Religion repressed in third of all nations

---The Associated Press

December 17, 2009

Study: Religion repressed in third of all nations

By NINIEK KARMINI

NEW YORK — In Indonesia, Muslim groups burn down a mosque belonging to the minority Ahmadiyya. In Singapore, the government refuses to recognize Jehovah’s Witnesses. In Belgium, 68 religion-based hate crimes are reported in 2007 alone.

People living in a third of all countries are restricted from practicing religion freely, either because of government policies and laws or hostile acts by individuals or groups, according to a study released Wednesday by the Pew Research Center, “Global Restrictions on Religion.”

That amounts to 70 percent of the globe’s population, since some of the most restrictive countries are very populous.

Of the world’s 25 most populous countries, citizens in Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan and India live with the most restrictions when both measures are taken into account, the study found.

“Where those two come together is where it’s most intense,” said Brian Grim, senior researcher at the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life.

The United States, Brazil, Japan, Italy, South Africa and the United Kingdom have the least amount of restrictions on religious practices when measured by both government infringement and religion-based violence or harassment, according to the study.

The study found that religious minorities suffer the brunt of the intolerance.

Timothy Shah, a senior research scholar at Boston University who is familiar with the study, said he was struck by the fact that more than 30 countries have high levels of both government and social restrictions on religion.

Shah pointed to Nigeria, where 12 majority-Muslim states adopted the Islamic Sharia criminal code after returning to civilian rule in 1999, resulting in hostilities against religious minorities.

“Where the state throws its weight around, that naturally creates a response of social hostility,” he said.

The Pew Center sought answers to 20 questions it created related to government restrictions on religious practices, such as policies or laws, and on 13 questions on social restrictions, such as individual acts of violence.

The group then examined published public information sources, including reports by the U.S. State Department, the United Nations and various non-governmental organizations, to answer the questions on a county-by-country basis. Researchers analyzed information from July 1, 2006, to June 30, 2008.

The report found that the percentage of the world’s countries with high or very high government restrictions is at about 20 percent, which amounts to 57 percent of the world’s population. These countries include Saudi Arabia, Iran and former communist countries, such as Russia, Belarus and Bulgaria, where state atheism has been replaced by favored religions that are accorded special protections or privileges.

Grim pointed out that many countries have language in their constitutions or basic laws that ban infringements on religion. But the reality is that governments often place restrictions on religions in practice.

For example, 90 percent of countries require religious groups to register for reasons including obtaining tax-exempt status or import privileges. But in almost three in five countries, the registration requirements result in problems or discrimination against certain groups.

The Singapore’s Societies Act, for example, requires all religious groups to register with the government but it doesn’t recognize Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Unification Church.

In practice, only about a quarter of the world’s countries implement constitutional language protecting religious freedom.

Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
URL: www.google.com/hostednews/ap...5Bke5rh5i9_hsAD9CKOMCG0

Bangladesh: Int’l Religious Freedom Report - 2009

Excerpts from
U.S. Department of State
International Religious Freedom Report 2009: Bangladesh
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
October 26, 2009

The Constitution establishes Islam as the state religion. It provides for the right to profess, practice, or propagate all religions, subject to law, public order, and morality. It also states that every religious community or denomination has the right to establish, maintain, and manage its religious institutions. Although the Government publicly supported freedom of religion, attacks on religious and ethnic minorities continued to be a problem during the reporting period. There were no reported demonstrations or attempts to attack institutions of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, but there were isolated instances of harassment. Demands that Ahmadis be declared non-Muslims continued sporadically, but the Government generally acted in an effective manner to protect Ahmadis and their property. Religion exerted a significant influence on politics, and the Government was sensitive to the religious sentiments of most citizens.

There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom by the Government during the reporting period. On December 29, 2008, the Awami League (AL), an avowedly secular party that enjoys broad support from religious minorities, won power in the first parliamentary elections since 2001. These elections were largely free of the violence and intimidation against religious minorities that had characterized earlier ones. The new Government appointed members of minority communities to several senior leadership positions. The Government initiated efforts to reform the curriculum of Islamic religious schools, known as madrassahs, to standardize education. Citizens generally were free to practice the religion of their choice. Government officials, including police, nonetheless often were ineffective in upholding law and order and sometimes were slow to assist religious minority victims of harassment and violence. The Government and many civil society leaders stated that violence against religious minorities normally had political or economic dimensions and could not be attributed solely to religious belief or affiliation.

There were reports of societal abuses and discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice during the period covered by this report, although figures suggested such incidents declined significantly in comparison to the previous reporting period. Hindu, Christian, and Buddhist minorities experienced discrimination and sometimes violence from the Muslim majority. Harassment of Ahmadis continued.

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom with the Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. In meetings with officials and in public statements, U.S. Embassy officers encouraged the Government to protect the rights of minorities. Publicly and privately, the Embassy denounced acts of religious intolerance and called on the Government to ensure due process for all citizens. The Ambassador met with minority religious communities around the country, including a visit to the country's most prominent Hindu temple just days before the national election and a visit to a predominantly Hindu polling station during the election. The U.S. Government sponsored the highly successful visit of a prominent U.S. Muslim cleric who spoke to audiences about Qur’anic interpretations that support tolerance and gender equity.

Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 55,126 square miles and a population of 154 million. According to the 2001 census, Sunni Muslims constitute 90 percent of the population and Hindus 9 percent. The rest of the population is mainly Christian, mostly Roman Catholic, and Theravada-Hinayana Buddhist. Ethnic and religious minority communities often overlap and are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and northern regions. Buddhists are predominantly found among the indigenous (non-Bengali) populations of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bengali and ethnic minority Christians live in communities across the country, including Barisal City, Gournadi in Barisal District, Baniarchar in Gopalganj, Monipuripara in Dhaka, Christianpara in Mohakhal, Nagori in Gazipur, and Khulna City. There also are small populations of Shi’a Muslims, Sikhs, Baha’is, animists, and Ahmadis. Estimates of their numbers varied from a few thousand to 100,000 adherents per group. There is no indigenous Jewish community and no significant immigrant Jewish population. Religion is an important part of community and cultural identity for citizens, including those who did not participate actively in prayers or services.
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Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution establishes Islam as the state religion but provides for the right to practice, profess, and propagate any religion, subject to law, public order, and morality. There are no laws against blasphemy, although religious political parties have pledged to enact such laws should they gain power. Since coming into power, the new Government has not publicly commented on this issue.

The Government publicly supported freedom of religion; however, attacks and discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities continued during the reporting period. In general, government institutions and the courts protected religious freedom.
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In 2001 the High Court ruled all legal rulings based on Shari’a known as fatwas, to be illegal. However, the ban was not implemented because a group of Islamic clerics filed an appeal, which remained unresolved at the end of the reporting period.

Although Islamic tradition dictates that only muftis (religious scholars) who have expertise in Islamic law are authorized to declare a fatwa, village religious leaders at times made declarations in individual cases. Sometimes this resulted in extrajudicial punishments, often against women, for perceived moral transgressions.
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Abuses of Religious Freedom

On March 15, 2008, the Special Branch of police in Brahmanbaria prevented the Ahmadiyya community from holding a religious convention. Following an intervention by higher authorities, the Special Branch lifted its objections and the event was held peacefully. A similar incident occurred at Shalshiri in Panchagarh district on March 21, 2008. There were no further developments in either of these cases or similar incidents during the reporting period.
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Section III. Societal Attitudes

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There were approximately 100,000 Ahmadis concentrated in Dhaka and several other locales. Although mainstream Muslims rejected some of the Ahmadiyya teachings, most of them supported Ahmadis’ right to practice without fear or persecution. As compared to the previous reporting period, harassment of Ahmadis by those who denounced their teachings declined.

Prothom Alo reported that on July 27, 2008, the Muslim religious extremist group Amra Dhakabashi resumed its campaign to declare the Ahmadiyya non-Muslim. The organization filed civil cases against the religious leaders of the Ahmadiyya in all 64 districts and launched a cell phone text message-based defamation campaign against Ahmadiyya leadership. By the end of the reporting period, these campaigns had been unsuccessful in provoking a widespread backlash against the Ahmadiyya community.

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom with officials at all levels of the Government as well as with political party leaders and representatives of religious and minority communities. During the reporting period, the Embassy emphasized the importance of free, fair, and credible national parliamentary elections in 2008 with full participation of all ethnic and religious communities. Following the election, the Embassy reiterated the need for an inclusive political process for all citizens regardless of religion. The Embassy continued to express concern about human rights, including the rights of religious and ethnic minorities. Embassy staff traveled to various regions investigating human rights cases, including some involving religious minorities, and met with civil society members, NGOs, local religious leaders, and other citizens to discuss concerns about pre and post-election violence. They also encouraged law enforcement to take proactive measures to protect the rights of religious minorities.

U.S. Embassy and visiting U.S. Government officials regularly visited members of minority communities to hear their concerns and demonstrate support. Prior to the elections, the Ambassador visited a prominent Hindu temple in Dhaka and met with leaders from the community to demonstrate the U.S. Government’s support for an electoral process that was inclusive and free of violence. On election day he observed voters in a predominantly Hindu polling center.

The Embassy assisted U.S. faith-based relief organizations in filing documents for approval of schools and other projects. The Government has been willing to discuss such subjects and has been helpful in resolving problems. The Embassy also has acted as an advocate in the Home Ministry for these organizations in resolving problems with visas.

The Embassy encouraged the Government, through the Ministry for Religious Affairs, to develop and expand its training program for Islamic religious leaders. After a pilot program, the U.S. Government provided orientation sessions for religious leaders on human rights and gender equality, among other topics. For the fourth year in a row, the U.S. Government sponsored the visit of a prominent U.S. Muslim cleric to tour the country and speak. The cleric visited the southeastern city of Chittagong and addressed several audiences in Dhaka about Qur’anic interpretations that support religious tolerance and freedom and promote gender equality.

During the reporting period, the U.S. Government continued to make religious freedom, especially the problems facing the population in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, a topic of discussion in meetings with government officials. Embassy officers, including the Ambassador, visited the Hill Tracts over the course of the reporting period and met with senior government officials to relay concerns about the treatment of minorities.

Democracy and governance projects supported by the U.S. Government included tolerance and minority rights components.

URL: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127363.htm

Indonesia: Int'l Religious Freedom Report - 2009

Excerpts from
U.S. Department of State
International Religious Freedom Report 2009 : Indonesia
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
October 26, 2009

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion. However, the Government officially recognized only six religions, and legal restrictions continued on certain types of religious activity.

The Government generally respected religious freedom in practice; however, ongoing government restrictions, particularly among unrecognized religions and sects of the recognized religions considered “deviant” were significant exceptions to respect for religious freedom. Since the previous reporting period the Government convicted and sentenced the leaders of a hardline Muslim organization to 18 months in prison, including time served, for their role in organized violence against a peaceful demonstration in support of religious freedom. The Government also prosecuted terrorists responsible for religiously tinged violence in Sulawesi and the Malukus. In some cases, however, the Government tolerated discrimination against and the abuse of religious groups by private actors and failed to punish perpetrators, although the Government prevented several vigilante actions during Ramadan. Aceh remained the only province authorized to implement Islamic law (Shari’a), although non-Muslims in the province are exempted from Shari’a. Many local governments outside of Aceh maintained laws with elements of Shari’a that abrogated certain rights of women and religious minorities; however, no new laws based on Shari’a were known to have passed during the reporting period. Even though the central Government holds authority over religious matters, it did not try to overturn any local laws that restricted rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Members of minority religious groups continued to experience some official discrimination in the form of administrative difficulties, often in the context of civil registration of marriages and births or the issuance of identity cards.

There were a number of reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. Some groups used violence and intimidation to forcibly shut at least nine churches and 12 Ahmadiyya mosques. Some of the churches remained closed and one Ahmadiyya mosque in Riau that was completely destroyed had not been rebuilt. Other mosques were reopened. Many perpetrators of past abuse against religious minorities were not brought to justice.

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom with government and civil society leaders as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. The Embassy promoted religious freedom and tolerance through exchanges and civil society development.

Section I. Religious Demography

An archipelago of more than 17,000 islands, the country has an area of approximately 700,000 square miles and a population of 245 million.

According to a 2000 census report, 88 percent of the population is Muslim, 6 percent Protestant, 3 percent Roman Catholic, 2 percent Hindu, and in total less than 1 percent Buddhist, followers of traditional indigenous religions, Jewish, and other Christian denominations. Some Christians, Hindus, and members of other minority religious groups argued that the census undercounted non-Muslims.

Most Muslims in the country are Sunni. The two largest Muslim social organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, claimed 40 million and 30 million Sunni followers, respectively. There are also an estimated 1 million to 3 million Shi’a.

Many smaller Muslim organizations exist, including approximately 400,000 persons who subscribe to the Ahmadiyya Qadiyani interpretation of Islam. A smaller group, known as Ahmadiyya Lahore, is also present. Other Islamic minorities include al-Qiyadah al-Islamiya, Darul Arqam, Jamaah Salamulla (Salamulla Congregation), and members of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Institute.

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Section II. Status of Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion and accords “all persons the right to worship according to their own religion or belief.” The Constitution states that “the nation is based upon belief in one supreme God.” The first tenet of the country’s national ideology, Pancasila, similarly declares belief in one God. Government employees must swear allegiance to the nation and to the Pancasila ideology. Other laws and policies placed some restrictions on certain types of religious activity, particularly among unrecognized religious groups and “deviant” sects of recognized religious groups. The Government did not use its constitutional authority to review or revoke local laws that violated freedom of religion.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs extends official status to six religious groups: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Unrecognized groups may register with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism as social organizations. Although these groups have the right to establish a house of worship, obtain identity cards, and register marriages and births, they face administrative difficulties in doing so. In some cases these challenges make it more difficult for individuals to seek employment or enroll children in school.

In June 2008 the Government released a joint ministerial decree freezing the activities of the Ahmadiyya Qadiyani (Ahmadiyya), banning proselytizing by the Ahmadiyya, and prohibiting vigilantism against the group. The decree is short of the outright ban strongly advocated for by hardline groups and a government-appointed body, the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor Pakem). The decree was signed by the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Religion, and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Minister of Religious Affairs stated that violations of the ban on proselytizing would result in a maximum 5-year jail sentence on charges of blasphemy. The decree does not prohibit the Ahmadiyya from worshipping or continuing to practice within its own community.

Following the decree’s release, the Government issued a joint circulatory letter providing the executive guidance on the joint ministerial decree on Ahmadiyya. The letter was signed by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Religion, the Assistant Attorney General for Intelligence, and the Director General for National Integration and Internal Politics at the Ministry of Home Affairs. The letter provides guidance for Governors, Regents, Mayors, Heads of the High Court, and Heads of Regional Offices under the Provincial Ministries of Religion throughout the country on proper implementation of the Joint Ministerial Decree (SKB).

Prior to the government decree, Bakor Pakem issued a recommendation to the Government to dissolve the Ahmadiyya. The April 2008 recommendation declared the group heretical and deviant, citing a 1965 presidential instruction on the “prevention of misuse and disgrace of religion.” The Government delayed action on issuing a formal decree against the group amid pressure from civil society and Islamic organizations that claim the ban would be unconstitutional and contrary to the teachings of Islam.

The Indonesian Council of Ulamas (MUI) released a number of fatwas (religious decrees) in recent years on the issue of “deviance” from mainstream Islam, including recommendations to ban the Ahmadiyya, that were influential in enabling official and social discrimination against the Ahmadiyya and other minority religious groups during the reporting period.

The Government formed the MUI in 1975 and continued to fund its members, but MUI opinions are not legally binding. Nevertheless, the MUI’s edicts or fatwas are designed to be moral guiding principles for Muslims and society, and the Government seriously considers them when making decisions or drafting legislation. MUI’s influence in restricting religious freedoms increased during the year, sometimes with government support.

In 2007 MUI issued a fatwa with 10 guidelines for determining deviant teachings. These include disagreeing with any of the six core principles of Islam; acknowledging a prophet after Muhammad; and changing or modifying Islamic rituals such as performing the Hajj to a place other than Mecca or saying that prayer five times daily is not necessary. In October 2007 the MUI declared the minority sect, al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah deviant. It issued a similar fatwa against the Ahmadiyya in 2005.

The 2006 civil registration bill requires citizens to identify their religion on National Identity Cards (KTP). The bill does not allow citizens to identify themselves as anything outside of the six recognized religious groups. Legally, citizens may leave the religious section blank, but some local government officials were not familiar with this option. Members of unrecognized religious groups were often unable to obtain KTPs as a result.

The Government requires officially recognized religious groups to comply with Ministry of Religious Affairs and other ministerial directives, such as the Revised Joint Ministerial Decree on the Construction of Houses of Worship (2006), Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions in Indonesia (1978), and Guidelines for the Propagation of Religion (1978).

The 2006 Revised Joint Ministerial Decree on the Construction of Houses of Worship requires religious groups that want to build a house of worship to obtain the signatures of at least 90 members of the group and 60 persons of other religious groups in the community stating that they support the construction. The decree also requires obtaining approval from the local religious affairs office, the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB).

The Guidelines for Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions require domestic religious organizations to obtain approval from the Ministry of Religion to receive funding from overseas donors. The Guidelines for Propagation of Religion ban proselytizing under most circumstances.

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Article 156 of the Criminal Code makes spreading hatred, heresy, and blasphemy punishable by up to five years in prison. Although the law applies to all officially recognized religions, the few cases in which it has been enforced have almost always involved blasphemy and heresy against Islam.

Many of the country’s policies concerning religion are enacted and enforced at the subnational level. Since October 2005 the regional representative office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in West Nusa Tenggara upheld a ban on 13 religious groups, including the Ahmadiyya, Jehovah’s Witness, Hare Krishna, and 10 forms of Aliran Kepercayaan as being deviations of Islam, Christianity, or Hinduism. The West Nusa Tenggara Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society closely monitored Ahmadiyya members in Mataram during the reporting period. There were no reports, however, on how the restriction affects the other banned groups in the region. In West Java a joint decree issued in January 2005 in the Kuningan Regency restricts the propagation of Ahmadiyya teachings. On May 5, 2008, Pakem West Java recommended municipal authorities ban Ahmadiyya. On May 6, 2008, the Mayor of Cimahi, West Java, issued an order banning the religious group.

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The Government bans proselytizing, arguing that such activity, especially in religiously diverse areas, could prove disruptive.

Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The Government generally respected religious freedom; however, a government decree restricting the ability of the Ahmadiyya to practice freely was a significant exception. Certain other laws, policies, and official actions also restricted religious freedom and the Government sometimes tolerated private actors’ discrimination against and abuse of individuals based on their religious belief.

Local governments issued bans against Ahmadiyya, al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah, and other minority Islamic sects during the reporting period and monitored them closely, frequently at the request of local MUI chapters.

In September 2008 the acting Governor of South Sumatra issued a governor’s decree banning Ahmadiyya. The decree stated that “the Ahmadiyya would be prohibited in the province because the sect is not compatible with Islamic teachings.” The local ban was supported by officials from the provincial offices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, local prosecutors, representatives from the local MUI and other Islamic organizations, including academics from Palembang-based Raden Fatah State Islamic Institute. Before the ban, several conservative groups under the umbrella organization Islamic People’s Forum (FUI), including the Islam Defenders Front (FPI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council, along with Hizbuth Tahrir Indonesia, a transnational organization, demanded the dissolution of the Ahmadiyya sect.

Despite the South Sumatra decree’s violation of the June 2008 central Government decree and guidance on Ahmadiyya, the central Government has taken no action to demand it be rescinded. The decree remains in place, but no efforts have been made to enforce it and local authorities consider that the decree has no force of law, given that the acting Governor was only in power for three months. The Ahmadiyya community reports that it is still able to perform its usual and normal religious activities in the province.

The June 2008, government decree on Ahmadiyya that bans proselytizing and practices deemed to be “deviant” from mainstream Islam came five months after a government-appointed team began monitoring the Ahmadiyya at the request of MUI. Civil society activists have said that passage of the decree was the most recent example of an escalating effort by Islamic hardliners to restrict the practice of the Ahmadiyya.

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Human rights groups continued to receive sporadic reports of local civil registry officials who rejected applications for identity cards (KTPs) submitted by members of unrecognized or minority religious groups. Some applicants found it easier to register with a religion other than their own and were issued KTPs that inaccurately reflected their religion. For example, some animists received KTPs that listed their religion as Islam. Many Sikhs were registered as Hindu on their KTPs and marriage certificates. Similarly, many Jews registered as Christians. Some citizens without a KTP had difficulty finding work. Several NGOs and religious advocacy groups continued to urge the Government to delete the religion category from the KTPs, but no progress was made.

Ahmadiyya followers forced from their homes in West Lombok by a mob in 2006 and living in the Transito Camp in Mataram continued to face difficulty obtaining KTPs due to the absence of a clear home address while displaced in the camp. As a result, The Ahmadiyya sometimes could not get free health services from hospitals as local officials refused to issue notification letters regarding their poor condition. The Ahmadiyya believed that they could obtain KTPs and resolve the issue if they could return to their home village.

In June 2008 in the Solok district of West Sumatra, local officials refused to perform marriage ceremonies for members of the Ahmadiyya sect. However, with the assistance of the local village head, individuals from the Solok district were able to marry in a different district and have not faced problems since their return.

Since the Government promulgated the Revised Joint Ministerial Decree on the Construction of Houses of Worship in 2006, implementation and defense of rights conferred under the decree have not always been enforced at the local level. During the reporting period, some Christian and Hindu groups pointed to sporadic acts of discrimination in which local authorities refused to authorize the building of churches and temples even though the groups managed to collect the necessary signatures.

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Abuses of Religious Freedom

During the reporting period, the Government continued to explicitly and implicitly restrict the religious freedom of groups associated with forms of Islam viewed as outside the mainstream.

The Government tolerated discrimination and abuse toward the Ahmadiyya by remaining silent on the 2007 MUI fatwa containing guidelines condemning Islamic groups such as the Ahmadiyya, who profess belief in a prophet after Muhammad. The Government also remained silent on the 2005 MUI fatwa that explicitly banned the Ahmadiyya, as well as local government bans. Varying reports provided different numbers of mosques attacked or closed. However, according to national Ahmadiyya spokespersons, since the June 2008 decree, 21 Ahmadiyya mosques were forced to close around the country; 15 were closed in West Java alone. The June 2008 joint ministerial decree on the Ahmadiyya responded to calls to restrict the group’s rights. For the most part, Ahmadiyya followers were allowed to continue worshiping, although some mosques were closed after the decree. However, because of the decree, Ahmadiyya followers were not free to proselytize or otherwise practice their faith publicly.

Authorities failed to halt vandalism on a number of Ahmadiyya facilities during the reporting period.

On June 2, 2009, a mosque belonging to Ahmadiyya members in Kebayoran Lama, South Jakarta, was deliberately set on fire by unidentified arsonists during dawn prayers. Witnesses told police that eight Ahmadiyya members were performing the dawn prayer on the second floor of the two-story building when two men sprayed the mosque with gasoline from a jerry can and lit the fire. There were no injuries in the incident and no arrests were made.

On April 19, 2009 a group of unidentified persons reportedly vandalized the Mahmud mosque in Talaga village. One hundred and fifty residents had sealed the same mosque in July 2008. Also, in July 2008, they sealed the Taher mosque in neighboring Sindankerta village, Cianjur, West Java.

On October 5, 2009, a group of people destroyed the Mubarak mosque in Mahato area, Tanjung Medan village, Pujud District, Rokan Hilir Regency, Riau Province, after the Eid al-Fitr celebration.

On August 27, 2008, hundreds of FPI members threatened the Ahmadiyya congregants of Al Mubarak mosque in Jagakarsa, South Jakarta, and demanded they cease all of their activities before the month of Ramadan.

Members of Ciputat Muslim Community Forum (FMCC) sealed the Baitul Qoyyum mosque belonging to Ahmadiyya on August 19. The FMCC believed that Ahmadiyya members had failed to abide by a joint ministerial decree released in June that banned the group from proselytizing. Police thwarted the residents’ attempt to seal the mosque.

On August 8, 2008, local residents vandalized Baiturahman and Baitol Do’a mosques in Parakansalak, Sukabumi, West Java.

A group of hardliners sealed a small Ahmadiyya mosque in Talaga village and a mosque in Parabon village, Cianjur, West Java on August 1, 2008.

The Ahmadiyya community of 182 individuals living in camps as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in West Lombok since their homes and mosques were attacked by a mob in 2006 continued to face challenges during the reporting period. On April 14, 2009, the local government requested that the IDPs cancel plans to return to their homes in Gegerungan Village due to continued security concerns and pending compensation issues. The April request followed an earlier series of requests in March that the Ahmadiyya delay their plans to return. So far, four families have returned to Gegerungan Village. They are reportedly living and working there safely, although sometimes they still face low level intimidation from the local community.

During the reporting period 125 Ahmadiyya IDPs remained in the Transito Camp and 57 in Praya Camp. In mid-2008 one family from the Praya Camp returned home briefly, only to return to the camp shortly thereafter due to threats of violence. Sources within the Ministry of Religion reported a lower number of 150 IDPs living in the camps, of which 80 had been repatriated back to their homes.

In 2007 the local government reduced the rice subsidy and stopped subsidizing the electricity supply for the IDP camp. At the end of the reporting period, IDPs in the shelter receive two tons of rice subsidies every month. The local government also reduced the water supply to the camp in 2008. Camp conditions remained difficult, with cramped living space and limited access to water. Although children have been able to attend local schools since 2006, they faced harassment. Ahmadiyyas who lived in the camps sometimes faced difficulties obtaining an ID card due to the absence of a clear address. However, those who lived in rented houses or took shelter in their family’s houses did not have these problems. Ahmadiyya who lived in the camp also found it difficult to participate in the free health service program for the poor because they were not able to obtain a letter from local authorities verifying their economic status.

In February 2009 the provincial government in West Nusa Tenggara established a “Coordination Team” consisting of 17 members (religious leaders and academicians) to examine Ahmadiyya teaching and to discuss alternative solutions for the Ahmadiyya. The team offered two options: to relocate the Ahmadiyya into a heterogeneous area in Pemanang district in West Lombok, or to disperse them throughout city-owned land. Ahmadiyya representatives said that these two options were not acceptable and too complicated. Most city-owned land is in disputed areas and located in open green space.

During the reporting period, the Government arrested and charged individuals with heresy, blasphemy, and insulting Islam.

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Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom

On October 30, 2008, the leader of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), Rizieq Shihab, and the leader of the Islam Troop Command (KLI), Munarman, were sentenced to 18 months in prison, including time served, for their roles in leading attacks on members of the National Alliance for Religious Freedom (AKKBB) on June 1, 2008. The AKKBB was holding a rally in support of religious freedom, pluralism, and tolerance at the National Monument (Monas) square. FPI and KLI members believed the rally was intended as a show of support for the Ahmadiyya. FPI and KLI attacked protesters, including women and children, with sticks and stones, leaving an estimated 70 persons injured. After serving nine months of their 18 month sentence, both Rizieq Shihab and Munarman were released in July 2009 based on good behavior.

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Local government officials in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) demonstrated a willingness to acknowledge the marriages of Ahmadiyya followers. Officials from the NTB Department of Religion went to the Ahmadiyya Transito Camp to marry Ahmadiyya couples, and to record and issue marriage certificates. Unlike previous years, it was difficult for the Ahmadiyya followers to marry as there were no local officials willing to either perform or register the marriage.

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Section III. Societal Attitudes

There were numerous reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice.

Controversy over the Ahmadiyya continued throughout the reporting period. Hardline groups renewed attacks on the minority group.

Hardline religious groups demanded the Government act quickly to disband the Ahmadiyya and threatened to do so independently if the Government failed to act. Various rallies took place throughout the country both for and against a ban. Civil rights activists, members of the Presidential Advisory Council, and some leaders from Muhammadiyah and Nadhlatul Ulama spoke out claiming such a ban would be unconstitutional and contrary to the principles of Islam. Groups such as FUI, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and FPI threatened senior NU clerics in Cirebon West Java who opposed banning Ahmadiyya. According to media reports and Ahmadiyya sources, after the June 2008 decree, hardline groups in some areas vandalized or closed 20 Ahmadiyya mosques. Women’s groups reported continued discrimination against Ahmadiyya women and children whose schools were forced to close.

In August 2008 fifty FPI members rallied in front of East Java DPRD, protesting Ahmadiyya. Eighteen FPI representatives received by East Java DPRD demanded the President issue a Presidential Decree and that the East Java Parliament issue a local regulation (Perda) banning Ahmadiyya teaching because the teaching is in violation of and insulting to Islam.

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Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom with the Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights.

The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, consulate general in Surabaya, and consulate in Medan regularly engaged Government officials on specific religious freedom issues, and also encouraged officials from other missions to discuss the subject with the Government. Embassy staff at all levels met frequently with religious leaders, officials of Islamic social organizations, and human rights advocates to clarify U.S. policy in support of religious freedom, discuss religious tolerance, and promote respect for religious freedom. Embassy staff also met with members of minority religious groups, whose houses of worship were forcefully closed, to discuss religious freedom and pluralism.

Embassy and consulate outreach to the public emphasized the importance of religious freedom and tolerance in a democratic and diverse society. The Embassy and consulates also promoted pluralism and tolerance through exchanges and civil society programs.

During the reporting period, two short-term programs sponsored by the U.S. Government that incorporated discussions of religious freedom, pluralism, and tolerance in the United States and Indonesia brought a total of 63 Indonesians to the United States. The programs allowed participants to engage in dialogue with U.S. counterparts about the integral roles of religious pluralism, interfaith dialogue, and multiculturalism in a democratic society, to promote the concept of religious freedom in the country. One exchange program offered 45 Indonesian Islamic boarding school (pesantren) educators the opportunity to shadow teachers in 12 schools throughout the United States and give presentations to American students about Indonesia. Participants examined U.S. democracy as well as religious freedom, civic involvement, and religious education in schools, and related those issues to U.S. and Indonesian society. Furthering the program, upon their return to Indonesia the pesantren educators continued dialogue via on-line blogs and e-mail communication connecting both students and educators.

Another exchange program brought 15 American high school teachers together with 17 Indonesian teachers to build a curriculum unit that promotes interfaith dialogue, cultural understanding, and democratic values to build tolerance among various communities. The Americans visited a wide variety of local leaders, teachers, and students, representing the country’s major religious groups, in Yogyakarta, Makassar, Balikpapan, and Jakarta. The Indonesian teachers traveled to the University of Massachusetts Donahue Institute to work alongside the Americans in creating this unit of curriculum to be used in American and Indonesian schools.

The Embassy and consulates reached a broad population during the reporting period through the production of media programs that provided in-depth coverage of issues, including religious freedom, from a U.S. perspective. These included several television co-op productions, which aired on major free-to-air Indonesian television stations.

The Embassy and consulates also supported campus seminar programs aimed at strengthening supporters of pluralism on Islamic campuses, and reinforcing an understanding of religious freedom, tolerance, pluralism, and gender equity. Five American religious scholars visited Indonesia on an exchange program and held public discussions on several campuses in Jakarta, Lombok, and Malang in cooperation with state Islamic universities and public universities. More than 1,500 students from a wide range of backgrounds participated in the discussions.

In October 2008 USAID signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the National Commission on Human Rights. Under this MOU, which will run through July 2010, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) agreed to provide training and technical assistance to selected provincial and district government officials to improve their understanding and implementation of national law protecting freedom of religion.

The U.S. State Department funded a summer institute for university faculty and education practitioners on religious pluralism, democracy, and culture in the United States.

URL: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127271.htm

Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan in United States House of Representatives Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission

United States House of Representatives
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Washington, D.C.

October 8, 2009

Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:

Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the legal and constitutional issues surrounding Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws. I am honored to provide testimony before this body. The fact that you have commissioned a special hearing on this issue demonstrates your deep commitment to international human rights and religious freedom, and for that you are to be commended.

I am a Muslim-American attorney residing in Los Angeles. In my private practice, I litigate complex business and commercial matters for the firm Latham & Watkins, LLP. In my pro bono practice, I represent refugees and disaster victims. I have studied international and human rights law at Harvard Law School and have written about Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws and surrounding issues for the Harvard Human Rights Law Journal and other periodicals.

The Problem of Blasphemy

Let me begin by defining the problem. Pakistan uses its Criminal Code to prohibit and punish blasphemy. Blasphemy in Pakistan broadly refers to any spoken or written representation that directly or indirectly outrages the religious sentiments of Muslims.[1] Five of Pakistan’s current penal code provisions punish blasphemy. These are collectively referred to as the “anti-blasphemy” laws. Over the course of 25 years, approximately 1,000 individuals have been arrested under the anti-blasphemy laws.[2] These individuals were Muslims (Sunnis, Shias and Ahmadis), Christians and Hindus.[3] Their crimes ranged from wearing an Islamic slogan on a t-shirt to planning to build a Mosque to distributing Islamic literature in a public square to offering prayers in a Mosque to printing a wedding invitation card with Quranic verses to sending a text message perceived as critical of Islam.[4] Their punishments ranged from fines to indefinite detention to life imprisonment to the death sentence. Although no one to date has been executed for blasphemy, at least 32 individuals have been killed by mobs after being arrested for blasphemy.[5] One Roman Catholic bishop committed suicide outside of a Pakistani courtroom to protest the death sentence of a Christian arrested for blasphemy.[6]

Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws continue in full force and effect today. They incite religious extremism and silence the opinions of both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. The U.S. State Department’s 2008 report on Pakistan points out how “authorities routinely used the [anti]-blasphemy laws to harass religious minorities and vulnerable Muslims and to settle personal scores or business rivalries.”[7] Amnesty International reports that Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws are “a handy tool to silence debate and dissent.”[8] Human Rights Watch reports that “Pakistan’s continued use of its blasphemy laws against religious minorities is disgraceful” and must be “repealed.”[9] The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, in a recent letter to President Obama, described the anti-blasphemy laws as “restricting religious freedom” and fostering “vigilante violence.”[10]

In 2006, the National Assembly of Pakistan submitted a bill to the standing committee entitled, “The Apostasy Bill,” which proposes sentencing to death male and female apostates who do not recant their conversions from Islam.[11] If passed, the Bill would supersede the anti-blasphemy laws currently in effect.

Thus, the problem of blasphemy in Pakistan remains more precarious than ever.

How Pakistan Came to this Point

Before I elaborate about the specific abuses stemming from the anti-blasphemy laws, it may be helpful to describe briefly how the laws came into existence.

Pakistan’s early founding reflected a deep commitment to fundamental human rights. Pakistan’s most famous founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, spoke openly about the importance of keeping religious distinctions out of politics and promoting religious freedom and tolerance.[12] The right to religious freedom was central to the struggle for an independent Pakistan in 1947. In fact, Pakistan was one of only a handful of Muslim countries to vote in favor of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and fought especially hard to defend Articles 18 and 19 of that Declaration, which pertain to religious freedom.[13] For example, Pakistan’s first foreign minister, Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, who later would become President of the United Nations General Assembly and President of the International Court of Justice (The Hague), defended the Declaration against intense opposition from Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s original 1956 constitution outlined in clear terms the right of each citizen to profess, practice, and propagate his religion (Article 20), to attend school freely without religious instruction (Article 22), to enjoy places of public entertainment without religious discrimination (Article 26), to qualify for appointment in the service of Pakistan without religious discrimination (Article 27), and to preserve and promote his own language, script, or culture without religious discrimination (Article 28).

Unfortunately, however, Pakistan’s commitment to religious freedom steadily deteriorated over the course of the next several decades. The building of a secular and inclusive state in Pakistan proved difficult in the face of rising religious fundamentalism. The inclusion of religiously-charged language in Pakistan’s Constitution eroded the vital constitutional safeguards for religious freedom. For example, in 1962, the Pakistan Advisory Council for Islamic Ideology added a “repugnancy clause” to the Constitution: “No law shall be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Qur’an and Sunnah [actions of the Holy Prophet], and all existing laws shall be brought into conformity therewith.”[14] In 1980, President Zia-ul-Haq created a special Federal Shariat Court to scrutinize all existing laws in Pakistan to make sure they were not repugnant to Islam.[15] In 1984, President Zia-ul-Haq approved new laws by Parliament to criminalize words and conduct that could be perceived as disrespecting Islam or Muslims. These laws are now referred to as the anti-blasphemy laws. Anyone can register a blasphemy case against anyone else in Pakistan. In 1986, President Zia-ul-Haq signed the Criminal Law Act, which imposed the death penalty for blasphemy under Pakistan’s Penal Code and Press Publication Ordinance Section 298-C.[16]

In short, within a span of a few decades, Pakistan devolved from being a leading international proponent of religious freedom to enacting some of the world’s most dangerous laws against religious minorities.

The Plight of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan

The anti-blasphemy laws have led to wide-ranging abuse of religious minorities in Pakistan. Perhaps the most telling example of the abuse concerns members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. Approximately 4 million Ahmadi Muslims live in Pakistan.[17] The fundamental difference between the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and the Sunni Muslim majority concerns the identity of the messiah – the reformer that the Prophet Muhammad foretold would appear after him. Ahmadis believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be the messiah.[18]

Ahmadis profess to be Muslims, but their belief is irrelevant under the law. Article 260 of Pakistan’s Constitution defines who is or is not a Muslim for purposes of the law.[19] The Second Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution, passed in 1974, amended Article 260 to say that “a person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad, the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad, or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.”[20] This amendment explicitly deprived members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community of their Muslim identity.

In the context of Pakistan’s Second Amendment to the Constitution, the anti-blasphemy laws have essentially criminalized the very existence of Ahmadis in Pakistan. Two of the five anti-blasphemy laws explicitly target by name the activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.[21] These two laws are part of what is known as Martial Law Ordinance XX, which amended Pakistan’s Penal Code and Press Publication Ordinance Sections 298-B and 298-C. For fear of being charged with “indirectly or directly posing as a Muslim,” Ahmadis could no longer profess their faith, either verbally or in writing. Pakistani police destroyed Ahmadi translations of the Qur’an and banned Ahmadi publications, the use of any Islamic terminology on Ahmadi wedding invitations, the offering of Ahmadi funeral prayers, and the displaying of the Kalima (the principal creed of a Muslim) on Ahmadi gravestones.[22] In addition, Ordinance XX prohibited Ahmadis from declaring their faith publicly, propagating their faith, building mosques, or making the call for Muslim prayers.[23] In short, virtually any public act of worship or devotion by an Ahmadi can be treated as a criminal offense punishable by death.

Ahmadis account for almost 40% of all arrests under the anti-blasphemy laws.[24] And the situation grows dire each passing day. For example, earlier this year, four Ahmadi school children in the Layyah District were formally charged with blasphemy for allegedly writing the name of Muhammad on the walls of a Mosque’s toilet.[25] The children (the youngest 14 years old) remained behind bars without bail for six months.[26] They continue to face blasphemy charges today and can be subject to life imprisonment or death.[27] According to BBC, the charges these children face were purely fabricated.[28] Cases like this are not uncommon in Pakistan. In prior years, elderly Ahmadi women, Ahmadi mothers and even Ahmadi babies have fallen victim to the anti-blasphemy laws.[29]

The persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan goes beyond individual arrests. Under the guise of the anti-blasphemy laws, Pakistani authorities have demolished, set on fire, forcibly occupied, sealed or barred the construction of over 90 Ahmadi Mosques.[30] They have also denied the cemetery burial of 41 Ahmadis and have exhumed after burial the bodies of 28 Ahmadis.[31] Finally, through a series of political maneuvers, they have also denied Ahmadis the right to vote in Pakistan.[32]

The Plight of the Christian Community in Pakistan

The anti-blasphemy laws have also been used to oppress Christian minorities in Pakistan. Over one hundred Christians have been arrested under the anti-blasphemy laws since their inception.[33] Blasphemy charges against Christians generate sectarian strife. Dozens of Christians have fallen victim to mob violence after being arrested for blasphemy. Most recently, just last month, several mobs attacked hundreds of Christian homes in the Gojra and Kasur Districts of Pakistan. Six Christians – including four women and a child of 7 years of age – were burned alive.[34] At least 11 Christians in these districts were formally charged with blasphemy and currently await sentencing.[35] The anti-blasphemy laws have been used to intimidate Christians and unjustly settle land disputes.[36] Several Christians who have been arrested under blasphemy are held in indefinite detention without charge and face grave risk.[37] For example, a Christian detainee in Sialkot was recently found dead in prison – allegedly beaten and tortured – while he awaited his trial for blasphemy.[38]

How the Anti-Blasphemy Laws Gained Legitimacy in Pakistan

Not surprisingly, having suffered under the anti-blasphemy laws for years, religious minorities in Pakistan have challenged the constitutionality of the anti-blasphemy laws under Article 20 of Pakistan’s Constitution.[39] Unfortunately, however, the anti-blasphemy laws have withstood legal scrutiny.

Just a few years after the laws were passed, the Federal Shariat Court (the highest religious court in Pakistan) was asked to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 203D of the constitution to rule whether or not Ordinance XX was contrary to the injunctions of the Qur’an and Sunnah (practice of Prophet Muhammad). The court, in the case Mujibur Rahman v. Government of Pakistan, upheld the validity of Ordinance XX and ruled that parliament had acted within its authority to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims.[40] Ordinance XX, the court maintained, merely prohibited Ahmadis from “calling themselves what they [were] not,” namely Muslims.

On July 3, 1993, the Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed eight appeals brought by Ahmadis who were arrested under Ordinance XX and Section 295-C. The collective complaint in the case, Zaheerudin v. State, was that the 1984 Ordinance violated the constitutional rights of religious minorities.[41] The court dismissed the complaint on two main grounds. First, the court held that Ahmadi religious practice, however peaceful, angered and offended the Sunni majority in Pakistan; to maintain law and order, Pakistan would, therefore, need to control Ahmadi religious practice. Second, Ahmadis, as non-Muslims, could not use Islamic epithets in public without violating company and trademark laws. Pakistan, the court reasoned, had the right to protect the sanctity of religious terms under these laws and the right to prevent their usage by non-Muslims. The court also pointed to the sacredness of religious terms under the Shari’a. The remarkable ruling further entrenched the anti-Ahmadi ordinances by giving the government power to freely punish Ahmadi religious practice as apostasy.

In light of these twin court decisions by the highest judicial bodies in Pakistan, the anti-blasphemy laws remain a legitimate state-approved instrument for persecution of religious minorities. Religious minorities have no further legal recourse within Pakistan to overturn the anti-blasphemy laws.

How the Anti-Blasphemy Laws Violate International Human Rights Norms

Despite their perceived legitimacy in Pakistan, the anti-blasphemy laws clearly run afoul of various international human rights instruments. First, the anti-blasphemy laws circumvent Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter[42] and Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), to which Pakistan is a signatory. This is especially troubling since Pakistan was once firmly committed to abide by the Charter and Declaration. Second, the anti-blasphemy laws circumvent Articles 18, 19, 20 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Pakistan is a signatory.[43] The ICCPR concretized the basic freedoms of religion and conscience articulated in the UDHR and made its signatories legally bound by it. In addition to prohibiting state coercion that would impair a person’s freedom to practice or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice, the ICCPR also prohibits states from denying religious minorities the right, in community with other group members, to enjoy their own culture, profess or practice their own religion, or to use their own language. The anti-blasphemy laws blatantly violate these principles. While Pakistan is not technically bound under the ICCPR until and unless it ratifies the covenant, it is arguably bound by the provisions therein by virtue of customary law. Finally, the anti-blasphemy laws circumvent Article 6 (c) of the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief[44] as well as U.N. Resolution 1985/21, which specifically condemns Ordinance XX.[45]

How Pakistani Government Officials Are Recognizing the Problem with the Anti-Blasphemy Laws

There is cause for hope. Pakistani Government officials have finally taken notice of the ever-increasing abuses emanating from the anti-blasphemy laws. Pakistan’s President, Asif Zardari, recently met with the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury and pledged that Pakistan would not permit the misuse of the anti-blasphemy laws.[46] Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Yousuf Gilani, recently pledged to scrutinize the anti-blasphemy laws.[47] Pakistan’s National Assembly Standing Committee on Human Rights recently requested the Pakistani Parliament re-examine the anti-blasphemy laws and scrutinize their nefarious effects on religious minorities.[48] Punjab Governor, Salmaan Taseer, recently urged Parliament to repeal the anti-blasphemy laws.[49] Pakistan’s Minister for Minority Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, recently stated: “The stand of the Pakistani government is to review, revisit and amend Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws so they will not remain a tool in the hands of extremists.”[50]

Why the United States Should Push for Repeal of the Anti-Blasphemy Laws

The United States is one of the largest investors in Pakistan’s future. It is firmly committed to assist Pakistan to combat extremism, violence and lawlessness within its borders. If Pakistan does not successfully defeat those extremists who aim to uproot democracy and use nuclear weaponry to perverse ends, the United States can face a grave security threat.

But the battle against extremists in Pakistan cannot be won unless the Pakistani Government scrutinizes and reforms the laws and policies that give ammunition to these extremists. It is simply not enough to apprehend and uproot extreme groups like the Taliban in Pakistan without first addressing the root problem. The United States must push Pakistan’s Parliament to repeal the anti-blasphemy laws in order to dismantle the extremist apparatus that endangers the world.

The time is ripe for decisive action. We cannot settle for a band aid solution to a festering sore. The House of Representatives has twice passed resolutions to condemn the anti-blasphemy laws in Pakistan – once in 1986 and once in 2002.[51] While both resolutions demonstrated the United States’ deep commitment to religious freedom in Pakistan, they could not solve the problem: the anti-blasphemy laws remain in effect and continue to victimize religious minorities. In fact, Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws have set a dangerous precedent for similar laws in other Muslim countries, such as Bangladesh and Indonesia.[52]

I commend this Commission for supporting the recent House Resolution Number 764, which calls for the restoration of religious freedom in Pakistan. It is an important step towards rectifying the problem of the anti-blasphemy laws in Pakistan. But more can be done. I respectfully recommend the following:

First, the Commission should urge Pakistan to ratify the ICCPR. Pakistan has only signed this treaty, but it has not ratified it. Once Pakistan firmly commits itself to upholding this treaty’s provisions for religious freedom, it will have to repeal the anti-blasphemy laws. Pakistan needs to return to its roots and become a champion of religious freedom once again.

Second, the Commission should urge Pakistan to include Ahmadis in the country’s joint electoral roll along with every other citizen of Pakistan. Ahmadis deserve the right to vote without unlawful restrictions.

Finally, the Commission should urge Pakistan to undertake a comprehensive review of all pending cases against Ahmadis under the anti-blasphemy laws. Those Ahmadis who languish in prisons without charge should be afforded basic due process.

Thank you very much for your time.

---

1. Amjad Mahmood Khan, “Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations,” Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 16, Spring 2003, at p. 227, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss16/khan.shtml#fnB40 (last visited on October 4, 2009).
2. National Commission for Justice and Peace in Pakistan (NCJP) data, quoted in “NJCP Signature’s Drive Against Blasphemy Laws,” Dawn, August 28, 2009, available at www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/ncjps-signature-drive-against-blasphemy-laws-889 (last visited on October 4, 2009).
3. Id.
4. See Dexter Filkins, “Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law Under Heightened Scrutiny,” Los Angeles Times, May 9, 1998, at A1; Editorial, “Pakistan’s Cruel Blasphemy Law,” New York Times, August 30, 2001, at A20.
5. NCJP data, supra, note 2.
6. Filkins, supra note 4.
7. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108505.htm (last visited on October 4, 2009)
8. Amnesty International, “Pakistan: Blasphemy Laws Should Be Abolished,” August 21, 2001, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA33/023/2001/en/6bd5700e-d8f5-11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c118e/asa330232001en.html (last visited on October 4, 2009).
9. Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan: Pandering to Extremists Fuels Persecution of Ahmadis,” May 5, 2007, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/05/05/pakistan-pandering-extremists-fuels-persecution-ahmadis (last visited on October 4, 2009).
10. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Letter from Felice D. Gaer to President Barack H. Obama, May 5, 2009.
11. Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Apostasy Bill 2006 (proposed), available at http://www.thepersecution.org/50years/apostasybill.html (last visited on October 4, 2009).
12. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Address at the Karachi Club (Aug. 11, 1947), available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html (last visited on October 4, 2009).
13. See Tayyab Mahmud, “Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice,” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 19, 1995, at p. 4086, see also Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2001, at p. 168.
14. Pak. Const., pt. IX, art. 227.
15. See David F. Forte, “Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan,” Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1994, at pp. 27, 35-37. By 1986, the Federal Shariat Court had invalidated fifty-five federal laws and 212 provincial laws as being contrary to Islam.
16. See Pak. Penal Code § 295C (part of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1986, which amended the punishments enumerated in §§ 298B and 298C to include death). “Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall be also liable to fine.”
17. See M. Nadeem Ahmad Siddiq, “Enforced Apostasy: Zaheerudin v. State and the Official Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan,” Journal of Law and Inequality, Vol. 14, 1995, at pp. 275, 279.
18. Id. Siddiq notes that, fundamentally, Ahmadis fall within the pale of Islam. They are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, India, who claimed to be the same Messiah foretold by Prophet Muhammad and awaited eagerly by all Muslims. The Ahmadiyya Community meant to revive the “true spirit” and message of the Islam Muhammad effectuated, relieving it from all misconstrued or superstitious teachings that tainted Islam for fourteen centuries. The orthodox Muslims claim that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had proclaimed himself a prophet, thereby rejecting a fundamental tenet of Islam: Khatem-e-Nabuwat (a belief in the “finality of Prophet Muhammad”). Ahmadis respond that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad came to illumine Islam in its pristine beauty and to reform its tainted image, as predicted by Prophet Muhammad; for Ahmad and his followers, the Arabic Khatem-e-Nabuwat does not refer to the finality of prophethood in a literal sense, that is, to prophethood’s chronological cessation, but rather to its culmination and exemplification in Prophet Muhammad.
19. See Pak. Const. pt. XII, ch. 5, arts. 260(3)(a), 260(3)(b). “Muslim means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him).” Subsection (b) reads: “‘Non Muslim’ means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging to the Christians, Hindus, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani Group or Lahori Group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes.”
20. See Pak. Const. Second Amendment.
21. See Pak. Penal Code §§ 298B, 298C (collectively referred to as Ordinance XX). According to § 298B:
    (1) Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation
    a. refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as ‘Ameer-ul-Mumineen,’ ‘Khalifat-ul-Mumineen,’ ‘Kilafat-ul-Muslimeen’ ‘Sahaabi’ or ‘Razi Allah Anaho’;
    b. refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), as ‘Ummul-Mumineen’;
    c. refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahle-bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as Ahle-bait; or
    d. refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as Masjid;
    shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
    (2) Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves as ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his faith as ‘Azan’ or recites Azan as used by Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
22. Siddiq, supra note 17, at pp. 288-289.
23. Id.
24. NCJP data, supra note 2.
25. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Letter from Felice D. Gaer to Anne C. Patterson, May 19, 2009 (citing Layyah incident).
26. Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Press Release, “Ahmadi Children Released on Bail After Nearing Six Months Imprisonment,” July 7, 2009, available at http://thepersecution.org/press/09/pk090707.html (last visited on October 4, 2009).
27. Id.
28. Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Press Release, “Four Ahmadi school children and an adult frivolously booked and arrested by the police on false accusation of Blasphemy by extremist elements,” February 2, 2009, quoting BBC report, available at http://www.thepersecution.org/case/case009.html (last visited on October 4, 2009).
29. Amnesty International, Report on Pakistan, September 1996, available at http://www.thepersecution.org/ai/amnst196.html (last visited on October 4, 2009).
30. See Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Facts and Figures on Pakistan, available at http://thepersecution.org/facts/events.html (last visited on October 4, 2009).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Barbara Crosette, “Pakistan’s Minorities Face Voting Restrictions,” New York Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at A5; David Lamb, “Non-Muslims in Pakistan Seek a Political Voice,” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 2002, at A9.
    The persecution of Ahmadis emanates from their political disenfranchisement. Between 1978 and 2002, Pakistan used a separate electorate system for Muslims and non-Muslims. In order to cast their votes for minority candidates, non-Muslims had to register on “non-Muslim” electoral rolls. Ahmadis, however, base their entire ideological foundation on Islam and profess to be true Muslims. Registering as “non-Muslims” demeaned their faith and compromises their ethical standards. Registering as “Muslims” resulted in severe legal consequences, including fines and imprisonment. As a result, Ahmadis were deprived of their basic freedom of conscience and could not adequately vote in Pakistan’s elections.
    On February 27, 2002, President Musharraf issued Chief Executive’s Order No. 7 of 2002 (Conduct of General Elections Order), which called for the elimination of the separate electoral system. Non-Muslim minorities and Ahmadis hailed the Order as a step towards democratic reform in Pakistan. After several decades, Ahmadis once again voted in large numbers. Succumbing to the pressure of religious extremists, however, President Musharraf subsequently passed a series of amendments to the original Order, which stated explicitly that the “[s]tatus of Ahmadis [was] … to remain unchanged” (June 17, 2002 Amendments; Section 7-B). This, in effect, kept intact a joint electoral roll for all eligible voters, Muslim and non-Muslims, except Ahmadis. As a result, Ahmadis presently are the only group in Pakistan who do not appear on Pakistan’s joint electoral rolls and cannot legally vote without facing severe punishment.
33. NCJP data, supra note 2.
34. Ben Quinn, “Six Christians Burned Alive in Pakistan Riots,” The Guardian, August 2, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/christians-burned-alive-pakistan (last visited on October 4, 2009).
35. Joseph Keenan, “Mob Attacks 100 Pakistan Christian Homes on Blasphemy Charge,” Pakistan Christian Post, July 3, 2009, available at http://www.christianpost.com/article/20090703/mob-attacks-100-pakistan-christian-homes-on-blasphemy-charge/index.html (last visited October4, 2009).
36. Michelle A. Vu, “Jailed Christian ‘Suicide’ Sparks Protests in Pakistan,” Pakistan Christian Post, September 16, 2009, available at http://www.christianpost.com/article/20090916/jailed-christian-s-suicide-sparks-protests-in-pakistan/index.html (last visited October 4, 2009).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Pak. Const., art. 20. “Subject to law, public order and morality:—(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.”
40. See Mujibur Rehman v Gov’t of Pakistan, 1985 S.D. Vol. II (Fed. Shariat Court) 382, 473 (Pak.).
41. Zaheerudin v. State, 26 S.C.M.R. 1718 (S.Ct. 1993) (Pak.). Zaheerudin v. State was a 4-1 ruling led by Justice Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry, holding that Ordinance XX was in accord with statutes and judicial opinions in England and the United States that protect religious freedom; the majority erroneously cited legal precedent from both jurisdictions as false support.
42. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3; U.N. Charter art. 55, para. c.
43. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 18, 27, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 1976).
44. See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/684 (1981).
45. See The Situation in Pakistan, E.S.C. Res. 1985/21, reported in Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Thirty-Eighth Session, U.N. ESCOR, 38th Sess., at 102, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/5 (1986).
46. Editorial, “Blasphemy Law Misuse Won’t Be Permitted,” Daily Times of Pakistan, September 19, 2009, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\09\19\story_19-9-2009_pg7_37 (last visited on October 4, 2009).
47. Zarar Khan, “Pakistan May Review Blasphemy Laws Following Violence Aimed at Ahmadis,” CNS News, August 6, 2009, available at http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/52134 (last visited on October 4, 2009).
48. Muhammad Bilal, “NA Committee Asks Government to Re-Examine Blasphemy Law,” Daily Times of Pakistan, September 2, 2009, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\09\02\story_2-9-2009_pg7_1 (last visited on October 4, 2009).
49. Editorial, “Taseer for Repeal of Blasphemy Law,” The Nation, September 17, 2009, available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/17-Sep-2009/Taseer-for-repeal-of-blasphemy-law (last visited on October 4, 2009).
50. Editorial, “Bhatti Vows to Revise Blasphemy Law,” Daily Times of Pakistan, September 19, 2009, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\09\19\story_19-9-2009_pg7_35 (last visited on October 4, 2009).
51. H.R. Res. 379, 96th Cong. (1986); H.R. Res. 348, 107th Cong. (2002).
52. See, e.g., Amjad Mahmood Khan, “Different, Banned,” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2004, at W4 (describing the persecution of Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Bangladesh), available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/taste/?id=110004718 (last visited on October 4, 2009).
    

Pakistan: International Religious Freedom Report – May, 2009

Excerpts from

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Report on International Religious Freedom – May, 2009

INTRODUCTION

“The Threat of Religious Extremism to Religious Freedom and Security” has been the Commission’s overarching theme during this reporting period, and unfolding events in Pakistan make clear the relevance of this theme to the 2009 Annual Report. At the time of writing, emboldened Taliban-associated extremists had advanced to within 60 miles of the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. In the areas they already control, these groups are imposing draconian restrictions on human rights and religious freedom and engaging in brutal acts against individuals, particularly women and local police, who refused to accede to their repressive policies.

The Commission predicted this result in February 2009, as the Pakistani government considered entering into a so-called “peace deal” with these elements in the Swat Valley. On February 25, the Commission publicly warned that the agreement “would represent a significant victory for Talibanassociated extremists fighting in the Swat Valley, and could embolden other violent extremists and Taliban militants who would seek to expand their influence and control elsewhere in Pakistan and Afghanistan”. The Commission’s concerns sadly were borne out when, soon after Pakistan’s Parliament and President approved the deal, the extremists moved to duplicate their success in neighboring regions.

While Pakistani leaders have acquiesced to the rule of Taliban-associated extremists in some regions, members of civil society have courageously objected. The front cover of this report features Pakistani women standing up against these violent extremist groups. Their signs, written in Urdu, protest violent religious fanaticism and the systematic destruction of girls’ schools, 150 of which reportedly have been demolished. These brave women are on the frontlines of the battle to preserve human rights, including religious freedom, in their country. Their voices must be amplified.

Since its inception, the Commission has strived to place religious freedom at the forefront of the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and the 10th Annual Report is a key component of those efforts. In this reporting period, the Commission engaged both the Bush and Obama Administrations on ways to promote religious freedom and highlighted a number of critical issues to U.S. foreign policy.

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During this reporting period, the Commission met with human rights defenders from many nations where violent extremists or repressive regimes threaten fundamental rights and national security. The Commission held public hearings that examined the threat to religious freedom and security posed by violent religious extremists in Sudan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, and reviewed possible U.S. government responses.………

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The Commission also has raised concerns and highlighted a variety of problematic regional and global trends, such as the expansion of highly restrictive religion laws in many countries of the former Soviet Union, the promotion of the pernicious .defamation of religions. concept at the United Nations, and major limitations on religious freedom throughout Asia.

REPORT OVERVIEW

Countries of Particular Concern and the Watch List

Each year the Commission makes recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Congress, based on its ongoing review of the facts and circumstances of violations of religious freedom, as to which countries should be designated as “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs. In doing this, the Commission works alongside an array of diplomatic mechanisms also established by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), such as the Office of International Religious Freedom at the Department of State, headed by the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. IRFA mandated that the State Department work through its embassies and consulates abroad to collect information on religious freedom conditions and by September 1 of each year review the status of freedom of religion or belief worldwide. That review comes in the form of the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom.

Based on that review, IRFA directs the Secretary of State, delegated by the President, to designate “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs, which are countries whose governments have engaged in or tolerated “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom. IRFA defines “particularly severe” violations as ones that are “systematic, ongoing, and egregious,” including acts such as torture, prolonged detention without charges, disappearances, or “other flagrant denial[s] of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons”. After a country is designated as a CPC, the president is required by law to oppose the violations by taking actions specified in IRFA.

In this reporting period, the Commission recommends that the Secretary of State designate the following 13 countries as CPCs: Burma, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, the People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Overview of CPC Recommendations and Watch List

Justification of Commission Recommendations for CPC Designation

Serious religious freedom concerns persist in Pakistan, due to continuing sectarian and religiously-motivated violence and the government’s inadequate response. The past year has seen the largely unchecked growth in the power and reach of extremist groups whose members are engaged in religiouslymotivated violence in Pakistan and abroad. A number of the country’s laws abridge freedom of religion or belief. Anti-Ahmadi legislation results in discrimination against individual Ahmadis and effectively criminalizes various practices of their faith. Anti-blasphemy laws have been used to silence members of religious minorities and dissenters, and frequently result in imprisonment on account of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence. The Hudood Ordinances—Islamic decrees predominantly affecting women that are enforced alongside Pakistan’s secular legal system—provide for harsh punishments for alleged violations of Islamic law. Extremists have imposed a harsh, Talibanstyle rule in the Swat Valley and neighboring districts, with the acquiescence of provincial and Federal government authorities. The government of Pakistan also continues to promote the flawed.defamation of religions. concept at the United Nations, which would violate the freedoms of religion and expression.

Keeping Congress Apprised of Religious Freedom Issues

The Commission held a series of hearings during the reporting period, many of which explored religious extremism and U.S. national security interests. Two hearings focused on the impact of religious extremism on religious freedom and security in Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively, while the other discussed the peace process in Sudan and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

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In March 2009, the Commission convened a hearing to discuss Pakistan and the threat posed by religious extremism to religious freedom and related human rights, particularly for women, members of religious minorities, and other vulnerable communities. Entitled Pakistan: The Threat of Religious Extremism to Religious Freedom and Security, Commissioners heard testimony from five witnesses who discussed limitations on religious freedom and violence against women and religious minorities, including Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus, as well as the extremist threat to democratic institutions and the rule of law and Pakistan’s relationship with Taliban-associated religious extremists. Witnesses included the former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, William Milam, and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Steve Coll. Representative Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) participated and provided opening remarks.

OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE COMMISSION’S CPC LIST

Pakistan

Dramatic political events unfolded in Pakistan in the past year, some of them with a potentially significant impact on the rule of law and human rights protections generally, including freedom of religion or belief. This year also has seen the largely unchecked growth in the power and reach of religiously-motivated extremist groups whose members are engaged in violence in Pakistan and abroad, with Pakistani authorities ceding effective control to armed insurgents espousing a radical Islamist ideology. In addition, all of the serious religious freedom concerns on which the Commission has reported in the past persist. Sectarian and religiously-motivated violence continues, particularly against Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus, and the government’s response continues to be insufficient, and in some cases, is outright complicit. A number of the country’s laws, including those restricting the rights of Ahmadis and criminalizing blasphemy, frequently result in imprisonment on account of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence against the accused.

Moreover, despite some minor improvements, Pakistan’s Hudood Ordinances, Islamic decrees introduced in 1979 and enforced alongside the country’s secular legal system, provide for harsh punishments, including amputation and death by stoning, for violations of Islamic law. Pakistan also has taken a leadership role in promoting in various international fora the concept of “defamation of religions,” an attempted globalization of its own blasphemy laws, which this Commission believes would limit seriously and criminalize the rights to freedom of religion and expression of individuals worldwide.… In light of these persistent, serious concerns, the Commission continues to recommend that Pakistan be designated a “country of particular concern,” or CPC. To date, the State Department has not designated Pakistan a CPC.

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The Zardari government has taken some positive steps regarding religious freedom. In November 2008, the government appointed prominent minority-rights advocate Shahbaz Bhatti as Federal Minister for Minorities with cabinet rank. Mr. Bhatti has publicly promised that the Zardari government will review Pakistan's blasphemy laws and that the government is committed to protecting the rights of minority religious communities, including by implementing a five percent quota for religious minorities in federal government employment. In March 2009, the government appointed a Christian jurist as a judge in the Lahore High Court. It is not yet clear what impact these developments will have on religious freedom, which has been severely violated by successive Pakistani governments in the past. Discriminatory legislation, promulgated in previous decades and persistently enforced, has fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and eroded the social and legal status of members of religious minorities, including Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians. Government officials do not provide adequate protections from societal violence to members of these religious minority communities, and perpetrators of attacks on minorities seldom are brought to justice. This is partly due to the fact that Pakistan’s democratic institutions, particularly the judiciary and the police, are weakened by endemic corruption, ineffectiveness, and a general lack of accountability.

Many religious schools, or madrassas, in Pakistan provide ongoing ideological training and motivation to those who take part in violence targeting religious minorities in Pakistan and abroad. In mid-2005, the government of Pakistan renewed its effort to require all madrassas to register with the government and ordered them to expel all foreign students. By that year’s end, despite an outcry from some violent extremist groups, most of the religious schools had registered. However, reports indicate that the registration process has had little if any effect on the content of the schools’ curricula, which remains extremist and includes exhortations to violence, and there are still no government controls on the madrassas’ sources of funding. It remains doubtful whether these belated official efforts to curb extremism through reform of the country’s Islamic religious schools will be accompanied by other measures to make them effective. Moreover, these efforts do not adequately address the much wider problem of religious extremism in Pakistan and the continued, unwarranted influence of militant groups on the rights and freedoms of others.
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Ahmadis, Christians, and Hindus also have been targeted in attacks by Sunni extremists and in mob violence conducted with apparent impunity. In September 2008, the Pakistani television network Geo TV broadcast a religious affairs program about the Pakistani parliament’s 1974 decision to declare Ahmadis “non-Muslim.” The host of the program reportedly encouraged his guests, who were religious scholars, not only to endorse this decision but to affirm the duty of killing Ahmadis. A day later, a prominent Ahmadi doctor was assassinated, and a local Ahmadi leader was killed the following day. Perpetrators of such attacks on minorities are seldom brought to justice. Indeed, according to the State Department, the government stalled investigation of these two murders.
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Among Pakistan’s religious minorities, Ahmadis are subject to the most severe legal restrictions and officially-sanctioned discrimination. Ahmadis, who number between 3 and 4 million in Pakistan, are prevented by law from engaging in the full practice of their faith and may face criminal charges for a range of religious practices, including the use of religious terminology. Pakistan’s constitution declares members of the Ahmadi religious community to be “non-Muslims,” despite their insistence to the contrary. Barred by law from “posing” as Muslims, Ahmadis may not call their places of worship “mosques,” worship in non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer rooms which are otherwise open to all Muslims, perform the Muslim call to prayer, use the traditional Islamic greeting in public, publicly quote from the Koran, or display the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith. It is also illegal for Ahmadis to preach in public; to seek converts; or to produce, publish, or disseminate their religious materials. Over two days in late May 2008, the inhabitants of the majority-Ahmadi town of Rabwah, Punjab (called Chenab Nagar by Pakistani authorities) celebrated their faith through distinctive clothing, badges with religious slogans, lighting displays, and fireworks. Two weeks later, police lodged charges against the entire community under the anti-Ahmadi laws. In a separate incident in June 2008, 23 Ahmadis were expelled from medical school in Faisalabad, Punjab for allegedly preaching their faith to others. Moreover, because they are required to register to vote as non-Muslims, Ahmadis who refuse to disavow their claim to being Muslims are effectively disenfranchised. The one potentially positive development—the December 2004 abolition of the religious identification column in Pakistani passports, which, among other advances, enabled Ahmadis to participate in the hajj—was derailed in March 2005, when members of a government ministerial committee restored the column, reportedly in response to pressure from Islamist religious parties. As far as is known, there has never been an effort on the part of any Pakistani government to reform the anti-Ahmadi laws.

Prescribed criminal penalties for what is deemed to be blasphemy include life imprisonment and the death penalty. Blasphemy allegations, which are often false, result in the lengthy detention of, and sometimes violence against, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and members of other religious minorities, as well as Muslims. Because the laws require no evidence to be presented after allegations are made and no proof of intent, and contain no penalty for leveling false allegations, they are commonly used by extremists to intimidate members of religious minorities and others with whom they disagree. They also are often used by the unscrupulous simply to carry out a vendetta or gain an advantage over another. Although the penalties were amended in October 2004 with the aim of reducing the more maliciously applied charges, the minor procedural changes have not had a significant effect on the way the blasphemy laws are exploited in Pakistan. The negative impact of the blasphemy laws is further compounded by the lack of due process involved in these proceedings. In addition, during blasphemy trials, Islamic militants often pack the courtroom and make public threats of violence as a consequence of an acquittal. Such threats have proven credible since they have sometimes been followed by violence. Although no one has yet been executed by the state under the blasphemy laws, individuals have been sentenced to death. Several of those accused under the blasphemy laws have been attacked, even killed, by violent extremists, including while in police custody. Those who escape official punishment or attacks by extremists are sometimes forced to flee the country.

Scores of arrests on blasphemy charges are reported each year and most of the accused are refused bail because of the danger of mob violence. In one case, five Ahmadi teenagers were arrested in January 2009 for allegedly writing the Prophet Mohammed's name on the walls of a toilet in a Sunni mosque. The arrest reportedly occurred when they voluntarily appeared before the police to deny the allegation. A fact-finding mission by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan concluded that there was no witness to the deed and no evidence linking the accused with the alleged action. In January 2009, five Christians, held on blasphemy charges since April 2007, were acquitted and released from custody in Punjab following reconciliation meetings between Muslim clerics and Christian representatives. Another two Christians, both elderly men from Faisalabad, Punjab, were acquitted by the Lahore High Court in April 2009. In November 2006, the two had been sentenced to 10 years in prison for allegedly burning pages from the Koran, a charge reportedly fabricated due to a land dispute. Although there have been occasional acquittals on blasphemy charges, in virtually all cases those acquitted have been forced into hiding or even exile, out of fear of attacks by religiously-motivated extremists.
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The government of Pakistan also has been active in the international arena in promoting limitations on freedom of religion or belief. As it has done in UN bodies since 1999, in March 2009 Pakistan once again presented a resolution to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva supporting measures to halt the so-called “defamation of religions”. The backers of the resolution claim that their aim is to promote religious tolerance, but in practice such laws routinely criminalize and prosecute what is often deemed—capriciously by local officials in countries where such laws exist—to be “offensive” or “unacceptable” speech about a particular, favored religion or sect. Defamation of religion laws clearly violate principles outlined in international human rights instruments, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression, as well as freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Moreover, they appear to grant rights to entire religions rather than to individuals. Regrettably, the resolution passed the Council with 23 votes. Eleven countries voted against the resolution and 13 countries abstained.

The Commission has long been concerned with the serious religious freedom abuses that are perpetuated in Pakistan, some of which are condoned by the government of Pakistan itself. Since 2002, the Commission has recommended each year that Pakistan be designated a country of particular concern. The Commission has highlighted religious freedom problems in Pakistan through public hearings, meetings with the Administration and the Congress, letters to senior U.S. government officials, and press statements. In February and April 2009, the Commission called attention to the willingness of Pakistan’s provincial and central governments to accept an agreement conceding local control of the Malakand division, of which the Swat Valley is a part, to Taliban-associated extremists who routinely use violence to enforce their political and theological agendas, resulting in systematic human rights abuses and severe limitations on religious freedom.

In March 2009, the Commission held a hearing on Capitol Hill entitled, “Pakistan: The Threat of Religious Extremism to Religious Freedom and Security”. Experts discussed legal restrictions on religious freedom in Pakistan; the threat, particularly to women and religious minorities, of religiously motivated violence and intolerance; strategies for promoting tolerance in Pakistan's educational system, including Islamic schools; and how U.S. policy toward Pakistan could better support the institutions that promote respect for human rights, including freedom of religion or belief.

Based on that hearing and the Commission’s earlier work on Pakistan, the Commission welcomes the Administration’s announcement on March 27, 2009 of “a comprehensive, new strategy” that “focuses more intensively on Pakistan than in the past, calling for more significant increases in U.S. and international support, both economic and military, linked to Pakistani performance against terror.” The Commission concludes strongly, however, that the contest with religious extremists now taking place in Pakistan, and neighboring Afghanistan, requires, in addition to economic and military assistance, that the United States bolster the position of those elements within Pakistani society that respect democratic values, the rule of law, and international standards of human rights, including freedom of religion or belief. To this end, the Commission has made a number of recommendations, the most recent of which appear below.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In addition to recommending that Pakistan be designated a CPC, the Commission has the following recommendations for the U.S. government regarding Pakistan.

I. Stopping Abuses of Religious Freedom and Other Human Rights

The U.S. government should urge the government of Pakistan to:

• oppose agreements that would empower violent Taliban-associated groups to control local justice systems, whether sharia or secular, which would result in human rights abuses and religious freedom restrictions for the citizens of Pakistan, and rescind any agreements made to date, including the agreement affecting the Swat Valley approved by the central government in April 2009;
• decriminalize blasphemy and, in the interim period until that action is taken, implement procedural changes to the blasphemy laws that will reduce and ultimately end their abuse; and ensure that those who are accused of blasphemy and their defenders are given adequate protection, including by investigating death threats and other actions carried out by militants, and that full due process is followed;
• prioritize the prevention of religiously-motivated and sectarian violence and the punishment of its perpetrators, including by:
• making greater efforts to disarm violent extremist groups and provide the necessary security to Shi’a, Sufis, Christians, Ahmadis, Hindus, Sikhs, and other minority religious communities in their places of worship and other minority religious sites of public congregation;
• investigating acts of religiously-motivated and sectarian violence, and punishing perpetrators in a timely manner; and
• constituting a government commission that is transparent, adequately funded, inclusive of women and minorities, and defined by a mandate to study and produce recommendations on ways that the Pakistani government can proactively diminish religiously-motivated and sectarian violence, particularly in areas with a heavy concentration of members of religious minority communities, such as Shi’a Muslims in Kurram Agency.
• rescind the laws targeting Ahmadis, which effectively criminalize the public practice of their faith and violate their right to freedom of religion guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
• halt its practice at the UN Human Rights Council and other international fora of introducing the socalled.defamation of religions. resolution, which violates the internationally-guaranteed rights to freedom of religion and expression.
  
  The U.S. government should:
  
  
• clearly articulate a concern for upholding religious freedom and related human rights as an essential element of the new U.S. strategy toward Pakistan, and support Pakistani civil society institutions that work to uphold and guarantee those rights; and
• designate a member of Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke’s team to report to the Special Representative exclusively on human rights in Pakistan, specifically including religious freedom and sectarian violence.
  

II Strengthening Law Enforcement, the Judiciary, and Civil Society

The U.S. government should urge the government of Pakistan to:

• reinforce the rule of law, including by strengthening protections for the freedoms of religion, speech, association, assembly, and the media, and by restoring and resolutely defending an independent judiciary.
  
  The U.S. government should:
  
  
• use its civilian financial assistance to Pakistan to strengthen institutions crucial to Pakistan’s democratic development, particularly the judiciary and the police, which are reported to be especially corrupt, ineffective, and lacking accountability, thereby contributing to violations of human rights, including religious freedom;
• ensure that non-military assistance emphasizes respect for human rights, civil society, constitutional processes, and democratic institutions, rather than the previous strategy of emphasizing the importance of certain political parties or particular political or military leaders to Pakistan’s stability;
• expand U.S. government contacts beyond the Pakistani government to include substantially more open and public dialogue with a variety of civil society representatives, including groups and political parties that may be critical of the government or represent diverse viewpoints; andexpand U.S. government contacts beyond the Pakistani government to include substantially more open and public dialogue with a variety of civil society representatives, including groups and political parties that may be critical of the government or represent diverse viewpoints; and
• recognizing that lasting stability in Pakistan will come from a vibrant civil society, expand programs leading to the sustained engagement of the United States with the Pakistani people, such as the Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Program, and other exchanges for professionals, students, and religious and civil society leaders from all of Pakistan’s diverse communities.
  

III Fighting Extremism and Government Alliances with Extremist Groups

The U.S. government should urge the government of Pakistan to:

• cease toleration or support of the Taliban or other terrorist groups by any element of the Pakistani government, including the intelligence services; and
• confront and work to address the consequences of the political alliances maintained by past military-dominated governments with Islamist political parties, which afforded an excessive amount of influence to these groups, and which, in turn, had a strong negative impact on religious freedom in Pakistan.
  
  The U.S. government should:
  
  
• set detailed, transparent, and measurable benchmarks for the use of civilian and military assistance to ensure, inter alia, that U.S. aid does not bolster Taliban-associated or other violent extremist groups; serves as a confidence-building measure that can help restore the trust of the Pakistani people in the United States and its commitment to Pakistan’s security, stability and prosperity; and promotes consistency in how aid is disbursed and goals are pursued.
  

IV Focusing on Education and Tolerance in Schools

The U.S. government should urge the government of Pakistan to:

• investigate and close any religious schools that provide weapons or illegal arms training in perpetrating acts of violence;
• set national textbook and curricula standards that actively promote tolerance towards all religions, and establish appropriate review and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee that such standards are being met in government (public) schools; and
• ensure that a madrassa oversight board is empowered to develop, implement, and train teachers in human rights standards, and to provide oversight of madrassa curricula and teaching standards.
  
  The U.S. government should:
  
  
• in administering its education assistance to Pakistan, focus more specifically on promoting reform in the state schools and madrassas, where textbooks regularly present religious intolerance as acceptable and include derogatory statements about religious minorities, particularly Jews and Hindus; and
• request an annual progress report from the U.S. State Department and/or the U.S. Agency for International Development to Congress and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom regarding U.S. education assistance to diminish intolerance in Pakistan’s state schools and madrassas, and progress made toward detailed, transparent, and measurable benchmarks.