Showing posts with label Illiberal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Illiberal. Show all posts

Saturday, February 5, 2011

Republic of Fear and Bigotry

Express Tribune, Pakistan
OINION
Republic of Fear and Bigotry
Nasim Zehra
By Nasim Zehra
Published: February 5, 2011
The writer is director current affairs at Dunya TV and a former fellow at Asia Center, Harvard University nasim.zehra@tribune.com.pk

Last week in our Senate, two revealing incidents took place. One, the refusal of a senator to lead the fateha for the assassinated Governor Salmaan Taseer. Second, a privilege motion moved by Senator Mandokhel, calling upon the deputy chairman of the Senate to declare a Pakistani woman a blasphemer because, in a text message, she had referred to the late governor as shaheed. Mandokhel sahib’s contention is that since Salmaan Taseer was a blasphemer, anyone calling him shaheed is also a blasphemer. On February 3, responding to the senator’s insistence that the chairman Senate give a ruling on the matter, the chairman said he would do so later. The Senate session was then prorogued.

In the last few weeks, new blasphemy cases have been filed, one of them against a first-year student. The 17-year-old, reported to the police for writing something blasphemous on his examination paper, is now in prison. Also, last week a sessions court handed down a death sentence, along with a Rs200,000 fine, to a man of Jalalpur Peerwala for committing blasphemy. The accused was reportedly mentally challenged.

Against the backdrop of these incidents, a factual review of the developments that took place after PPP MNA Sherry Rehman proposed the initial bill, alongside initial government moves to review Article 295, is essential. Of course, the current outcome of this move has been that the prime minister has announced the withdrawal of Ms Rehman’s bill.

The new aspect to the prime minister’s February 3 announcement was that he had consulted Ms Rehman and that she had agreed to withdraw her bill. Her statement, however, indicates that it was more or less a unilateral move by the prime minister but that she would abide by it because of party discipline. More importantly, as she explained, the withdrawal announcement was unnecessary since the bill had not even been tabled. What is truly ironic is that in the same statement in which the prime minister announced the withdrawal of the bill, he invited various political parties to come forward and discuss ways on how to prevent misuse of the existing law — which is precisely what Ms Rehman’s proposed amendment bill was seeking to address.

Meanwhile, of the many developments that took place after the sessions court’s judgment against Aasia Bibi, six are especially noteworthy.

The first is that while human rights groups have been working on the issue of misuse of the blasphemy law for years, it was when the PPP-led government announced a committee to amend the laws that Ms Rehman tabled her bill. She shared it with all party leaders and made it a point to inform the chief whip of the government of her plans — and he did not ask her to hold off for a while. She consulted with several lawyers about the bill and did not submit it in secret. The proposed amendment created a wave of awareness that has finally led everyone (including the Council of Islamic Ideology) to concede that changes are required to end the existing law’s misuse. Even the religious parties have taken this position of reform repeatedly in various forums. All this contradicts the claims of those who now hold the view that the introduction of this bill was an ill-timed move.

Two, the government blundered along, making contradictory moves and statements on the issue of amending the blasphemy law ever since Aasia Bibi’s conviction. They set up a committee to review it and created a parliamentary subcommittee headed by MNA Nafisa Shah. But at the first whiff of criticism by other groups, the law minister announced that the amendment will take place “over my dead body”.

On one hand, the Punjab governor, when he was alive, criticised the law and lobbied for Aasia’s presidential pardon while on the other, the same government’s law and interior ministers were saying quite the opposite. Instead of ironing out these stark contradictions, the departure of the JUI from the coalition convinced the government that backtracking on the amendment would buy it survival security. Hence, Sherry Rehman’s bill was not a victim of bad timing but, in fact, a victim of the PPP’s bad politics.

Three, every backtracking move by the government emboldened those who equated amendment of the man-made law with blasphemy. Parties like the PTI, the PML-N and the PML-Q have become actively engaged in street protests organised by the ‘religious right’ that are shadow-boxing with imaginary blasphemers.

Four, in pursuit of what the government believes to be survival-mode politics, the government and the PPP have practically abandoned Sherry Rehman. She has been provided some security outside her house but no government ministers have spoken in parliament against the death threats that she has been receiving. Almost no one has spoken for her at other public forums either. The government has not opted to be part of her defence in the Lahore High Court where there is a case demanding that she be disbarred from parliament. She is also involved, again unsupported by the PPP, in a blasphemy case in Multan.

Five, the big names of the legal community who led the lawyers’ movement seem to have opted for selective commitment to rule of law by not taking a clear-cut position to stand by Sherry Rehman — barring exceptions like Salman Akram Raja and Hina Jilani. Six, against the backdrop of increasing cases of blasphemy being registered — against a student, a doctor and a Dera Ghazi Khan imam and his son — Ms Rehman stands vindicated on both the call for amending the existing law and on the timing of such a proposed amendment.

The government’s blundering over amending Article 295 of the Pakistan Penal Code will qualify as a textbook example of how expedient politics can take nations down a path of disaster. Clearly, in the Senate, the chairman has found it difficult to give a ruling against Senator Mandokhel’s incredible demand that an activist be denounced as a blasphemer. Equally incredible is the imprisonment of a 17-year-old on blasphemy charges. And, not least of all, the news that no one is representing the prosecution in the court as the case of Governor Salmaan Taseer’s murder proceeds is shocking.

In the coming days, it is not unlikely that, led by the short-sighted politics of the PPP and of other parliamentary parties, Pakistan’s politics and state will have, in fact, weakened the best Islamic values within Pakistan, undermined parliamentary politics and strengthened the constituency of those who want to see Pakistan turn into the Republic of Fear and Bigotry.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 6th, 2011.

Saturday, August 14, 2010

Saving Jinnah’s Pakistan

Express Tribune, Pakistan
Pakistan
Opinion
Saving Jinnah’s Pakistan
Ayesha Siddiqa
By Ayesha Siddiqa
August 14, 2010
The writer is author of Military Inc and a visiting professor at Johns Hopkins University, US ayesha.siddiqa@tribune.com.pk

The Awami Jamhoori Party’s march to save “Jinnah’s Pakistan” is commendable. It denoted mobilisation of civil society against violence and intolerance. The procession ended at Data Darbar, which is considered a symbol of the country’s liberal Islamic ethos or culture of religious multi-polarity. But are we quite clear about whether this is the kind of liberal Islamic tradition that Jinnah and other founding leaders of Pakistan opted for?

There was quite a bit of confusion regarding the type of religious ideology that the leaders thought was suited to the new state. According to renowned scholar Farzana Sheikh, whose latest book Making Sense of Pakistan adds to our knowledge of Pakistan’s polity, Iqbal and others did not prefer sufi Islam for the functioning of a modern Islamic state. For them, sufi Islam represented the traditional type which may be popular but was certainly not modern. In any case, Jinnah did not necessarily think deeply about the ideological and socio-political connotations of religion or using religion for nation-building. Much that some people may protest against the factual description of Jinnah’s personal habits, the fact of the matter is that he had a western lifestyle. Nevertheless, he created a state that defined citizenship on the basis of, what Sheikh argues, is the citizen’s putative relationship with religion.

Later, the Muslim League engaged with Majlis-e-Ahrar because the group had links with the Punjabi elite and made inroads into society. The anti-Ahmadi riots of the 1950s exhibited both the growing power of puritanical and illiberal ideology, and the Muslim League’s leadership’s willingness to turn a blind eye to Ahrar’s activities. Instead of giving a liberal direction to the state, if that was indeed the intention, Liaquat Ali Khan went for a formula that appeared as a concession to both the liberal and religious-right in the form of the Objectives Resolution of 1949. The document with its conservative-religious interpretation is central to Pakistan’s legal, constitutional and political frameworks.

But then is cultural or religious-liberalism all that falls in the purview of religion? How about political-liberalism, which no one really wants to talk about? One can be less sure of Jinnah’s intended direction as far as political liberalism is concerned. The conflict between words and actions emerged due to his decisions to annex the state of Kalat and sack Dr Khan Sahib’s provincial government in the frontier. This, as Ayesha Jalal argues, might have been necessary for establishing and strengthening the newly born state. The measures, however, set a politically non-liberal tradition which was followed by his successors. The emphasis was on building a central state with a singular identity. All sub-nationalities were forced to merge their independent cultural and social identity into one mega-identity. The formula did not work so well because the state’s option for sub-nationalities or individuals was to opt for the central narrative and abandon everything else.

But even if we were to use the narrow definition of liberalism as representing religious-liberalism, even that may not seem possible at this juncture. Religious liberalism cannot happen in the absence of political liberalism. Religious radicalism grows not just because the majority or a minority believe in a peculiar and narrow interpretation of religion, but due to the fact that they live in a politically closed system which does not empower them economically and politically. It is not money alone which checks radicalisation but also the richness of a political system. The combination of political and economic poverty makes the problem even denser.

A lot of people have been radicalised in Pakistan not because they understand the radical philosophy of Ibn Tamiyya, Syed Qutb,and Maulana Maududi or its tactical interpretation by Maulana Shamzai, Zawahiri, bin Laden and others, but because they view religion and violence both as necessary tools to fight existing political hegemony and oppression. Under the circumstances, talking about Jinnah’s Pakistan does not make sense until the capable people (those who have resources, education, contacts and power) have the sense to take the bulk of people along and give them at least some of the opportunities they deserve.

Maybe it is time we thought about all what Jinnah could not do.

Published in The Express Tribune, August 15th, 2010.


URL: http://tribune.com.pk/story/39340/saving-jinnah%E2%80%99s-pakistan/
 
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