murtaza had filed a case against 129 Christians from Gojra.

Murtaza claimed that he had been among 12 Muslims who had been injured on August 1st, the day that seven Christians had been injured in Gojra. In this counterclaim, it was stated that one of the Muslims who was injured on the day of the rioting, Muhammad Asif, later died from injuries. The legal charges invoked the Anti-Terror Act as well as Sections from the Penal Code, including Section 295-C (insulting Prophet Mohammed), 280 (theft from a house), 436 (mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy house etc.), 324 (Qatl-i-amd or attempting to cause death of another), 148 (rioting, armed with deadly weapon), 149 (being part of an unlawful assembly and guilty of committing a crime) and Section 342 (wrongful confinement).

The individuals listed in Murtaza’s charge sheet included John Samuel, the Bishop of Gojra, and also Samuel’s two sons, and a local administrator.

Six days before Ghulam Murtaza brought his extraordinary set of charges against members of Gojra’s Christian community, 18 people who were held in custody for the violence of August 1st were released. A joint committee of Muslims and Christians, set up to enact reconciliation, had decided to declare the 18 individuals innocent. A similar committee had brought the same results — and consequence lack of punishment for offenders — in the aftermath of the Sangla Hill riots of 2005.

The Death of a Dream

When Pakistan broke free from British rule, it was led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. It is hard to imagine that originally, the state of Pakistan was officially secular. Nowadays, Section 2 of the constitution maintains that “Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan.” Jinnah was only in power for 13 months before he died. With him died the dream of a secular nation.

The current Constitution maintains in Section 20 A that, “subject to law, public order and morality, every citizen shall have the right to profess and propagate his religion”. Section 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code deliberately suppresses this basic right in relation to the Ahmadiyya. These believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who founded their faith on March 23, 1889, is a prophet. In every other way they follow the tenets of the Koran, though they are banned by Saudi Arabia from performing one of the five pillars of Islam, making the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca.

One of the few heartening things to have emerged as a consequence of the recent attacks against Christians is a willingness on the part of respected Muslim commentators within Pakistan to voice their shock and shame at the events that have been allowed to take place on account of the Blasphemy Laws. For the first time in three decades, there appears to be a determination on the part of Pakistan’s elite to discuss the removal of the contentious and divisive laws.

Several writers have gone back to the historic speech made by Muhammad Ali Jinnah on August 11, 1947, the day of Pakistan’s Independence. As president of the new republic, Jinnah addressed the Constituent Assembly.

He included the following words: “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State. As you know, history shows that in England, conditions, some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.”

He added: “Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”

The evidence is now incontrovertible: Pakistan is now a nation where Hindus, Christians and the “heretical” Ahmadiyya are minorities who have none of the freedoms that were described by Jinnah in his first speech as elected president. Jinnah was speaking of the need to frame a Constitution and what it should encompass. He railed against the corruption that had been endemic at the time of Independence. Acknowledging that Pakistan would have non-Muslims in its population, he urged that the state should work for the well being of everyone. He said: “If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his color, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.”

Pakistan has long abandoned the principles that brought it into being. The rule of Zia ul-Haq was the third military dictatorship since independence. Since 1947, only one government, the one that preceded this current one, has completed a full term of office, and that was blighted by emergency powers introduced by Musharraf at the end. The Blasphemy Laws, approved by Zia ul-Haq with the support of Islamic fundamentalists, have been a source of strife, a means by which personal scores can be settled, a pretext for communal violence. At a speech delivered after the funeral of Fanish Masih, Father Emanuel Yousaf Mani called on the current government to review the Blasphemy statutes. He told a press conference that since their introduction, 947 people, all of them non-Muslims, had been killed.

In Part Two, I will describe how previous attempts to amend the Blasphemy Laws have foundered in the face of fundamentalist opposition, and show how they have been used to settle scores and to turn minority groups into convenient scapegoats.

FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Adrian Morgan is a British based writer and artist. He has previously contributed to various publications, including the Guardian and New Scientist and is a former Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Society. He is currently compiling a book on the demise of democracy and the growth of extremism in Britain.

URL: www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.4447/pub_detail.asp