Bangladesh: Checking Islamist Extremism in a Pivotal Democracy

--- The Heritage Foundation, USA              RESEARCH
 

This is a Backgrounder On Asia, National Security and Defense, Worldwide Freedom and Human Rights, South Asia, Southeast Asia and War Against Terrorism

Bangladesh: Checking Islamist Extremism in a Pivotal Democracy

Published on March 15, 2010 by Maneeza Hossain and Lisa Curtis

Abstract: Bangladesh , the world’s third largest Muslim-majority nation, is facing challenges from violent Islamist groups. The government is cracking down on radical groups and emphasizing the democratic principles of the country’s founding, but radical Islamism still threatens to undermine stability in Bangladesh. Radicalization and terrorism are directly linked to government corruption and a lack of trust in the representative political process. To build trust in the political process, Bangladesh needs to strengthen its democratic institutions and develop a culture of transparency in the government that fosters accountability and restrains corruption.

The restoration of democratic government in Bangladesh, the world’s third largest Muslim-majority nation, has helped to counter the immediate threat from Islamist extremists. Three years ago, when elections were postponed due to escalating political violence, observers warned that Bangladesh’s traditional culture of tolerance and moderation was threatened by the political clashes as well as by rising Islamist militancy. Since the December 2008 election, the new government led by Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League, has taken steps to stem Islamist extremism in Bangladesh by cracking down on radical groups and emphasizing the democratic principles of the country’s founding.

However, like many nations in the “Muslim world,” Bangladesh continues to struggle to define the role of Islam in society and governance. A robust civil society, a vibrant community of nongovernmental organizations, an independent judiciary, and active participation of women in the social and economic sectors have thus far contributed to denying extremists a foothold in the country. Yet Washington needs to remain closely engaged with Dhaka and continue to encourage democratic trends and steady development of the country’s economy.

Until millions of Bangladeshis are raised out of poverty, governing institutions are strengthened further, and corruption is controlled, Bangladesh will face a threat from Islamist extremists seeking to undermine the country’s democratic institutions and tolerant traditions. Preventing Bangladesh–a nation with 140 million Muslims–from falling prey to a volatile mix of radicalization and political unrest should be a top priority for Western policymakers. The U.S. should seek new ways to partner with the Bangladeshi government to stem the influence of Islamists so that they do not become an urgent threat to the country.

A Return to Democracy

More than a year has passed since the elections that put Bangladesh back on the democratic path. On January 11, 2007, the Bangladeshi military intervened in a precarious democratic process, effectively removing Bangladesh from the list of recognized democracies. One more Muslim-majority nation seemed to be heading toward prolonged autocratic rule. In December 2008, however, Bangladeshi democracy received another lease on life with elections that international observers deemed credible.

The return of democracy to Bangladesh is a welcome development, but the country continues to face challenges from groups that support Islamist ideologies as well as from groups that violently oppose the state. Without concerted action by government authorities and increased awareness among the Bangladeshi public about the agendas of these groups, the political center of gravity in Bangladesh could shift increasingly toward Islamism.[1]

While moderation and religious tolerance continue to be defining features of Bangladeshi politics, the secular discourse and ideals upon which Bangladesh was founded in 1971 have been diluted. Arguably, the process of integrating Islam more fully into the political sphere began as early as 1975, after General Ziaur Rahman assumed the presidency. He removed the reference to “secularism,” a fundamental principle of Bangladeshi nationhood, from the preamble of the Bangladeshi constitution and replaced it with a new clause asserting that “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah” should be “the basis of all actions.” Zia also lifted the ban on religious political parties, thus allowing Islamists a role within the political realm. Furthermore, to prove his own Islamic credentials, General Hussain Ershad, Zia’s successor, declared Islam the state religion in 1988.[2] These military regimes, which took power through coups in 1975 and 1982, respectively, generally pursued policies of Islamization to gain political legitimacy.[3]

Islamist ideas have thus become more prevalent in the country’s political discourse, a process spurred by the rising fortunes of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the predominant Islamist political party. The two major political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League, have found it politically expedient to create space for political Islam in their own campaign rhetoric and to form short-term and long-term alliances with Islamist political parties. When the BNP ruled the country from 2001 to 2006, it formed an alliance with the JI, allowing JI members to hold cabinet positions for the first time. Although the JI has captured only about 6 percent to 8 percent of the vote in the past four elections, it is considered a kingmaker in Bangladeshi politics. Just before the 2007 election, the Awami League, which trumpets its secular credentials, found it politically expedient to reach out to the Islami Okiyo Jote, a smaller and more radical Islamist party.

The emergence of violent Islamist groups in Bangladesh over the past decade is another worrisome trend, although the Bangladeshi authorities have demonstrated a willingness to deal firmly with the threat. A handful of transnational terrorist groups, some with connections to Pakistan-based groups, stepped up attacks against the state in 2004-2005. On August 17, 2005, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) conducted the most spectacular of these attacks, a coordinated series of bombings throughout the country. On November 29, 2005, at least nine people were killed in another series of attacks on Bangladeshi courts, which further demonstrated that Islamist groups were seeking to weaken the state.[4] The bombings served as a wake-up call to the Bangladeshi government about the need to control Islamist terrorist groups. In March 2007, the military-backed caretaker government tried and executed six JMB leaders for their involvement in the August 2005 bombings.

While violent groups increased their attacks against the state, Islamist political parties initiated a campaign against the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh and demanded that the government declare them non-Muslims.[5] In 2004, the Bangladeshi government, then led by the BNP, banned the publication, sale, distribution, and preservation of all books and booklets on Islam published by the Ahmadiyya in Bangladesh. In June 2005, Islamists set fire to an Ahmadiyya mosque in Brahmanbaria and detonated more than two dozen bombs, injuring two people.[6] As Bangladesh scholar Dr. Ali Riaz noted in 2004, “The accommodation of political Islam [in Bangladesh]…has created a context within which political radicalism and social intolerance are increasing and soon may become the mainstay of politics.”[7]

However, the U.S. State Department reported in its 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that the Bangladesh government has improved its protection of religious minorities, including the Ahmadiyyas. The report also noted that the Bangladesh High Court stayed the government ban on publishing Ahmadiyya literature, effectively allowing Ahmadiyyas to publish.[8]

The current Awami League government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has demonstrated its determination to deal firmly with violent Islamist groups and to roll back Islamist trends within the country’s politics.[9] The Hasina government’s October 23rd banning of the Islamist extremist group Hizbut Tahrir is one indicator that the Bangladesh government is taking a tough stance toward extremism and is committed to ensuring the country remains on a democratic and peaceful path. The Appellate Division of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court also recently upheld the 2005 High Court decision to reinstate the ban on religious political parties, which was lifted in 1979 by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Appellate Division dismissed two petitions challenging the High Court ruling, which had found the Fifth Amendment “illegal and unconstitutional.” It is unclear whether the decision will lead to the official banning of religion-based parties.

Evolution of Bangladeshi Identity

Bangladesh (previously East Pakistan) was born in 1971 as a reaction to perceived exploitation and repression by the country’s leaders located in West Pakistan (now Pakistan). Two main elements of identity have shaped the people in this land: the Islamic faith and Bengali culture. The cultural element gained prominence immediately after the War of Liberation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed this local conflict as another manifestation of their proxy confrontation, and Bangladesh became a battlefield for competing regional and international interests, with Pakistan supporting local forces to counter India’s influence. An ally of India and the Soviet Union, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the charismatic figure at the founding of the Bangladesh nation, incorporated secularism and socialism as national ideals enshrined in the Constitution. However, in its early years, the Bangladesh government failed in its nation-building tasks, and Sheikh Mujib even resorted to the one-party rule.

Bangladesh became a sustained democratic system only in 1991, with the election of Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). The two subsequent elections were bitterly contested, but the results were still accepted. Regrettably, democratic government further amplified corruption, which was an endemic problem that predated the democratic era. The economic opportunities of the globalizing world of the 1990s also brought a modest prosperity to some Bangladeshis. The democratic era thus became a breeding ground for the vicious circle of corruption, patronage, and popular resentment.

In the context of democracy’s eroding credibility, support for Islamist ideas began to grow in Bangladesh. The fading memory of the War of Liberation diluted the importance of nationalism in the political identity of Bangladesh and allowed the Islamic element of this identity to gain ascendancy. Globalization also enhanced Middle Eastern influences, both through the influx of funds from Islamic charitable organizations seeking to foster new Islamic learning and social services institutions and through migrant workers who returned from Gulf states with new ideas about the relationship between state and religion.[10]

Impact of the Caretaker Government (2007-2008)

The army takeover of January 11, 2007, was carried out in the name of cleansing the political process of both corruption and terrorism. Most Bangladeshis initially supported the Bangladesh Army’s action as the only option to save the country from political disaster and a potential bloodbath. Three years later, however, the army appears to have failed to root out corruption. Indeed, Bangladeshi media has reported some cases of corruption by the military-backed civilian rulers.[11]

On the issue of terrorism, the military-backed government of 2007-2008 made notable progress, arresting and executing Islamist activists involved in terrorism. The military-backed government also commissioned a report on effective ways to address the terrorism issue. As such, the government’s main thrust in handling the terrorism problem was to view it as a criminal phenomenon. This tendency has influenced the approach subsequently adopted by the Hasina government.

A less helpful legacy of the military-backed government is the precedent that it set by suspending the democratic process. This plays into one of the ideological underpinnings of extremism and terrorism, the political proposition that questions the validity of democracy and the legitimacy of popular sovereignty. Although the Bangladeshi people initially viewed the state of emergency as necessary given the rising political tensions in the country, they nevertheless welcomed the 2008 elections and the return to democracy.

The imposition of military-backed rule for 18 months has increased doubts of many Bangladeshis about civilian authority over the army. Rumors of an impending coup flourish in the country, and faith in Hasina’s leadership fluctuates accordingly.

Mutiny Challenges Hasina Government

Sheikh Hasina faced the most severe challenge to her leadership in February 2009 when a mutiny in the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), one corps of the armed forces, degenerated into a massacre. The government’s handling of events had the potential to create a confrontation with the military. However, it managed the crisis deftly and averted a catastrophe.

The exact circumstances that led to the mutiny on February 25-26, 2009, have not yet been fully uncovered. The BDR is a border guard force of about 67,000, led by Bangladeshi army officers. While government and military investigations have explored the events at length, many questions remain unanswered, and competing narratives are circulating in different segments of the Bangladeshi political spectrum. What is known is that BDR elements took over a portion of the Dhaka Cantonment, the main concentration of military offices and residences in the country, and made public demands for parity with the Army on benefits and promotions. By the second day, the unrest had spread to at least 12 other towns. The mutiny ended with the mutineers surrendering their arms and releasing their hostages after negotiations with the government.

No solid evidence yet indicates exactly who instigated the mutiny or whether the purpose of the mutiny went beyond the stated demands of the mutineers for higher pay and better employment benefits. The intensity of the atrocities–including the massacre of dozens of high-ranking military officers, disfiguration and dismemberment of army personnel, and rape of female family members of the officers–was clearly disproportionate to the mutineers’ demands.

Several questions remain: Were the atrocities the results of miscalculations and uncontrollable excesses, or were they part of a deliberate attempt to weaken the army? If it was an attempt to weaken the army, who is behind the conspiracy? One member of Hasina’s cabinet has called the mutiny a “deep-rooted conspiracy” by people intent on destabilizing the country.[12]

Islamism as an Existential Threat

The largely socialist and secular background of today’s Bangladeshi cultural elite contrasts with broader society, which is growing more conservative in religious practices and mores. The reasons behind this trend are numerous. Locally, the emergence of distinct social classes and the identification of some segments of the elite with a Western way of life have triggered a reaction toward a more conservative outlook. Contributing factors include the abundance of satellite television channels that preach more dogmatic forms of the religion and the large number of Bangladeshi migrant workers returning home from Gulf states where they acquired different values. Islamists have injected themselves into this environment of greater religious conservatism, adding components of activism and intolerance.

This sociocultural dynamic is significant and needs to be monitored. Islamists do not generally state a political vision at the outset, but the socioeconomic needs of the people provide the Islamists with an opening to begin influencing the grassroots of society. Islamists engage in a bait-and-switch process, entering through a social question and then eventually promoting a political formula. In reality, their political formula is negation of the existing system. They argue that the current order is illegitimate and needs to be changed and that Islam is the solution, but leave the specifics of this solution unexplained. Still, in their relentless rejection of the current order, Islamists capitalize on and amplify the resentment toward the ruling elite. They also undermine the legitimacy of the state and question the foundations of democracy.

Bangladesh is grounded in a tradition of pluralism and its aspiration for sound democratic governance. Furthermore, indications are that Bangladeshis have become increasingly devout in their religious practices, but are uncomfortable with any notion of increased state engagement in religious affairs. However, there are some signs that Bangladeshi confidence in democratic values has receded. Islamists are actively seeking to uproot these values further, and the trend may be toward losing the pluralistic values of liberal society, unless proactive steps are taken. Radical Islamism should be treated as an existential threat to the country.

Three Types of Islamism

Islamism as a political ideology, which aims at redefining sovereignty in Islamic terms, has coalesced into three main approaches globally.[13] These approaches can be described as evolutionary, revolutionary, and opportunistic.

Evolutionary Islamism. The evolutionary model is represented in Bangladesh and the rest of South Asia by the Jamaat-e-Islami. The JI seeks to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic state, in which the people and the parliament no longer have sovereignty, but JI seeks to achieve this goal by working within the existing laws and conventions of the country.[14] The JI Islamist project proceeds incrementally from individual to family to society to state through a process of Islamization that seeks to reshape everyday life according to the Islamists’ understanding of Islam.

Evolutionary Islamism is accommodating of existing systems and institutions, but operates with the underlying belief that these structures will naturally dissolve as the project moves forward. JI is willing to contest elections and assume responsibilities of government–behaving as any other political party–with the implicit conviction that this is merely a temporary framework until the Islamist ideal is realized. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is another evolutionary Islamist group.

Revolutionary Islamism. In the revolutionary model, Islamists reject the temporary compromise on principal or simply make no space to accommodate it. Instead, they choose to openly confront the existing system. The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh follows this model.

Opportunistic Islamism. The opportunistic model, which is less prominent in global Islamism, also rejects any legitimacy outside the Islamic framework. Opportunistic Islamists do not seek an immediate open confrontation with the existing order, but instead are inclined to seed state institutions, particularly the military, with their own activists to usher in a momentous transformation when the time is right.

The Hizbut Tahrir can be called opportunistic Islamists. Any effort to counter the effects of these groups in Bangladesh needs to be informed by their global ideological context, but the idiosyncratic histories of these groups in Bangladesh may also be important in devising ways to contain them.

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami is by far the oldest, largest, and most deeply rooted Islamist organization in Bangladesh. It has maintained a constant presence in the Bangladeshi National Parliament since the restoration of democracy in 1991, although it secured only two seats in parliament in the December 2008 elections. Its youth organization has branches nationwide and is an effective recruitment arm for the political party. Its network of social services offers impoverished constituents basic health and an invitation to political patronage. The JI has faced two main handicaps in the past few years: the revival of political interest in reexamining its role in the 1971 War of Liberation and its long-term association with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), a political party that faced a serious setback in the most recent elections.

While it can be argued that any liberation war is also a civil war, the cultural consensus in Bangladesh is to draw a clear line between those who sought independence and those who supported the Pakistani Army’s repression of the independence movement. In 1971, supporters of Pakistan as the Muslim state of the Indian subcontinent argued that the independence movement in East Pakistan was a secessionist action instigated by India to undermine the integrity and power of the Islamic state. The JI’s role in supporting West Pakistan and the repressive measures of its army has since been recast by political opponents as collaboration in genocide. The JI leadership, largely due to political circumstances and military rule, has so far largely escaped being stigmatized by this accepted version of history. However, the constant threat of being tarred by these accusations indirectly helps to prevent the JI from overtly undermining democracy in Bangladesh.

From the point of view of the Awami League and its allies, the JI’s active participation in the BNP government from 2001-2006 justified the invocation of the anti-JI weapon of raising the issue of the 1971 war crimes. In an attempt to court the Awami League and the left-leaning part of the political spectrum, the 2007-2008 military-backed government reintroduced the question of a special tribunal for the war criminals of 1971. Over the past few decades, the military’s apparent oscillation on questions relating to the JI and the targeting of Islamists likely reflects internal divergences within the military. On the other hand, the interactions between the military and JI demonstrate the army leadership’s ability to balance and manipulate the political system. During two years of military-backed rule, the army leadership seemed to explore various approaches in managing the diverse political forces, finally choosing to endorse much of the Awami League’s program.

Today, having inherited the war crimes issue from the military-backed caretaker government, the Awami League finds it advantageous to raise the issue in its quest to dismantle the BNP, its opposition. Prosecution of the 1971 war crimes has limited support in some segments of Bangladeshi society, but it is widely seen as a political issue aimed primarily at discrediting the JI, rather than as a societal issue to be resolved in the interest of national reconciliation.

Supporters of holding trials view them as a means to curtail the JI’s influence and as a potentially fatal blow to the organization. However, seeking to counter the JI only through the courts would be misguided. The JI, as an evolutionary Islamist group, is engaged in a generational quest to change Bangladeshi society and government. Court actions may distract it, but they are unlikely to derail its long-term project. It is noteworthy that JI’s leaders consider the December 2008 elections a victory, even though its representation in parliament dwindled to just two seats. Jamaat-e-Islami representatives instead highlight the fact that JI candidates received more votes in 2008 than they did in 2001. These votes may not have translated into parliamentary seats, but they demonstrate that the party is making incremental gains in the electorate.

Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh

On August 17, 2005, the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh staged a spectacular series of coordinated bombings across the nation, detonating approximately 400 devices within the space of 45 minutes in 63 of the country’s 64 districts, but killing only three people. The JMB apparently believed that this dramatic action would usher in the rise of a revolutionary Islamist insurgency. Sporadic terrorist operations followed the August bombings, further demonstrating the JMB’s goals in the country. The language that the JMB used to justify its attacks was sharp, unyielding, and consistent with global jihadist discourse. The JMB argued that the Bangladesh government was corrupt and that its democratic system should be rejected.[15]

The military-backed government of 2007-2008 tried the JMB ringleaders in court and eventually executed them without taking special legal measures. Vigorous enforcement against the JMB seems to have largely curtailed the group’s operations, although Bangladeshi authorities discovered a JMB-connected bomb factory in an Islamic school in the Bhola district in the spring of 2009. Local villagers had noticed suspicious activity at the school and alerted the authorities.[16] The JMB has thus far shown little ability to penetrate social environments in Bangladesh that could be tapped to sustain an insurgency. Yet the JMB’s possible revival into a renewed threat to the Bangladeshi state and society cannot be ruled out, especially with international players seeking a foothold in murky Bangladeshi politics. The spectacular character of the JMB’s “baptism of fire,” the series of coordinated bombings, seems also to have created a well-known brand name for the group among international extremist networks, as evidenced by the group’s technologically savvy presence on the Internet.

Sources in the Bangladesh government have indicated that many operational aspects of the synchronized bombings were outsourced to other insurgent groups, such as a hard-line communist insurgency that operates in Bangladeshi rural areas. However, this should be viewed as a strength, not a weakness, of the JMB. In fact, the JMB has demonstrated sophistication in its Web presence, elusive networks, and associations with unlikely partners.

Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh

The Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HuJI-B) is an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), a pan-Islamist terrorist group that has the stated goal of combating worldwide oppression of Muslims. The HuJI originally formed to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It then focused its militant activities against India in Jammu and Kashmir throughout the 1990s, and it now fights alongside the Taliban and al-Qaeda against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan-based HuJI leader Ilyas Kashmiri has been targeted by U.S. drone missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas and was recently named by the FBI as co-conspirator in plots to attack India and Denmark.

The HuJI-B was formed under the leadership of Shafiqur Rehman in 1992 by Bangladeshi veterans of the 1980s war in Afghanistan, and it likely maintains close connections with the Pakistan-based HuJI.[17] The U.S. State Department designated HuJI-B as a foreign terrorist organization in March 2008. In late January 2010, Indian authorities reportedly arrested a HuJI-B operative who had planned to attack Hyderabad, India, on Indian Republic Day.[18]

Hizbut Tahrir

Between JI’s temporary acceptance of the democratic process and the JMB and HuJI-B’s unequivocal rejection is qualified coexistence with the system, as practiced by the Hizbut Tahrir (HUT). This group presents itself globally as the party of the restoration of the Caliphate, the universal Islamic state that transcends nationalities and political borders.[19] Hizbut Tahrir seeks to achieve its goal through de facto acceptance of established order in Muslim majority societies, while aggressively questioning the legitimacy of any system other than the universal Islamic state.

Globally, Hizbut Tahrir has only rarely been implicated in violent or terrorist actions, but it has been banned in Germany, Russia, Kazakhstan, and a handful of other countries. The Bangladesh government banned HUT’s Bangladesh chapter after an unidentified group bombed a ruling party parliamentarian on October 21, 2009. The government said it would not punish HUT activists for past offenses, but warned them not to continue “anti-state” activities. Mohiuddin Ahmed, the HUT chief coordinator in Bangladesh and a professor at Dhaka University, was put on “forced leave indefinitely.”[20]

HUT is the fifth militant organization to be outlawed in Bangladesh since 2001.[21] Previously, it was suggested that leaders in the Bangladeshi Armed Forces viewed HUT in its discipline and professional outlook as a counterproposition to the revolutionary Islamism of the JMB and similar groups.[22] However, this view ignored the potent radicalization effect of HUT. As described by former HUT members in the United Kingdom, the organization instills in its youthful recruits a sense of alienation and isolation from the wider society.[23] HUT leads its members on a path to radicalization and rejection of the established order. It is unclear whether HUT engaged directly in terrorism in Bangladesh, but it has staged intimidating demonstrations that apparently provoked people to violence.[24]

HUT originally drew the attention of the Bangladeshi authorities after a grenade attack on British High Commissioner to Bangladesh Anwar Choudhury in May 2004. Bangladeshi press reported that, two days before the incident, HUT supporters had posted anti-British and anti-U.S. posters at the shrine where Choudhury was later attacked. Although HUT may not be a force of insurgency, it is a major driver of radicalization.
 

 What the U.S. Should Do

As Bangladesh seeks to limit the influence of radical Islamists and to prevent extremist ideologies from taking root in the country, the U.S. should: 

• Assist Bangladesh in improving its democratic process. Bangladesh is an imperfect democracy. Radicalization and terrorism are directly linked to corruption and a lack of trust in the representative political process. Thus, it is important for the U.S. to help Bangladesh to engage in a long-term reform of its democratic practices and to address endemic problems, such as strong-arm politics and the perpetual rejection of electoral defeat. The Hasina government can help this process by focusing on developing a common civic sense that places nation and state ahead of party and dynastic politics.
• Urge the Bangladesh government to develop a culture of transparency that fosters accountability and restrains corruption. One way to encourage greater transparency is to require all government agencies and departments to issue periodic reports detailing their activities and disbursements of funds. Disclosure should become the norm, and withholding information should require justification. The current administrative culture of Bangladesh remains afflicted by both secrecy and ad hoc reporting. Transitioning to a more predictable, more transparent relationship with the citizenry is essential to establishing good governance. 
• Support Bangladesh in strengthening and streamlining its judicial system. In Bangladesh there is a critical vacuum in the law and order system. Even secular liberal democrats do not trust the legal system. The legitimacy of the political process has largely relied on charismatic leadership, rather than strong and enduring institutions. The evolution of Bangladeshi democracy into a reliable system based on consistent laws and individual accountability remains a major challenge.
• Support Bangladesh in developing a comprehensive approach to countering extremism and terrorism. Dhaka needs to resist the temptation to view terrorism as solely a criminal issue or an imported ideology. It is a combination of the two. Bangladesh needs to recognize the importance of addressing the radicalization as more than a criminal issue.[25] For example, the main leaders of the JMB were prosecuted and executed, but the organization continues to exist and evolve. In addition to decapitating the organization, the government needs to pursue the JMB’s ideological links to other organizations and individuals and work to prevent the spread of extremist ideas. The Hasina government is starting to grasp the complexity of the terrorism issue. Washington should support the Bangladesh government in adopting a comprehensive approach to dealing with the challenges posed by extremist ideologies.
• Support Bangladesh in working with other Muslim states and societies that are countering radicalism. Initiatives to counter radicalism are best conceived and implemented at the nongovernmental level, with local civil society actors assuming the primary role. While radical Islam has a global narrative, the most efficient responses to it are formulated at the local level, with regional and international counterradicalism networks providing support and sharing ideas. Bangladesh can also contribute to building up international networks to counter radicalism by sharing its own experiences of fusing local culture with Islam in a way that upholds democratic values, supports religious tolerance and pluralism, and serves as a bulwark against violent groups seeking to weaken the state.
• Support the Bangladesh government in developing a reintegration program for migrant workers returning to Bangladeshi society. Bangladeshi religious leaders should take a role in ensuring that Bangladeshi laborers returning from the Gulf region understand that there is no dichotomy between Bengali culture and the religion of Islam. Returning migrant workers from the Gulf have often been exposed to new ideas about the relationship between state and religion and/or have been influenced into thinking that Islam as practiced in Saudi Arabia is somehow superior to Islam as traditionally practiced in Bangladesh. Insistence on the validity of Bengali Islam can counter the destructive impulse of reductionist Islamist ideas, the seeds of which can be planted in Bangladeshi laborers during extended stays in the Gulf.
• Encourage Bangladesh to build on the strength of its culture to offer women relative freedom and choice in both the public and the private spheres. Since independence, women, regardless of social class, have assumed important roles in Bangladeshi society and have been active participants in socioeconomic life. Confronting Islamism in the social sphere should focus on the empowerment of women as individual, productive, and full members of society, not on the type of clothing they wear. The success of microfinance programs in Bangladesh that primarily lend to women demonstrates the benefits of women’s active involvement in economic life. Bangladesh should build on this success.
• Support the depoliticization of the debate surrounding radical Islam. The issue of radicalization should not be politicized for short-term gains against political opponents. Trials of the 1971 war crimes, in particular, could easily be misused for narrow political purposes, undermining a process of recovery and national reconciliation that is still lagging. The U.S. government should encourage Bangladesh to openly debate issues of national import, but discourage the parties from exploiting such issues for narrow political purposes.

Conclusion

While Bangladesh has so far met the challenges from creeping Islamist radicalization, the situation inside the country remains somewhat precarious. The local challenges in Bangladesh have been amplified by the injection of an internationally minded radicalization process. However, the assets that Bangladesh has accumulated over the past four decades remain a solid base for a potential recovery and reversal of Islamist radicalization.

The U.S. should stand ready to support local Bangladeshi actors, while recognizing that a free Bangladeshi society and democratic government must take the lead role and responsibility in meeting these challenges.

Maneeza Hossain is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Lisa Curtis is Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

APPENDIX

SOURCES FOR TABLE 1: TEN KEY ISLAMIST GROUPS IN BANGLADESH

Islamist Political Groups

Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami: Jamaat-e-Islami, “Maulana Motiur Rahman Nizami,” at http://jamaat-e-islami.org/index.php?option=com_popup_org&Sub_Menu=PR&Info_Id=12 (February 5, 2010); Bangla2000, “Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh,” at http://www.bangla2000.com/Election_2001/Manifesto_Jamaat-e-Islami.shtm (February 9, 2010); and Anis Ahmed, “Former PM Hasina Wins Landslide in Bangladesh Poll,” Reuters, December 30, 2008, at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4BR0KL20081230 (February 24, 2010).

Islami Oikyo Jote: “Salauddin Qader on PM’s India Visit: People Want to See Positive Outcome,” The New Nation, January 8, 2010, at http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/01/09/news0687.htm (February 9, 2010); Ali Riaz, Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008), p. 159; and Swati Parashar, “Engage Bangladesh Before It Is Too Late,” Asia Times, April 4, 2006, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South _Asia/HD04Df01.html (February 24, 2010).

Islamic Democratic Party: Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); Islamic Democratic Party, Dhaka City Branch, Web site, at http://www.islamicdemocraticpartydhakacitybranch.blogspot.com (February 5, 2010); U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, April 2009, pp. 297-298, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf (December 30, 2009); and Indo-Asian News Service, “12 Militant Outfits Active in Bangladesh: Home Ministry,” Thaindian News, March 17, 2009, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/wrld-news/12-militant-outfits-active-in-bangladesh-home-ministry_100167313.html (February 8, 2009).

Islamist Grassroots Organizations

Hizbut Tahrir: Khilafat.org, “About Us,” at http://www.khilafat.org/newPages/Contact/contact.php (February 9, 2010); Hizb ut-Tahrir, “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” at http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def (February 9, 2010); BBC News, “Bangladesh Islamist Group Banned,” October 23, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south _asia/8321329.stm (February 8, 2010); and South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Bangladesh Timeline Year 2008,” at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2008.htm (February 9, 2010).

Islami Chhatra Shibir: “24 Key Shibir Leaders ‘Quit’ over RU Violence,” The Daily Star (Dhaka, Bangladesh), February 23, 2010; Bangladesh Islami Chhatra Shibir, “Central President’s Profile,” at http://shibir.org.bd/indexeng.php/organization/presidentbiography (February 24, 2010); “Rampage at RU,” The Daily Star, February 10, 2010 at http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=125635 (March 2, 2010); and “Shibir, BCL Trade Gunfire on RU Campus,” bdnews24.com, February 9, 2010, at http://bdnews24.com/details/php?id=153204 (February 10, 2010).

Islamist Militant Groups

Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh: Animesh Roul, “Islam-O-Muslim and the Resilience of Terrorism in Bangladesh,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, July 27, 2009, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35326 (February 9, 2010); National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh,” at http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4497 (January 6, 2010); and DAWN, “Six Militants Executed in Bangladesh,” March 31, 2007, at http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/31/top14.htm (February 9, 2010).

Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh: South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Jangrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh,” at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm (February 9, 2010); National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh,” at http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4587 (December 30, 2009); and Paul Cochrane, “The Funding Methods of Bangladeshi Terrorist Groups,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 5 (May 2009), pp. 17-23, at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss5.pdf (February 9, 2010).

Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh: Chaitanya Chandra Halder and Kailash Sarkar, “Huji Founder Makes Startling Confession,” The Daily Star, December 4, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=116253 (February 9, 2010), and U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, April 2009, pp. 297-298, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf (December 30, 2009)

Shahadat-e al Hikma: Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); and Indo-Asian News Service, “12 Militant Outfits Active in Bangladesh: Home Ministry,” Thaindian News, March 17, 2009, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/wrld-news/12-militant-outfits-active-in-bangladesh-home-ministry_100167313.html (February 8, 2009).

Hizbut Touhid: Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, “Islamist Militancy Group Hizbut Towhid in Action in Bangladesh,” American Chronicle, October 3, 2009, at http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/120840 (March 2, 2010); Joyeeta Bahattacharjee, “Understanding 12 Extremist Groups of Bangladesh,” Observer Research Foundation, June 7, 2009, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/ modules/analysis/attachments/Bangladesh-Militant-Groups_1246945884723.pdf (January 6, 2010); Amanur Aman, “31 Hizb-ut Towhid Men Arrested in Kushtia,” The Daily Star, April 18, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=84464 (February 9, 2010); South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Bangladesh Timeline Year 2009,” at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/timeline/2009.htm (February 10, 2010); and Indo-Asian News Service, “12 Militant Outfits Active in Bangladesh: Home Ministry,” Thaindian News, March 17, 2009, at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/wrld-news/12-militant-outfits-active-in-bangladesh-home-ministry_100167313.html (February 8, 2009).

---

1. For further details on this process, see Maneeza Hossain, Broken Pendulum: Bangladesh’s Swing to Radicalism (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2008).
2. Ali Riaz, “‘God Willing’: The Politics and Ideology of Islamism in Bangladesh,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East , Vol. 23, Nos. 1-2 (2003), pp. 310-312, at http://www.cssaame.com/issues/23/34.pdf (March 1, 2010).
3. Ali Riaz, Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008), p. 139.
4. Ali Riaz, “Bangladesh in 2005: Standing at a Crossroads,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 1 (January/February 2006), p. 107, at http://my.ilstu.edu/~ariaz/as.2006.46.1.pdf (March 1, 2010).
5. The Ahmadiyya Jamaat has approximately 10 million followers in the world, but only about 100,000 are in Bangladesh. Toward the end of the 19th century, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), founder of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat, broke with centuries-old Islamic dogma by claiming to be an Islamic prophet. (Mainstream Muslims believe that the Prophet Mohammad was the last prophet.) In the 1950s, Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, published the controversial pamphlet “The Qadiani [Ahmadi] Question and the Finality of Prophethood,” which argued that Ahmadiyya was an entirely new religion that should not be associated with Islam. The Ahmadis have been declared non-Muslims in Pakistan.
6. Riaz, “Bangladesh in 2005,” p. 110.
7. Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Landam, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), p. 143.
8. U.S. Department of State, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices , s.v. “Bangladesh,” February 25, 2009, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/sca/119132.htm (March 1, 2010).
9. Such recent actions include the banning of Hizbut Tahrir and Harakat-ul-Jihadi Islami and the arrest of the leadership of the latter. See BBC News, “Bangladesh Islamist Group Banned,” October 23, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8321329.stm (March 1, 2010).
10. Riaz, Faithful Education, pp. 142-143.
11. Rashidul Hasan, “Ministry to Sue Matin for Container Deal: Accused of Graft, Violation of Constitution,” The Daily Star (Dhaka, Bangladesh), August 14, 2009.
12. Julhas Alam, “Bangladesh Mutiny: 1,000 Guards Charged over Massacre,” The Huffington Post, March 1, 2009, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/01/bangladesh-mutiny-1000-gu_n_170864.html (January 5, 2010).
13. In this paper, Islamism, or political Islam, refers to an ideology that supports the goal of establishing an Islamic state or government. While different Islamist groups vary as to which tactics they support to reach their goals, they share common beliefs, including opposition to political and/or religious pluralism and rejection of democracy as un-Islamic. Hassan Mneimneh, “Convergence? The Homogenization of Islamist Doctrines in Gaza,” Hudson Institute, Current Trends, December 16, 2009, at http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/convergence-the-homogenization-of-islamist-doctrines-in-gaza (March 1, 2010).
14. Riaz, God Willing , p. 15.
15. Hassan Mneimneh, “Seven Years Later: The Jihadist International,” American Enterprise Institute Middle Eastern Outlook No. 6, September 2008, at http://www.aei.org/outlook/28598 (October 28, 2009).
16. “Out of Action: Bangladesh Cracks Down on Terrorists,” Asia Pacific Defense Forum, Vol. 34, Issue 3 (3rd Quarter, 2009), p. 11.
17. Ali Riaz, testimony before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on Bangladesh, December 4, 2008.
18. Press Trust of India, “Huji Man’s Arrest Spares Another Terror Attack on Hyderabad,” Daily News and Analysis (India), January 19, 2010, at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_huji-man-s-arrest-spares-another-terror-attack-on-hyderabad_1336729 (March 1, 2010).
19. Hizbut Tahrir, “About Us,” at http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/1-19-about-us.aspx (March 4, 2010).
20. “2 Hizbut Offices Raided,” The Daily Star, October 26, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=111369 (March 4, 2010).
21. The other four outlawed military organizations are HuJI-B, JMB, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, and Shahadat-e-Al Hikma.
22. Private conversation with confidential source, Dhaka, Bangladesh, August 21, 2009.
23. Quilliam, “Quilliam Outreach and Training Unit,” at http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/quilliam-outreach-and-training-unit.html (March 4, 2010).
24. When the Caretaker Government considered amending inheritance laws to institute equality between men and women in Bangladesh, HUT showed its ability to mobilize intimidating mobs. “Violent Clashes with Cops Leave 200 Hurt,” The Daily Star , April 12, 2008, at http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=31858 (March 1, 2010).
25. Sharier Khan and Abul Kalam Azad, “Government Takes on Terror Socially, Politically,” The Daily Star , August 25, 2009, at http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=102755 (March 1, 2010).

URL : www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010..mocracy

Persecution of minorities and women in South Asia

---Weekly Blitz, Bangladesh

VOLUME - 4, ISSUE - 42, DHAKA,
OCTOBER 14, 2009

Persecution of minorities and women in South Asia

Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury

Right before the end of British rule in Indian sub-continent in 1947, several riot amongst various religious groups, mainly amongst Muslims and Hindus took place in India and Pakistan [the then West and East Pakistan], causing severe rise of religious hatred amongst the people in the region. Subsequently, massive Muslim persecution in Gujrat, Sikh Persecution in Punjab by the Indian government, persecution of Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Persecution of Christians in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as well persecution of religious minorities in almost all the countries in South Asia gradually generated deep rooted hatred amongst the people belonging to various religious beliefs. The Partition of India was the partition of British India that led to the creation, on August 14, 1947 and August 15, 1947, respectively, of the sovereign states of the Dominion of Pakistan [later Islamic Republic of Pakistan and People's Republic of Bangladesh] and the Union of India [later Republic of India]. The partition of India included the geographical division of the Bengal province of British India into East Pakistan and West Bengal [India], and the similar partition of the Punjab province into West Punjab [later Punjab - Pakistan and Islamabad Capital Territory] and East Punjab [later Punjab – India, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh], and also the division of other assets, including the British Indian Army, the Indian Civil Service and other administrative services, the Indian railways, and the central treasury. The partition was promulgated in the Indian Independence Act 1947 and resulted in the dissolution of the British Indian Empire. In the aftermath of Partition, the princely states of India, which had been left by the Indian Independence Act 1947 to choose whether to accede to India or Pakistan or to remain outside them, were all incorporated into one or other of the new dominions. The question of the choice to be made in this connection by Jammu and Kashmir led to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 and other wars and conflicts between India and Pakistan. Stable democratic nation like India could not free itself of curse of communalism even more than fifty years after independence. If anything it has been getting worse year after year. There has been not a single year in post-independence period, which has been free of communal violence though number of incidents may vary. The year 2002 has been one of the worst years in this matter right from the beginning as the Gujarat carnage began in the very beginning of the year. In the year 2002 the first reported riot took place in Kozhikode [Calicut], Kerala on 3rd January. In the clashes between two communities [Hindus and Muslims] five persons were killed. The clashes occurred on the question of eve teasing. The whole region came in the grip of violence. More than twenty persons were injured including five women. Properties worth millions of rupees were destroyed. A heavy police bandobast was made to bring the situation under control. Kerala is generally thought to be free of communal violence. But occasionally it also experiences such frenzy and bout of communal violence. However, it is generally brought under control as the Kerala government usually does not allow things to go out of had.

Gujarat was next to come under intense bout of communal carnage. It was of the kind, which India had never experienced accept at the time of partition. The communal carnage in Gujarat shook whole world. It was difficult to believe such intense communal frenzy could be incited by the BJP for its political gains. More than 2000 people were killed most cruelly in this carnage according to very reliable sources though the Government admits only about 1000 dead.

The Viswa Hindu Parishad [VHP], the Bajrang Dal and Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] gave a call for bandh [general strike] on 28th February and violent incidents started from the morning of 28th February, particularly in Ahmedabad. And before the sun set on 28th February more than 100 persons were killed in Ahmedabad alone. Most ghastly incidents took place in a place called Naroda Patia where more than 80 persons were burnt alive including women and children and number of women were raped in full gaze of public. The other ghastly incident took place in Gulbarg Society, Chamanpura where about 40 persons were burnt alive including a former member of parliament named Ahsan Jafri from Congress Party.

What is worse the Chief Mister Narendra Modi justified such frenzy and described it as reaction to action in Godhra. And all this happened with full complicity of the police and bureaucracy. The honest officers who did not allow carnage in their areas were instantly transferred by the Narendra Modi Government.

Some ministers who led the mobs have been named in case lodged after the incident. Many mosques and mausoleums were demolished and ground was leveled. Some accounts maintain about 700 such religious structures were brought down or severely damaged. Ahmedabad, Baroda, Mehsana and Panchmahal districts were the worst affected districts covering entire north and central Gujarat. There have been various estimates of the properties destroyed but generally it is maintained properties worth more than US$ 1.5 billion were looted or burnt. The business lost due to closures and migration of labour is several times this figure. Hundreds of Muslim families were totally uprooted. The carnage continued for more than five months.

The next riot took place in Kaithal, at Indian state of Haryana. Though the cause of the violence on disturbances on 28th February is not clear but it seems to be related to Gujarat incidents. According to The Hindustan Times report Shiv Sena, Viswa Hindu Parishad [VHP] and Bajrang Dal mobs pulled down a mosque and caused extensive damage to two others. They damaged at least four mausoleums and enforced a complete bandh. Prohibitory orders were later clamped down on the town.

During the general strike Maharashtra called by the Shiv Sena, Viswa Hindu Parishad [VHP] and Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] on 1st March 2002 to protest the setting ablaze of coach of the Sabarmati Express on 27th February 2002 in Godhra a violent mob went on rampage in Murbad 80 kilometer from Mumbai. Fortunately Murbad was the only town affected during the call for bandh by the Sangh Parivar.

During the general strike in Murbad in India the Bajrang Dal alliance began looting and burning Muslims shops. It also looted the houses of two prosperous grain merchants and set fire to a jeep [cross-country vehicle] belonging to a transporter. The general strike was total and all shops were closed. The mob was also determined to attack the families of some of the well to do Muslim shopkeepers. But they fled minutes before the attack and saved themselves.

The Police claimed that it fired 13 rounds in the air but the Minorities Commission said that it did not come across anyone who could corroborate the police claim. The Police claimed that they had arrested 32 people including the local Bajrang Dal leaders and charged them with attempted murder, arson and lootings. The Muslims are a microscopic minority in Morbad and are afraid of giving any details of damage to the madrasa and are praising the role of the police, according to the Minorities Commission.

On 17th March 2002 communal incidents took place in Loharu in Bhivani district of Haryana in India. Loharu was once under a Muslim ruler. There is thus Muslim population in this town. A mob of three hundred incited by the rumour of cow slaughter attacked two mosques and at least 15 shops and houses belonging to the minority community. The police had to fire in the air when the mob could not be controlled by tear gas charges.

When the people belonging to the majority community heard that a cow has been taken for slaughter in one of the mosques, it attacked and set fire to this mosque and shops nearby. According to a media reports quoting the police sources, a mob of 300 Shiv Sainiks [Soldiers of Shiva] set fire at another mosque near the railway station and many shops in the adjacent area.

Next incidents of communal violence in India took place in three places in Rajasthan in which three persons were killed on 25th March 2002 on the occasion of Muharram. The immediate provocation was the holding of poornahuti yagnas [a Hindu religious ritual] and kirtans [Hindu religious songs] at various temples on the route of Muharram processions.

Curfew had to be clamped in the town of Gangapur, 80 kilo meters from Sawai Madhopur, in central Rajasthan where 3 people were killed and 15 injured in police firing. According to the police, violence broke out when activists of the Viswa Hindu Parishad [VHP], Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] and Bajrang Dal sat inside an ancient Hanumanji temple for religious rituals. They began to chant provocative anti-Muslim slogans when the Muharram procession came closer to the temple.

Persecution of Sikhs:

Operation Blue Star, which continued during 3–6 June 1984 was an Indian military operation ordered by Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister of India, to remove Sikh separatists who were amassing weapons in the Golden Temple [Holy Temple of Sikhs] in Amritsar [India]. The operation was launched in response to a deterioration of law and order in the Indian state of Punjab.

The operation was carried out by Indian army troops with tanks and armoured vehicles. Militarily successful, the operation aroused immense controversy, and the government's justification for the timing and style of the attack are still under debate. Operation Bluestar was included in the Top 10 Political Disgraces by India Today magazine.

Official reports put the number of deaths among the Indian army at 83 and the number of civilian deaths at 492, though independent estimates ran much higher.

The impact of the military assault, its aftermath and the increased tensions led to assaults on members of the Sikh community within India and uproar amongst Sikhs worldwide. In India, many Sikhs resigned from armed and civil administrative office and returned their government awards.

Indira Gandhi first asked Lieutenant General S. K. Sinha, then Vice-Chief of Indian Army and who was to succeed as the Army chief, to prepare a position paper for assault on the Golden Temple. Lieutenant General Sinha advised against any such move, given the sacrilegious outlook from pious Sikhs. He suggested the government adopt an alternative solution. A controversial decision was made to replace him with General Arun Vaidya as the Chief of the Indian army. General Vaidya was assisted by Lieutenant General K. Sunderjee as Vice-Chief. Operation Blue Star was eventually planned and controlled by them.

On 3 June 1984, a 36-hour curfew was imposed on the state of Punjab with all methods of communication and public travel suspended. Electricity supplies were also interrupted, creating a total blackout and cutting off the state from the rest of India and the world. Complete censorship was placed on all types of media.

The Indian Army stormed the Golden Temple on the night of 5 June under the command of Major General Kuldip Singh Brar. The forces had full control of the Golden Temple by the morning of 7 June, 1984. Bhindranwale, Lieutenant General Shahbeg Singh and several other militant leaders were killed in the operation along with a large number of followers and civilians. The armed forces also suffered many casualties. Operation Blue Star coincided with a Sikh annual festival. Pilgrims, including the elderly and children, were trapped inside the temple when the operation began and many were reported as wounded and killed as a result.

Sikh reaction in India began with the decade old persecution of Sikhs, mostly by the Hindu majorities as well as state-partonized terror on them. Indian government enforced total media blackout and stopped local and international media from covering this tragic blood shed of the decade. Before the attack by army a media blackout was imposed in Punjab. The Times reporter Michael Hamlyn reported that journalists were picked up from their hotels at 5 a.m. in a military bus, taken to the adjoining border of the state of Haryana and “were abandoned there”.

Brahma Chellaney, who was then the South Asia correspondent of the Associated Press, was the only foreign reporter who managed to stay on in Amritsar despite the media blackout. His dispatches, filed by telex, provided the first non-governmental news reports on the bloody operation in Amritsar. His first dispatch, front-paged by the New York Times, The Times of London and The Guardian, reported a death toll about twice of what authorities had admitted. According to the dispatch, about 780 militants and civilians and 400 troops had perished in fierce gunbattles. The high casualty rates among security forces were attributed to “the presence of such sophisticated weapons as medium machine guns and rockets in the terrorists' arsenal.”

Chellaney also reported that “several” suspected Sikh militants had been shot with their hands tied. The dispatch, after its first paragraph reference to “several” such deaths, specified later that “eight to 10” men had been shot in that fashion. In that dispatch, Mr. Chellaney interviewed a doctor who said he was picked up by the army and forced to conduct postmortems despite the fact he had never done any postmortem examination before. The number of causalities reported by Brahma Chellaney were far more than government reports, and the Indian government, which disputed his casualty figures accused him of inflammatory reporting. The Associated Press stood by the reports and figures, the accuracy of which was also “supported by Indian and other press accounts” according to Associated Press; and reports in The Times and The New York Times.

Whole of Punjab and especially the Golden Temple Complex was turned into a murderous mouse trap from where people could neither escape nor could they seek succor of any kind. The way the dead bodies were disposed off adds to the suspicions regarding the number and nature of the casualties. The bodies of the victims of military operation in Punjab were unceremoniously destroyed without any attempt to identify them and hand them over to their relatives. The government, after the operation, on the other hand, did every thing in its power to cover up the excesses of the army action. The most disturbing thing about the entire operation was that a whole mass of men, women, and children were ordered to be killed merely on the suspicion that some terrorists were operating from the Golden Temple and other Sikh temples in India.

Similar accusations of high handedness on part of Indian Army and allegations of human rights violation by security forces in Operation Blue Star and subsequent military operations in Punjab has been leveled by Justice V.M. Tarkunde, Mary Anne Weaver, Ram Narayan Kumar, a noted human rights lawyer, Joyce Pettigrew, a Swedish Anthropologist and many others.

Muslim women in India:

On the completion of five decades of independence, women in Muslim communities face considerable challenges as citizens of India and as members of India's largest minority. Their poor socio-economic status reflects a lack of social opportunity which, though not a feature exclusive to Muslim women, is exacerbated by their marginal status within an overall context of social disadvantage for most Indian women. This point was highlighted in a study of 39 districts in 1981 [where the population of Muslims ranged from 20 per cent to 95 per cent - which could be considered a fairly representative sample of the status of Muslims in India]. In the study, the literacy rate of Muslim women was found to be 21.91 per cent - lower than even the poor national average of 24.82 per cent.

According to government reports, Muslim women are among the poorest, educationally disenfranchised, economically vulnerable, politically marginalized group in the country. In 1983, the Gopal Singh Committee instituted by the government, declared Muslims as a “backward” community in India. A central feature of this “backwardness” is their exceedingly poor socio-economic status, particularly of Muslim women. Most Muslim women remain “invisible” workers in the informal economy. The Muslim share in public employment is less than 3 per cent. Within this picture of marginalization, it is a predictable certainty that the corresponding figures for Muslim women are further skewed towards the bottom. A lack of information on Muslim women contributes to the reinforcement of cultural stereotypes, serving to obfuscate their life experiences and struggles. Consequently, the notion that Muslim women's status in India is attributable to certain intrinsic, immutable “Islamic” features or that their social status derives solely from Muslim laws, is widely prevalent.

On the other hand, the appropriation of Muslim women's issues by a vocal and politically influential male Muslim constituency for political purposes poses a considerable challenge to Muslim women's legal empowerment. This was highlighted during the Shah Bano case and the passage of the Muslim Women's Bill in 1986.

Furthermore, it is crucial for Muslims “women and men” to debate among themselves the possible reasons and remedies for their poor status as citizens of India.

The political ascendence of the Hindu right-wing and its inherent link between politics and religion has threatened India's secular fabric. The rise of communal violence in the last two decades has undermined secular law and violated constitutional ideals of religious non-discrimination, protection of human rights, implementation of social justice and the equality of all Indian citizens as well as principles of international human rights law. Right-wing illiberalism, communal prejudice and intolerance of diversity bodes ill for all Indian women; in the case of Muslim women it heightens physical and economic insecurity, limits possibilities of renegotiating their status with Muslim men and precipitates Muslim militancy.

The lack of social opportunities for Muslim women is a crucial issue needing urgent action. An improvement in literacy rates would directly influence Muslim women's socio-economic and political status as citizens of India.

The acknowledgement of the universality of women's rights by the international community is relevant to the debate on Islam and women's rights, particularly with reference to women's rights in the family. The formation of forums and associations of Muslim men and women's initiatives in the 1990s is an important step towards facilitating public debate on Muslim women's issues. Muslim women and men must collaborate with individuals and organizations who are committed to the realization of women's human rights. The alliance of Muslim women with the women's movement in India, as well as movements for secularism, democracy and human rights, are crucial for forging a common front against forces opposed to women's self-determination.

Christian persecution in India:

When Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was in the US in September [2000], the National Association of Asian Christians [NAAC] in the US paid US$ 50,000 to the New York Times to publish “an Open Letter to the Honorable Atal Bihari Vajpayee, prime minister of India.”

While “warmly welcoming the PM,” The NAAC expressed deep concern about the persecution of Christians in India by extremist [meaning Hindu] groups mentioning as examples “the priest, missionaries and church workers who have been murdered,” the nuns “raped,” and the potential enacting of conversion laws, which would make “genuine” conversions illegal. The letter concluded by saying “that Christians in India today live in fear.”

Many Hindu religious leaders feel Christianity is a real threat today for Indian democracy and ‘integrity’.

Rape of a nun and brutality on Churches:

Case – 1: A nun was raped in 2008 in the Indian city of Mumbai. Spanish born sister Antolina Martinez de Maranon of the Daughters of Charity, who works in Mumbai with leprosy, tuberculosis and AIDS patients, said in her letter that the violence began in Orissa, “but has now spread to many more states, even to the state we call the Rome of India, Bangalore, where our provincial house is located.”

“Many churches have been profaned there, Masses have even been disrupted, priests and others have been beaten, many things have been destroyed, and they are sowing panic.”

“Nobody is doing anything to stop the radicals from sowing panic and hatred in the minds of simple people and fear and insecurity in the minds of Christians,” Sister Martinez said.

“The Indian bishops want to draw attention to this all over the world, in order to get the international community to react,” she continued. “Otherwise nothing will be done, even though the central government has warned the extremists. Nevertheless, we are dealing here with the opposition party, which has many economic resources and many members trained to hate Christians,” she explained.

Sister Martinez pointed out that news of the death of a priest or nun in some part of India comes each day. “The Daughters of Charity are very protected by the Virgin Mary, even those who are in the north amidst the violence. We recognize that and we give thanks to God,” she said.

Case – 2: On August 25, 2008, India's Orissa state government has been accused of failing to take action against the perpetrators of the gang rape of a 28 year old Catholic nun.

India’s largest English daily, The Hindu reports the Orissa government has failed to take any action against those who committed the gang rape of the nun and the brutal attack on a Catholic priest who courageously resisted their attempts to force him to participate in the atrocity.

The incidents took place on August 25, 2008 at K. Nuagaon, 12 kilometres from the Baliguda subdivision in Kandhamal district in Orissa state in India. Both victims filed First Information Reports at the Baliguda police station. Sister Nirmala, Superior-General of the Missionaries of Charity, wrote to the Orissa Chief Minister and the Prime Minister specifying the atrocities.

The brutalisation of the nun and the priest by a mob raising anti-Christian, Hindutva slogans took place around 1pm at the site of the Divya Jyothi Pastor Centre.

The church was burnt the previous day in reprisal against the murder of an RSS activist, Lakshmanananda Saraswathi, and four of his associates on August 23 2008. The gang rape of the young nun, whose “virginity [was] grossly violated in public” took place in front of a police outpost with 12 policemen from the Orissa State Armed Police present and watching, according to Fr Thomas Chellan, the priest who was dragged out and badly beaten.

“Around 1:00 pm a gang came and pulled me and the Sister out of the house where we had taken shelter and started assaulting us,” Father Chellan told Indian newspaper The Hindu in a telephone interview from Kerala where he was recuperating.

“My appeals to the policemen who were standing nearby and watching only resulted in further beating. At one point the nun slipped away to plead with the police for help but she was dragged back by the mob and her blouse torn,” he said. The nun was gang raped in a nearby building, and he was doused with kerosene by the mob, which threatened to set him on fire. They were saved by a group of youth who took them to the police outpost where “one among the attackers was present with the police between 3pm and 9pm,” Father Chellan said.

News of the K-Nuagaon atrocity was conveyed through mobile phones to several priests and nuns hiding in the forests, fearing for their lives as the anti-Christian hunt was on. The victims were taken to the Baliguda police station around 9:00 pm where they filed First Information Reports.

Father Augustine Kanjamala is a Verbite clergyman who teaches at the University of Mumbai [India]. He appealed to the Churches of the world to “express their protest to the government of India” which has remained “inactive” with regards to anti-Christian violence. He openly charges the Orissa state government for its increasingly explicit collusion with the pogrom currently underway against the community of faithful.

According to Father Kanjamala a plan to cleanse Orissa of its Christian population has been in the making for years, especially in the district of Kandhamal [where most of the atrocities have taken place] where Christians now constitute around 5 per cent of the population. Conversions by, development for and emancipation of Tribals and Dalits are confronted by Hindutva conservatism.

“On 24 December 2007, while the Christians were getting ready to celebrate the birth of Lord Jesus Christ, Swami Laxmananda Saraswati, a member of a Hindu fundamentalist organization [Vishwa Hindu Parishad] and its supporters attacked and destroyed many churches and prayer centres. A large number of Christians were injured and made homeless in the communally sensitive district of Kandhmal, in Orissa state, eastern India.

Exactly eight months later, on 23 August 2008 when the same seer and the Hindu community were preparing to celebrate the birthday of Lord Krishna [Janmashtami] in Jalespata ashram [monastery], he and four of his disciples were gunned down by tribal revolutionary Maoists.

That it was a premeditated attack is evident from the fact that he was warned in advance and that government authorities were aware of it. A local TV Channel reported that the murderers left a note on the spot of the murder that this was a revenge killing for the last December attack on the Christians.

Hindus were quick to accuse the Church of masterminding the murder of their revered religious leader, who was in his 80s, rather than accept the government’s view that the attack had a Maoist origin and color.

A meeting of Hindu leaders took place on the following day in Rourkela, also known as Steel City, where a decision for an immediate and violent retaliation was taken. The total success of the dawn to dusk strike in Orissa on 25 August, 2008 is clear evidence of the shocking reaction. The simultaneous unleashing of violent attacks on 35 Christian centres in Orissa on the evening of 25 August further confirms that the plan was organized.

All bomb attacks were directed at Christians and their institutions. The rampaging mob, seeking revenge for the Guru’s murder, destroyed the pastoral centre of the archdiocese of Bhuvaneshwar with a bomb. A priest and a nun working there were beaten up, stripped and paraded naked in order to humiliate them. Four other priests were severely beaten—one suffered severe burns and is now in critical conditions in Burla Medical College, in the district of Sambalpur. The nun was also gang raped by the mob.

The mob also ransacked a church-run orphanage near Burgarh, and the caretaker, Ms. Rajni Maji, was set ablaze and burned to death. A large number of churches, prayer centres, convents, hospitals, dispensaries and vehicles were attacked and torched. Some nuns received warned by mobile phone and either ran into the jungle or escaped by jeep to the neighbouring state of Chattisgarh.

A few lay people lost their lives while thousands ran for theirs into the forests; more than 200 houses were set on fire.The radical Hindu mobs defied the curfew and forced everyone and everything to shut down, bringing life to a stand still and the state virtually to its knees. The official death toll of 20 reported by the controlled media is totally false.

With 40 per cent of the population made up of Tribals and Dalits [outcasts] Orissa is one of the most underdeveloped states in the country.The Kandhamal district, which has seen high levels of anti-Christian violence in the last decade, is also where a significant number of Christian conversions have taken place in the same period. As Dalits who embrace Christianity achieve socio-economic progress, many Tribals have followed them in that path in recent times. Thus while Orissa's Christian population is less than 2 per cent, the Christian population in the district doubled in the last decade to reach the 5 per cent mark.

In January 1999, the Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two young sons were burned to death by a mob led by one Dara Singh [convicted in 2003].Objecting to missionary activities, the murdered Hindu sage recently said: “The sooner Christians return to the Hindu fold the better it would be for the country.”

Orissa was the first state in the country that passed legislation against religious conversion in 1967, followed later by other states.

Another factor also generates opposition to Christians. It is becoming increasingly clear that where Christian missionaries operate, important social changes take place. People develop, acting and living with greater dignity. Thus, as a result of education, even basic education, Tribals and Dalits are no longer willing to be used as cheap labour in farming. Their sense of dignity and their education have given them the courage to protest against their exploitation and oppression. In addition to such changes over the past two generations, Tribals are now moving in great numbers to the big cities. In Mumbai alone there are some 100,000 young Tribals or Adivasi from Orissa, all working in domestic service or small industrial plants. It is obvious that these changes are transforming Orissa’s socio-economic structure.

There are series of allegations of rape of nuns by the fanatics Hindus in various parts of India. In most cases, those violated nuns do not speak of such brutality fearing social wrath. In some cases, nuns were viodegraphed while being raped, and such video tapes were sold in Indian market as well as in the Middle East by organized crime racket. Alluring titles such as ‘Raping virgin nun’ etc are given to such tapes and the crime racket are cashing millions by selling the sordid stories of the nuns in Christian missionaries.

Case – 3: Meena Lalita Barwa [29], a Roman Catholic nun was raped by a mob of fanatic Hindus in October 2008 and was paraded half-naked.

Sister Meena said that a mob of up to 50 men armed with sticks, axes, spades, crowbars, iron rods and sickles dragged her from the house where they were shelterin. One of the mob raped her, while two more held her down, and then a fourth tried to rape her again, before they paraded her, minus her blouse and underwear, along a road, she said.

When the crowd passed a group of a dozen policemen she begged for help, but they ignored her and talked in a “very friendly” manner to her attackers, she said. “State police failed to stop the crimes, failed to protect me from the attackers,” she said. “I was raped and I don't want to be victimise[d] by the Orissa police. God Bless India, God bless you all.”

Persecution of Ahmadiyya:

While some fanatic Islamists are demanding declaring Ahmadiyyas as ‘non Muslims’, persecution of this religious group is continuing mostly in Pakistan and Bangladesh, while state authorities are completely silent on this extremely serious matter. There are also reports of persecution of Ahmadiyyas in Malaysia, Indonesia and other Muslim nations.

Indonesian government barred the Ahmadiyyas from visiting Mecca to perform Haj. At West Nusa Tenggara in Indonesia, provincial administration imposed the ban a long time ago, but the matter was not publicly anounced.

In Bangladesh, dozens of Ahmadiyya mosques were attacked and destroyed by Muslim fanatics. BNP led Islamist coalition government in 2004 imposed ban on religious books of Ahmadiyyas and police raided various mosques of this religious minority group and ransacked those places with the excuse of searching for banned publications.

Rana Ata-ul Karim [36] was killed on 6 August 2009 in Multan, Pakistan. He was murdered simply for being an Ahmadi. Karim, a well educated agriculturist, left his home for a few minutes in the afternoon and returned to find that his wife had been locked in their bedroom by three young men who had entered his home. He was later shot 3 times and died on the spot. The assailants immediately fled the scene.

Ahmadiyyas are arguably the most vilified minority across the Islamic world. They are not considered Muslims by mainstream branches of the religion. Founded in the 1880s by a religious figure named Ghulam Ahmad, Ahmadis differ with the mainstream on the death and return of Jesus, the concept of jihad and, most controversially, the question of whether the Prophet Mohammad was the last messenger from Allah. Ghulam claimed to have received messages himself from god, making him a later prophet.

Pakistan is hardly alone in discriminating against Ahmadis. In Indonesia, where they are known as the Ahmadiyah, they have been terrorized regularly, with their places of worship attacked by fundamentalists and members being banned from taking part in the Haj in some parts of the country. Laws were passed in Indonesia last year restricting their activities and prohibiting them from proselytizing. In many parts of Kyrgistan, they have been told to cease worshiping.

The depredations in Pakistan have been particularly distressing. Since the mid 1980s, the Ahmadiyyas have been dying in droves. Some 104 have been murdered in targeted attacks or lynchings and 117 others have escaped murder attempts, according to the community’s records. Other forms of harassment are also common: mosques have been demolished, set on fire and forcibly occupied and Ahmadiyya corpses have been dug up from Muslim graveyards.

Persecution of Hindu:

In Bangladesh and Pakistan, Hindus are regularly repressed by the religious majorities. Hundreds of cases of rape take place every year, most of which fail to reach the attention of the media. There are also series of allegations of abduction and forceful convertion of Hindu females to Islam. In most cases, these Hindu females are abducted and raped to put pressure on them in converting to Islam thus marrying a Muslim man.

Such notoriety take place almost o a daily basis, mostly in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Grabbing Hindu properties is another phenomenon of great concern. Muslims with social or political links, grab the properties of the Hindus thus in many cases forcing them to leave the country and migrate to India. Several Hindu rich families were evicted from their properties, while there had been murders of Hindus by the influential Muslims in the locality to create panic in the minds of this religious minority group.

According to a figure, only in 2008, more than 10,000 Hindu women and girls were raped in various parts of Bangladesh. The total number of such brutality would be several folds higher, if the cases of such notoriety in Pakistan and other Muslim nations are taken into consideration.

A large number of Hindu temples were destroyed in Bangladesh and Pakistan during since the independence of India in 1947. Most of the governments in the Muslim nations consider Hindus as ‘second class citizen of the country’.

In Bangladesh, Muslim house-owners, while renting out homes to Hindu families, openly warn them to refrain from performing rituals every day. A Bangladeshi newspaper editor, who belongs to Hindu community said, he was instructed by his land-lord to refrain from blowing religious flute during their daily rituals.

Situation of religious minorities in most of the South Asian nations are truly volatile. This is becoming more complicated with the ongoing spread of religious hatred amongst the population, thus resulting in communal riot almost every year.

Government in the respective countries, as well members of the civil societies should surely look into this issue with due urgency, before things turn worst.

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